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A B S T R A  C T
The following study has as its purpose the desire 
to identify what qualities have become characteristic of the 
present day Italian Communist Party and to relate historically 
their ideological and political genesis during the years froir 
1911 to 1964. The former date represents the year when the 
two most important leaders of the party began their intellectual 
preparation for future political careers; the latter, the year 
the celebrated Yalta Memorandum was written by Palmiro Togliatti. 
It is hoped that this will contribute to an appreciation of 
the reasons why il Partito comunista italiano has succeeded in 
exercising a profound influence on all aspects of contemporary 
Italian national life and how it has attracted and retained 
the immense following it possesses among the Italian masses.
The desire also is to trace the origins of the party*s 
considerable reputation for intellectual competency to the 
ideological heritage left to it by Antonio Gramsci, one of the 
two great personalities of the party and the most eminent 
Marxist thinker produced in Italy during this century. Gramscirs 
thought is little known outside Italy. liven there, the greater 
part of his writings have been published posthumously only since 
the collapse of the Fascist regime which incarcerated him in 
order —  to use the public prosecutor*s words —  "to prevent 
this mind from operating for twenty years." It is impossible
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Vto overlook Gramsci's ideas when discussing Italian Communism 
because they pervade the thinking of all his successors.
Gramscifs Marxism is characterized not by a raono- 
phagous concentration on economics but rather by a profound 
attentiveness to the importance of culture and philosophy as 
both catalysts and media of social change. This has led the 
Italian Communist Party to place particular emphasis on the 
role of the intellectual in revolution. It was Gramsci*s view 
that, in any society the intelligentsia provides the rational 
shield for the existing socio-political-economic order. Remove 
the protective veneer provided by the "mandarinate" and society 
will be exposed to the corrosive effects of whatever new ideals 
the disaffected intelligentsia champion against the old order.
The importance it attached to the cultural aspect of 
political and social transformation caused the Italian Communist 
Party to adopt with reluctance any dogmatic ideological postures 
in charting its political course and it did so only when poli­
tical conditions made it imperative. Conversely, the party 
remained responsive to the exigencies of changing conditions in 
society which exacted political inaleability and ideological 
heterodoxy in adapting to them. The party was to experience 
many changes of fortunes from the time of its founding in 1921, 
but the quality briefly mentioned above remained a constant 
feature of Its political personality and in the end this was 
to prove to be its most valuable trait.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
vi
While subject of this paper has meant that the time span 
covered is necessarily quite long, what follows is not intended 
to be an exhaustive study of Italian Communism. A profile 
ought to be detailed enough to suggest the whole character of 
the subject it depicts but it cannot be, by its nature, a full 
length portrait.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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XINTRODUCTION
The threads of history which were spun together to 
form the Italian Communist Party can be seen today in the form 
of the bright red fibres woven into the political, economic, 
social and cultural fabric of contemporary Italy. This inter­
weaving is not a recent thing; it is the result of a painstaking 
process which took years to achieve. It began not just at the 
formation of the Italian Republic after WVtf II; but must be 
traced back to the time of the party’s own origins in 1921 and, 
earlier still when today’s reality was only a wild aspiration 
in the minds of a few men.
The circumstances under which the "Italian Section 
of The Communist International" was organized ought not to be 
disregarded for the truism that "the Child is Father to the Lian" 
can well be applied to politics. Thus it is important to look 
at the environment in which the Italian Communist Party was 
gestated to see what nurtured those characteristics which are 
discernible today in a party which is seeking to revitalize 
itself and reinsert itself into il sisterna of Italian politics.
The physical and ideological environment in which 
the growth of the party was fostered prior to its formal creation 
at Livorno in 1921.. was principally, but, by no means exclu­
sively, the city of Turin. The importance of this particular 
environment is stressed because it influenced very deeply the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
won who wore ho give il Part It o comunista italiano* its most 
enduring philosophical and political leadership. Above all, 
it worked upon the thought of Antonio Gramsci, the most subtle 
and profound theoretician ox Italian I'iarxism, and his colleagues 
Palmiro Togliatti, Umberto Terracini and Angelo Tasea, who were 
to collaborate with Gramsci in editing the weekly publication 
LTOrdine Nuovo.
Of this group, Togliatti was to become the best known 
Communist personality inside and outside of Italy because, 
from the time of Gramsci1s eventually fatal incarceration in 
1926, until his own death in 1964f il was he who led the PCI 
with grew, after World War II, to become the largest Communist 
Party in the West, During the Thirties, under the pseudonym 
Srcole Ercoli, Togliatti also held responsible positions in 
the Comintern and played an important role, as a leader of the 
Communists, in the Spanish Civil War. Today, Terracini heads 
the Communist group in the Italian Senate and, despite his 
fifteen years in Fascist prisons is still considered to have 
one of Italy*s more brilliant legal minds. Of the four original 
Ordinovisti only one, Tasca, was eventually to become estranged 
both from his colleagues and their party the PCI.
* For the sake of convenience the initials PCI will be used 
henceforth.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C H A P T ii A I
THd FORMATION OF THti
ITALIAN COMMUNIST P/UiTI
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The Setting
As capital of the region of Piedmont and as the 
seat of the House of Savoy, which became the national dynasty 
of Italy during the Risorgimento. Turin has held a prominent 
place in modern Italian political history. From the time of 
the Risorgimento. with perhaps more enduring effects, Turin 
has been a major protagonist in the economic development of 
the country and, as its political and economic importance 
increased, the city became a centre of Italian cultural life 
as well. Its university attracted some of the finest scholars 
in Italy to its faculties and it became one of the most impor­
tant in the country.
Piedmont, the northwesteramost region of the penin­
sula, has a character quite unlike Mediterranean and insular 
Italy. If the "boot” ware severed from Europe, Piedmont vrould 
be one of three Regions left entirely on the continent. It is 
differentiated not simply by geography or greater industrial 
advancement. The Piedmontese, who speak a dialect with strong 
and unmistakable French qualities, revealing their long detach­
ment from the mainstream of Italian history, are a rather sober, 
earnest, unartistic people with little of the supposed Southern 
Italian penchant for speculative dolce far niente. which Is 
not suited to their temperament. The role of the Piedmontese 
in modern Italian history has paralleled none so much
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2as that of the Prussians in Germany,
Like the neighbouring Lombards, they are an industrious 
people who, perhaps because of a less enervating climate, have 
applied themselves to affairs of business with more success 
than their southern compatriots. Under ambitious leadership 
in the later nineteenth century, (Cavour was Piedmontese), the 
region began to become industrialised and this process naturally 
took place in the cities, principally Turin, There, metallur­
gical industries, later to become associated with the making of 
automobiles, flourished particularly, and by the early twentieth 
century great industrial organizations such as Fiat2 became an 
enormously powerful force in the economic life of the city whose 
population came to depend so much on Fiat for its livelihood.
While the Piedmontese countryside remained poor, 
agrarian, and really quite backward, with little in the way of 
non-agricultural industry, the population of the Region as a 
whole did not grow very greatly. However, between 1901 and 1911, 
the population of industrial Turin was swelled by over 
through internal migration of provincial Piedmontese seeking 
more lucrative employment in the capital. These new Turinese 
became an urban industrial proletariat of almost classical
1. Vide Berard Wall, Italian Art, Life and Landscape. (London, 
1962), See Chapter 1 particularly.
2, The name is formed by the initials of the company’s full 
title, Fubbrica italiana automobili Torino.
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3Marxist description; wage-earning, unorganized and victims of 
the fluctuations of a developing capitalist economy. Industries 
were large, still largely controlled by individual capitalists 
(the Agnelli family in the case of Fiat), and rigorous ten or 
eleven hour, six-day work weeks were the rule for the workers 
who depended entirely on these factories for their livelihood.
These new workers were not all simply peasants 
transferred into the factories. Metallurgical industries 
required skilled tradesmen, while in 1912 there were some 
93,000 factory workers in Turin, some 30,000 were skilled.^
Class differences in the city were accentuated by the fact 
that those citizens who could have formed a substantial "whits 
collar" middle-class as government bureaucrats had long left 
Turin to follow the royal government to the new capital of 
united Italy, Florence, and later, home. As industry expanded 
with greater rapidity, a situation was created in which "Pro­
letarian" faced "Capitalist" with little middle ground.
It was in such a situation that Socialism was to 
find numerous adherents among workers who 3aw in it justifi­
cation for their claim to a greater share of the wealth they
3. John M. Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Qrdine Nuovo 
Movement: A Study in the Hise oi* Italian Communism.
(Columbia University, Faculty of Political Science, 1959), 
an unpublished doctoral dissertation, p. 27.
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4were producing.^" Since the turn of the century, Piedmont had 
been the second most important source of Socialist party strength 
(after Emilia-Romagna).^
As their sense of solidarity and of common interest 
developed the metallurgists started their first unions and by 
1911 began seriously to organise agitation for better working 
conditions and higher wages. During the grim winter of 1911 a 
strike was staged and for three months the determined Turinese 
workers held out for their demands. Cut their efforts were to 
meet complete, frustrating defeat.
In this same year Antonio Gramsci arrived in Turin 
to begin studies at the university. His own background could 
hardly have been more different from the Turinese environment 
which he was Just entering. As Piedmont was continental, 
European, industrial, progressive and dynamic, Gramsci’s 
native Sardinia was insular, Mediterranean, agrarian, backward 
and static and, for all that, perhaps more "Italian." He was
4 . Palmiro Togliatti, II nartito cociunista italiano. (Rome,
1961) p. 20.
Togliatti admits that the early spread of Socialism among 
the Turinese proletariat resembled a religious phenomenon 
as much as anything:
Among the masses. Socialist ideology took on an ele­
mentary, messianic character, but it was precisely 
this quality which allowed it to reach hundreds of 
thousands of workers who were being awakened for the 
first time to a political consciousness and thus it 
profoundly convinced them that, even under the most 
wretched conditions, they would win respect by their 
daily struggles and sacrifices to reaffirm their 
solidarity and strengthen their economic and political 
organizations.
5. Cammett, op. cit., p. 25 (Footnote)
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5born into a family of economically modest station* His father 
was employed as a clerk for the local office of the provincial 
government but this itself signified having an above average 
education for the time and place and all the Gramsci children 
grew up in a home where books circulated and where reading was 
encouraged* Antonio revealed himself to be a highly intelli­
gent child but as he grew older a serious physical handicap was 
to reveal itself. Gramsci greiy to be hunchbacked. His physical 
deformity bore as much weight as his evident intelligence when 
the decision was made to have him schooled despite the hardship 
involved for the family.
Even so, the future Marxist personally became 
acquainted, at a very young age, with the sternness of econo­
mic necessity which introduced him to labour ha could hardly 
perform physically. For two years, starting at the age of 
eleven, to contribute to the family income, Gramsci was working 
ten-hour days including Sunday mornings concerning which he 
was later to write: "I used to move about registry books which 
weighed more than I did and many nights I used to cry in 
hiding because my whole body ached.” 6
This early experience with hard economic reality 
left an indelible impression on an impressionable mind of the 
pitilessness of economic deprivation and its indifference to
6. Paolo Spriano, "Gramsci,” I prota^onisti della storia 
universale. {Milano, 19&5 )7p"*~~3V?
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6individual needs or the human capacity to satisfy them.
Luckily, Gramsci*s excellence in school permitted him compara­
tive mobility amidst the otherwise torpid and primitive 
pattern of Sardinian life. His introduction to the Italian 
intellectual world was to reveal to him the immense distance 
which separated the peasant masses from the intelligentsia 
and seeing that culture and learning was the one nexus between 
the two, Gramsci became acutely sensitive to the role and impor­
tance of the educated and cultivated in society. Another 
glaring contrast within Italian society was observed by Gramsci 
when he was exposed in Piedmont, to the existence of another 
Italy; an advanced industrial North, to which an agricultural 
and backward south was a stark contradiction. Despite half a 
century of unity, the two Regions did not seem to be part of 
the same country,
Gramsci was able to attend university upon winning 
one of several state scholarships for needy students in a 
rigorous competitive examination. Another successful candidate 
in the same competition wa3 a student of similar background, 
Palmiro Togliatti. The two young intellectuals met, became 
close friends and, as history would have it, the two outstanding 
figures in the Italian workers* movement. For the first two 
years at the university, both Gramsci and Togliatti immersed 
themselves in their studies of history, economics, languages, 
philosophy, philology and literature following the classical 
university curriculum.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7Two other students at the university at the same 
time, Umberto Terracini and Angelo Tasca also formed a friend­
ship with Gramsci and Togliatti and all four became part of 
the nucleus which was to have great significance for the future 
PCI. During these years before 1920, Turin University had 
enrolled a number of future Communist leaders including Luigi 
Longo and Mauro Scoccimarro as well as outstanding Liberals 
such as Piero Gobetti who became Gramsci*s counterpart as 
ideological ancestor of the radical Giustizia e Liberty anti- 
Fascist resistance movement and its heir the Partito d ,Azione. 
Gramsci and Gobetti also became close personal friends despite 
their ideological differences. All these early colleague- 
friends sincerely acknowledged Gramsci*s intellectual pre­
eminence.
If the proletariat of Turin was being drawn to 
Socialism for practical economic reasons, the young intellectuals 
of the city, such as Gramsci and Togliatti, Terracini and 
Tasca associated with the university, were coming to an intellec­
tual encounter with Marxism. It was not that the faculty of 
Turin University was bursting with Marxists. There were some 
who declared themselves to be of such orientation but Italy*s 
outstanding Marxists were to be found at Home or Naples. At 
Turin, many of the most distinguished professors, such as the 
economist, Luigi iiinaudi who was later to become the first 
constitutional president of the Italian Republic, were in fact
classical Liberals,
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8Nevertheless, students were exposed to vivid person­
alities such as that of the professor of German literature,
Arturo Farinelli from whom, Togliatti later was to recall, they 
learned:
a new morality...whose supreme laws were utter sincerity 
with ourselves, refusal of conventions and abnegation^for 
the cause for which we had consecrated our existence.-
The Turinese students arrived at Marxism by following
an exhaustive intellectual path, by way of Hegel and especially
by way of Italy’s most distinguished modern philosopher-historian
and virtual cultural dictator, Benedetto Croce. Croce and his
outstanding teacher, Antonio Labriola, both Neopolitans, were
Marxists although Croce’s early Marxism was but a passing
phase in his intellectual development (to Gramsci’s disapproval.)
As this exhilarating intellectual confrontation was occurring,
Gramsci and his friends were coming into personal contact with
the concrete problems of the working class:
In 1912, in 1913” wrote Togliatti, "at certain hours of 
the morning, when we left the classroom and went out from 
the corridors into the porticos heading toward the Po, we 
met crowds of men different from us, who were taking the 
same road. A whole crowd headed toward the river and 
toward the parks on its banks where in those days the wor­
kers held their meetings during strikes or holidays. And 
there we went, accompanying these men; we heard their 
speeches, .we spoke with them, we became interested in their
struggle.“
7, Togliatti, quoted by Cammet, op, cit., p. 16
8. Togliatti in Robert Wohl "Togliatti, Master of Maneuvra" 
Communist affairs. Vol. 1, No. 9, (Nov.-Dec. 1963) 21-26
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9Through the Socialist Youth Federation, to which they 
were introduced by Tasca who was already active in its ranks, 
they established their first formal links with the Socialist 
party. Thus, young workers and students came together and the 
experience was to affect both. The presence of the latter 
raised the intellectual level of the Section and their meeting 
with the former introduced the young intellectuals to the 
realities of proletarian Turin. Under the auspices of the 
Federation, the students organised and administered numerous 
mutual benefit societies and taught night courses to the keen 
workers whose intelligence, character and political conscious­
ness won their admiration.
This combination of serious theoretical study and 
practical party activity gave the energetic Marxists scholars 
an enthusiasm for their political commitment. During the day 
they debated theory at the university and, at night, would con­
tinue their activities at the Federation:
We often left the party meetings in a group surrounding 
whoever happened to be our loader, Gramsci wrote, We 
continued our discussions through the streets of the by 
now silent city while the few late goers stopped to watch 
us, amazed at our ferocious propositions, our explosive 
laughter, our sorties into the realm of dreams and the 
impossible...For us the future tvould be a perfect alloy 
between the old...and over cautious socialism...and the 
new socialism full of moral and revolutionary energy in 
which there was not a party and a Proletariat but a single 
mass rapidly moving toward a goal which at certain moments 
we believed so near and imminent.°
9. Cammett, op. clt.. p. 32, quote of Antonio Gramsci
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Gramsci*s political activities were to absorb his attention 
Increasingly. He left university without taking his degree 
for despite his promising career as a philological scholar 
he grew dissatisfied with the university*s "isolation" which 
prevented him from taking a more active part in the European 
drama which daily was coraing closer to a climax.
The year was 1915. Europe was at war and European 
Socialism had collapsed in humiliation as national parties 
abandoned Internationalism to support national war efforts.
In Britain and France Socialists even entered the government. 
In Italy only did Socialists, reflecting general public 
feeling, oppose the war consistently: when Italy did enter
on the side of the Allies the Socialists unofficially split 
and compromised on a "neutral" formula of "neither support nor 
sabotage." It was a compromise which merely papered over the 
differences between the "reformist" Right and "revolutionary" 
Left-wings of the party which had been living in an uneasy 
menage since the turn of the century and which were becoming 
increasingly alienated from each other. The sentiments of the 
politically conscious Turin workers, however, were clearly 
and most decidedly anti-war. Four days before Italy entered 
the war the workers of that city staged a general strike in 
resentment and protest against impending Italian intervention.
It was in this charged atmosphere that Gramsci 
committed himself completely to journalism and party work.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Because of his poor physical condition he wa3 exempted from 
military service, but many Turin Socialists were conscripted 
and Gramsci consequently rose in the party to take increas­
ingly responsible positions. During this period his 
incipient elaborations of theory began to acquire greater 
articulation.
Up to now the impression given has been that 
Gramsci and the ’'Piedmontese" Communists were the princi­
pal movers in the founding of the PCI. This is misleading. 
It is certainly true that they wore to emerge triumphant 
and form the leadership and that Gramsci*a ideas were to 
hold sway, but this was not settled until 1926. Until then, 
the dominant figure of the future party was the young Neo- 
politan engineer, Amadoo Bordiga.
Bordiga was a revolutionary thinker of consider­
able stature but neither he nor his faction, though more 
politically energetic, were as subtle or as theoretically 
exhaustive as the Turin colleagues. While he remained 
within the Socialist party, Bordiga was leader of the 
radical Left-wing known as the Abstentionists. This group 
identified itself with one of the three rival groups in the 
Second International which had formed on the eve of World
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Bordiga’s views at this time were very close to 
Lenin’s. Indeed, at about the same time Lenin was formulating 
his ideas on the imperialist nature of the war in Zurich, 
Bordiga was arriving independently at the similar conclusions 
in a series of articles written during the winter of 1914-15 
and published in Avanti. the Socialist daily. (At this time 
Gramsci became editor of its Turin edition.)
Once Italy’s entry into the war was an established 
fact the Reformist Socialist Right-wing, whose strength lay 
in the parliamentary group led by Filippo Turati, was not long 
in approaching "defensist11 postures and giving its blessing 
to the Italian war effort. V.hile the wavering Left, still in
1G, The three factions in the International were split on 
doctrinal issues concerning the position Socialists 
should a33umo in relation to their national participa­
tion in the War.
(a) The Defonsists (mainly French and German) maintained 
the right of' a state to defend itself from external 
attack.
(b) The Left wing (led by Lenin and Rosa Luxembourg) 
stressed therevolutionary possibilities caused by the 
critical situation and urged action by the Socialists 
to promote overthrow of their governments.
(c) The Pacifists rejected the proposition that "defen­
sive wars" were legitimate and rejected the idea that 
revolution was more necessary than peace.
(For a fuller discussion of how this division was related 
to the PSI soe Donald Vi. Urquidi, The Origins of the Italian 
Communist Party 191&-1921, (Columbia University, Faculty 
of Political Science, 19u2), an unpublished doctoral dis­
sertation. See Introduction particularly.)
See also Carl Landauer, iiiuropean Socialism. (Berkeley, 1959), 
Vol. 1, Chapter 17
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
formal control of the party machine, stuck to the original 
neutralist formula, Bordiga, speaking for the radical Absten­
tionists, was preparing the ground for the inevitable split.
The Abstentionists essentially took the following 
positions: As long as Capitalism was solidly entrenched, the
most fruitful Socialist tactics could only consist of propagan­
dizing, recruitment, criticism and vigorous verbal opposition 
to the dominant class in control. But such tactics had become 
obsolete. In a period of revolutionary crisis in which the 
breaking point between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat had been 
reached, the proletarian party must push for the violent over­
throw of bourgeois domination.
The issue was one of updating old policies to fit 
new conditions. The arguments which were to rage within the 
Socialist party concerned just this: was today really different
from yesterday? Did conditions demand new attitudes, new 
policies? The Abstentionists answered an emphatic yes. The 
war had undeniably thrown the world into crisis. Europe and 
Italy had surely entered into a phase of imminent revolution, 
and, if the time for revolution was ripe, the proletarians 
must indeed unite and prepare for it. There was no longer 
time for class collaboration. It was, above all, wrong to join 
a bourgeois parliament or a bourgeois cabinet. These only 
corrupted Socialist deputies. The behaviour of European 
Socialists in the face of World War I had proved this. And
Socialists in the government proved to be window dressing to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ukeep the working-class quiet while important decisions were 
still being made by conservatives.
Parliaments only smothered revolutionary intransi­
gence in the illusion that Socialist participation in govern­
ment meant the working-class was sharing in power while real 
power was still exercised by the police, the army and the 
courts. The Abstentionists insisted that those Right-wing 
elements in the Socialist party who had become collaborators
be expelled and wanted the party transformed into a militant,
11disciplined revolutionary party.
By then external events were weighing heavily on 
Italian events. The civilian populations of Europe were 
smouldering in bitterness and discontent over the human suffer­
ing the war was causing and resented it all the more since 
they felt it was a useless war for them. This was no less 
true in Turin than elsewhere. It was 1917 and the March 
Revolution had already taken place in Czarist Russia.
There was no bread in Turin and other staples were 
extremely scarce but the factory workers were subjected to 
rigid work discipline under the surveillance of a government 
supervisor. The Kienthal and Zimmerwald manifestos calling 
for peace, of which Lenin was a leading signer, were well cir­
culated among proletarians in the city who sympathized with
11. Urquidi, op. cit.. p. 2b-37
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their resolutions. Finally, at the end of August, 1917 the 
eruption occurred. For five days the Turinese workers raised 
the barricades in a spontaneous, unled insurrection which was 
to become one of the most bloody events in the history of 
Italian labour. Despite the armed support of some sympathetic 
Alpine troops, the uprising ended in defeat.
Suppression was not easy. Some fifty were killed, 
two thousand were wounded and thousands of workers were
12arrested and sent to the front, ironically to Caporetto. 
Socialist leaders of all levels were subsequently imprisoned 
and in the vacuum the relatively unknown Gramsci became provi­
sional secretary of the Turin Section of the party. The Left- 
wing of the party seemed vindicated and it accused the previous 
Turin leaders, who were largely Reformists, of not having had 
the courage to channel the resentments of the workers into a 
more effective protest with less tragic results.
After Caporetto, the parliamentary Right-wing became 
openly Defensist while the Left, in disgust, called for a 
national conference to coordinate its own action in the face 
of this clear rupture over strategy. On November lb, 1917 some 
forty delegates gathered in Florence and for the first time 
Antonio Gramsci and Amadeo Bordiga were to meet. Gramsci and
12, It has been stated that the collapse of the front at
Caporetto which took place in October 1917 was due partly 
to the defeatism and low morale of the soldiers sent to 
this front. {Footnote in Cammett, p. 53)
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Bordiga spoke for the extreme Left while Giacinto Menotti 
derrati and Costantino Lazzari dominated the more numerous 
Massimalisti.^  trying to steer a middle course* The former 
urged expulsion of the Right and abandonment of the official 
but now meaningless neutralist position of the party with 
regard to the war effort in order to organize for the revolu­
tion. The final declaration of the meeting, however, was 
less radical and, while condemning the Right’s support of the 
war, limited itself to reaffirming the principles of the 
Zimraerwald and Kienthal meetings.
Once the de facto split existed, every new issue
only served to sharpen divisions. The Bolshevik revolution
became the issue of greatest consequence to face the now dis­
united PSX, While the revolution evoked widespread sympathy 
in the whole party, especially among the Maximalists and 
Abstentionists,^*" it was the latter which was most heartened
13. This term refers to that section of the party which pushed 
for implementation of the maximum programme of the party 
as opposed to the Right wing "gradualist3."
14* In December Lazzari, who was a principal Maximalist spokes­
man of the PSI, circulated a note stating: "All should
follow with confidence the developments in Russia where, 
thanks to our comrades, peace and socialism are being 
achieved."
Quoted by Aldo Garosci "The Italian Communist Party" in 
Communism in Western Europe, (Ithaca (NX), 1951), Mario 
Einaudi (Ed.) p. 156
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by the Bolshevik success and fully identified itself with the 
Bolsheviks.
Reaction to the setting
Gramsci hailed the October revolution because it 
proved that Marxist laws were not rigid. The revolution could 
be carried out where there was a revolutionary will and it was 
thus not necessary for Socialists to sit on their hands until 
immutable economic laws developed conditions for Socialism, 
at the Right was pedantically arguing* Gramsci did not deny 
the tenet that Socialism depended upon industrialization to 
function properly but he emphatically denied that mature, 
fully-developed industrialization was an essential pre-condi­
tion or that full capitalism had to pass before the socialist 
transformation could take place. Revolutionaries could create 
revolutions. This emphasis on will, revolutionary conscious­
ness, and action characterizes all of Gramsci*s thought.
Soon after the Bolshevik overthrow in Russia, Gramsci, 
Ta3ca, Togliatti and Terraclni foundod L*Ordino Huoyo in Turin. -^5 
This weekly journal which first appeared on May 1, 1919 became
15. At about the same time Bordiga was publishing his ideas 
in the journal 11 Soviet published in Naples.
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the most Important organ of Italiam Communism. It was to be 
a journal of Marxist theory and Socialist culture, according 
to the young editors, but its most important contribution 
was to be the elaboration of the theory of creating a new 
state and a new proletarian civilization based upon a new
■I £
representative institution, the factory council.
Ordine Nuovo was convinced that the creation of
the Soviets, which Italian Socialists were then hearing about 
increasingly, had a value beyond the Russian situation. It 
sought In Italy an indigenous ’'germ” of this proletarian 
institution which was comparable to the Soviets in nature 
and could confirm a universal validity beyond the Russian 
situation to show that the Soviets were the natural form for 
proletarian self-government. Gramsci felt that the Soviets, 
by any name, were the concrete expression of the latent ten­
dencies for emancipation already existing in the revolutionary 
consciousness of the proletarian masses. Theorizing from the 
real situation he was most familiar with, Gramsci was not 
incorrect. In Turin, the germ of the Soviets had, in fact, 
existed since 1906. The Internal Factory Commissions had been 
created to hear workers’ complaints to Management and to 
settle disputes concerned with labour conditions. During the 
War their importance grew notably and they became the single
16, Consigli di fabbrica
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instrument for exerting pressure on Management since strikes 
were outlawed.
In Marxist terms, by which the contradiction of the 
existing state structure exists latent within itself and 
hastens collapse of the old structure, Gramsci and the "Ordino- 
visti" saw in the Factory Commissions the embryo of the new 
Socialist state, the kernel of worker self-government* Since 
the factory was the source of modern economic power, and the 
political superstructures of all societies were a reflection 
of the productive nature of the economic base, Communist 
society would necessarily rest upon the factory and therefore 
the political structure of this society had to be based in 
the factory also. The factory would be to the socialist 
worker what the constituency was to the bourgeois voter,
This emphasis on the factory council was not merely 
an aping of the Russian experience. It came from a Marxist 
conviction that this was the most suitable instrument by which 
the working class would create a new Socialist state. The 
real revolution, in Gramsci*s theory, did not consist simply 
in toppling a bourgeois government. It was a process of 
replacing the entire capitalist system with a "New Order."
As Gramsci*s theory developed in Ordine Nuovo a doctrine
17. It should be noted that until 1913 the franchise in 
Italy was restricted to a minority of the population, 
about 2% of adult males.
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•unfolded which sought to justify concentration on the factory
1 ficouncil. It was based on three basic positions.
A principal consideration was the conviction that 
traditional organs which spoke for tho working class, that 
is, unions and the political party, were not and could not 
be revolutionary in the sense that Gramsci took revolution 
to mean. Both of these organs were not directly or permanently 
connected with the workers. The Party was able to reach the 
worker imperfectly, by periodic local or mass meetings or 
more continuously by the press. It could not assimilate the 
whole working class and train It for its future tasks. Nor 
was this its proper function. The Party must remain the organ 
of the vanguard of the working class, keeping its attention 
fixed to broad general problems and the planning of strategy. 
The trade unions were also imperfect for they spoke for mem­
bers of specific trades and were organized to achieve limited 
goals: higher wages, fewer hours, better working conditions.
Unions necessarily treated the worker as did the Capitalist, 
as a commodity to be bought and sold for a price to be bar­
gained for.
18. For a more complete discussion of the Ordine Nuovo pro­
gramme see Urquidi, op. cit., pp, 41-51; Cammett, op. cit. 
pp. 60-113
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Gramsci emphatically rejected the notion that the 
worker was a commodity. The worker himself had to reject this 
view and see himself as the essential active component of the 
economy, of society. He must see himself not as just another 
wage earner but as the producer of wealth, not for the capi­
talist, but for himself and for his fellow man.
According to this analysis, neither the Party nor 
the Union could be considered to be the latent anti-thesis 
to the capitalist system. Both wore creatures of Capitalism. 
The Party was molded by the bourgeois institutions in which 
it participated. It faced the danger of becoming a reformist 
body merely seeking concessions for the workers within the 
capitalist system without seeking fundamentally to change it. 
The Unions for their part were defective because they could 
only 3eek to compete with the entrenched capitalist; they 
could not remove him.
Another major assumption was that since real poli­
tical power in Marxist terms is ultimately derived from 
economic control and ownership, the Proletariat must not be 
diverted or distracted from gaining control of the means of 
production merely to chase after the state instruments 
exercised to protect that control. The real revolution would 
take place in the factory. The worker must gain real 
managerial control there. Industrial sophistication had 
diminished the importance of the Capitalist:
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The captain of industry has become the cavaliere 
d*industria hidden in the banks, salons, stock exchanges, 
and ministerial and parliamentary corridors. The owner 
of capital has become a dry branch in the field of pro­
duction. Since he is no longer indispensable— since his 
historical functions have atrophied— he has become a mere 
agent of the police. He puts his interests immediately 
into the hands of the state which will ruthlessly defend 
them. *
Once the workers controlled the factories the capi-
20talist grip would weaken until it was forced to lose hold.
This persuasion led finally to the assumption that 
the taking of power would be a continuing process. Revolution 
had not merely to be provoked, its success had to be guaranteed 
and since the protagonists of the revolution would be the 
workers it was they who had to prepare themselves culturally 
to build and run the new socialist state they would create 
once power was achieved. This carried the implication of 
mas3 participation in the social and economic revolutionary 
process. And, since neither the Party nor the Unions could 
bring this about it was the Factory Council which became the 
perfect organ for this participation. Membership would be 
general and universal and based not exclusively on trade union 
membership or party militancy but on basic membership in the
19. Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit. p. 83
20. One might be led to assume from this that Gramsci was not
terribly concerned about the capitalist '’superstructure."
On the contrary, this very thing was Gramsci*s most con­
suming interest. The emphasis on worker control of industry 
was made in the conviction that once this was an established
fact it would form the economic basis of the new proletarian
civilization or superstructure and that this control was the 
essential condition for it.
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labouring masses. The Internal Factory Commissions therefore 
■would have to be transformed from agencies dealing only with 
conditions of work and wages into instruments for gaining con­
trol over the actual management of factories.
The Ordina Muovo articles continued to elaborate 
upon the programme and organisation of the Factory Councils 
in great detail but the Ordinovisti did little to organize a 
Leninist type of party or even a Communist faction in the PSI. 
Bordiga was taking care of that problem. In Turin, however, 
a young Bordighist Fiat worker, Giovanni Parodi, active in 
the Socialist Youth Federation, did much to spread Ordine Nuovo 
ideas among the workers in the city’s factories. Factory 
Councils soon formed so that by 1920 more than 150,000 workers 
were organised in the Italian "soviets."
Committed as it was to the concept of the Factory 
Council, Ordine EJuovo became as dedicated to the inescapable 
task of raising the cultural level of the proletariat to prepare 
it for its difficult new responsibilities. In substance 
Gramsci insisted upon the need for creating a new proletarian 
intelligentsia, of forming intellectuals from the working 
class, a recurronca of h±3 own exparienco. But their education 
must not be arid and isolated, merely literary or traditionally 
academic. It must relate to life and have a scientific com­
petence related to industrial society. Learning, too, is work
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and the working class must realize that:
...it is in their interest to submit themselves to a 
permanent discipline of culture, to develop a concep­
tion of the world and the complex and intricate system 
of human relations, economic and spiritual, which give 
form to the social life of the globe.
The Turin environment in which a modern efficient and
technological, industrial society was developing found an echo
in the emphasis of Ordine Nuovo on the role of the worker as
producer in a simultaneously social-economic arrangement:
The more the proletarian is specialized in a professional 
act, the more he feels the indispensability of his com­
rades, the more ha thinks of himself as a cell of an 
organized body..., (then) the he feels the need for
order, method (and) precision.
Consequent to this, the worker-producer would con­
ceive of society as a whole as "one immense factory organized 
with the same precision, method and order which he sees as 
vital in the factory where he works."23 Gramsci*s attention 
to this problem was fervent in the belief that:
For the proletarian it is a duty not to be ignorant. 
Socialist civilization, without the privileges of caste 
and class, to be fully realized, demands that all citizens 
know how to supervise what their spokesmen decide and do. 
The problem of the education of the proletariat is the 
problem of freedom. ^
21. Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit., p. 89. See also Antonio
Gramsci, "In Search of Education" Hew Left Review. No. 32,
(July-August 1965), pp. 53-63
22. Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit., p. 84
23. Ibid.
24. Gramsci in Spriano, op. cit.. p. 373
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Gramsci did not escape criticism, for his idea3 were
difficult, not easy to grasp, especially for workers who did
not have his erudition. But he insisted that a question which
was basically difficult should not, nor could be watered down
or reduced to neat, uncomplicated rudimentaries to make it
more accessible to the workers. Too much was at stake:
To be easy we ivould have had to misrepresent and impoverish 
the debate which extends onto concepts of the greatest 
importance, onto the most intimate principles of our 
spirit. A concept which is per 3e difficult cannot be 
made easy in the expressing of it without its becoming 
vulgar.25
And, instead of diluting the quality of his arguments, Gramsci 
and his colleagues on Ordine Nuovo, aided by some professors 
from the university, organized schools for workers to raise 
them up to the level of the debate.
Gramscl’s insistence that the Proletariat achieve 
economic, technological and intellectual superiority was related 
to another, much broader, more complicated problem. While 
Turin absorbed Gramsci*s attention for its industrial advance­
ment and for the militancy of its working class, he was not 
blind to the larger problems of Italian society as a whole.
His Sardinian origins remained a vivid memory for Gramsci and 
he was to devote much study to the ‘‘questione del Mezzogiorno,” 
the southern issue, especially during his long incarceration.
25. Ibid-
I ■: - . r „
■ - I T
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And because Italy remained overwhelmingly agrarian, outside 
of the industrial islands of the North, the southern problem 
was connected to the whole of Italy’s socio-economic structure 
and was one of the greatest problems that would face the 
Italian revolution.
Gramsci viewed the peasantry and specifically the 
southern peasantry tolling on the great "latifondi" as a vast 
submerged mass whose economic, social and political aspira­
tions were constantly frustrated and rendered impotent by the 
amorphous, undirected, usually violent manner in which they 
were vented. This grew out of the traditional social establish­
ment of the South. Roosting above the unschooled masses was 
the class of the rural petty- and middle-bourgooisie and Its 
intelligentsia and lording over the whole were the great land­
owners and the small elite of great intellectuals. Traditionally, 
the political agents of the peasant masses were members of the 
rural middle-class intelligentsia but it was the great land­
owners and the great intellectuals who really channelled and 
directed the activity, political in one case, ideological in 
the other, of these deputies.
The peasantry, especially the vast, illiterate dis­
inherited mass had however to be convinced that their real 
interests lay in an alliance with the urban proletariat and 
that their emancipation from nearly feudal conditions depended 
on the success of the proletariat in achieving its aims. If
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the latter could win power it would use it to attack and over­
throw the rigid rural hierarchy lifting it from the shoulders 
of the overburdened but inarticulate peasantry*
For just as the peasants needed the industrial worker* 
the latter needed the peasantry. Cities had to be fed* But, 
for Gramsci, the solution to the peasant*s problems could not 
end at the division of land into small individual plots* The 
peasants would bring with them nothing but antiquated, ineffi­
cient and unproductive habits of cultivation. And to modernize 
agriculture required investment capital which peasants did not 
have. In agriculture, as in industry, progress could only 
emerge from constructive planning for efficient collective 
effort administered by peasant councils through which the 
awakened peasantry would participate in self-government.
But the majority of "gradualist" Socialist leaders 
failed to tackle the problem of the countryside, preferring to 
view everything through rigid Marxist economic formulae. The 
frequent violent rumblings unsettling the agrarian South were 
not recognised as the ideal opportunity to detach the peasantry 
from Its faith in its reactionary leadership. Instead, the 
traditionally conservative peasantry was allowed to flock to 
the clerical Populist Party, forerunner of the Christian 
Democrats. And those who could prod the "contadlni" into an 
awakening chose not to.
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Gramsci inculpated principally the great intellec­
tuals such as Croce, {who was the independently wealthy son of 
great Southern landowners) for this state of affairs.26 By 
rationalizing and defending the status quo to the parsons who 
spoke for the peasantry, these great intellectuals bound the
26. In this ethical search...for a new quality of life under 
socialism...Croce?s name recurs constantly in Gramsci,s 
writings. And the relationship is one of mixed respect 
and blame. Gramsci was fond of comparing Marxism to the 
Protestant Reformation or the Enlightenment of the eighteenth 
century. Like them he argued, it had the function of 
creating a "new integrated culture" of a "mass character." 
Hence it "did not matter” that it was originally based 
on "mediocre philosophical works.” The Marxist writings 
that would have the "classical characteristics of Greek 
and Renaissance culture" would come later. Meantime,
Gramsci argued, in his role as a highly educated leader 
of European thought, Croce was wrong to turn his back on 
Marxism. He was behaving like Erasmus and the other 
Renaissance humanists who were repelled by Luther’s 
crudities. Impatient for an immediate refinement of 
thought, Croce refused to recognize a new culture in 
embryo: he forgot that it had taken German Protestantism
three centuries to produce a Hegel...by viewing Marxist 
philosophy as a mere "parenthesis" in his intellectual 
life Croce had blinded himself to the potential importance 
of his own thought in the culture of the future (and) he 
had denied himself a truly popular influence. For the 
wider strata of the population, Gramsci reasoned, the 
Crocean philosophy held the promise of raising the 
intellectual level of twentieth century Marxism in the 
same fashion in which Hegelianism had given to the doc­
trine its original philosophical categories.
This brief summary of part of Gramsci*s ”11 materialising 
storico e la filosofia di Benedetto Croce" is contained in 
H, Stuart Hughes* Consciousness and Society The Reconstruc­
tion of European Social thought 1896-1930. (New York. 1961), 
p. 103-4
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peasant to his helpless subordination to the great landowners.
It became, therefore:
...important and useful that within the mass of intel­
lectuals...a left tendency be formed..., oriented toward 
the revolutionary proletariat. The alliance between the 
proletariat and the peasant masses requires this formation. 
The alliance between the proletariat and the peasant masses 
of the South needs it even more. The proletariat will 
destroy the southern agrarian bloc in the measure in 
which its party succeeds in organizing larger and larger 
masses of poor peasants into autonomous and independent 
formations, however, its success in this necessary task 
is dependent upon its capacity to dissolve the intellec­
tual bloc which is the flexible but highly resistant 
armour of the agrarian bloc.*7
Gramsci was sure that the intellectuals could be won over and
would throw in their lot with the cause of the proletarians.
If bourgeois society could be deprived of its man­
darins who spoke on its behalf, praising it, defending it and 
protecting its institutions, it would be left exposed to the 
corrosive Influence of new views concerning "the good society,” 
When a social structure commands no confidence from its members 
it evokes no enthusiasm for its perpetuation. If it tottered, 
the response would be apathetic and indifferent. And, while it 
was in crisis, while It crumbled, if there existed within this 
old society a vital well articulated challenge to the status 
quo, this new rival opposition could enlist the disaffected 
majority of the population who found its programme valid 
enough to tilt the balance of social forces to the side of the
27* Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit. p. 21+2
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innovators. This new grouping would form a "hegemony" within 
the civic institutions of society, its schools, its political 
groupings, its cultural movements, literature, the arts, 
theatre, even the Church, so that only the persistence of the 
coercive political apparatus of the old ruling establishment—  
the courts, police, army and bureaucracy— existing beyond its 
valid time, would prevent the assumption of power by this 
renovating movement.
For Gramsci the State was the "apparatus of hegemony,0 
This was orthodox Marxism for it did not negate the class nature 
of the state nor conceal its repressive potential. Within 
political society Gramsci perceived two aspects of power, one 
was managerial power (direaione), the other, ruling power 
{dominlo}. Since the State as superstructure reflected its 
economic understructure, a social group had to exercise manage­
ment power over the economy before it could rule politically. 
Moreover, once it exercised political rule, or dominio. it .had 
to continue to exercise the managerial function or direzione.
For State hegemony was in fact the unity of the two. If this 
unity broke, or crumbled, the State structure was placed in 
crisis.
There was a further elaboration in Gramsci1s theory
28. See Luciano Gruppi, nLa tesi di Lenin e di Engels sullo 
Stato" Rinascita. (Rome.) Ho. 30, Anno 21, {July 25, 1964)
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which concerns the nature of popular consent to being ruled.
There v3re two "momenta” to consent. One was:
...the ’spontaneous* consent given by the great masses 
of the population to the direction impressed upon social 
life by the fundamental ruling group, a consent which 
arises •historically’ from the prestige (and hence from 
the faith) resultant to the ruling group from its posi­
tion and function in tho world of production.^
The second source of consent is:
...the apparatus of state coercion which assures •legally* 
the discipline of those groups which do not ’consent* 
either actively or passively, but is established for all 
of society in the expectation of times of crisis in rule 
and management in which the spontaneous consent diminishes.^
Hence, from this stemmed the crucial importance of 
winning over the intellectuals as well as raising the Prole­
tariat to tho cultural level it would require during the 
"time of crisis" in order to build its moral and intellectual 
hegemony. And amid the ruins of World War I the time of crisis 
seemed to have arrived all over burope.
These ideas, presented here in fragmentary summaries, 
form the core of Grarosci’s entire intellectual achievement, 
which ha3 been described as the "most subtle and original” of 
twentieth century Marxist thought.-*1 Indisputably, one of 
Gramsci’s bequests to Italian Communism has been a tradition 
of sincere intellectual openness toward problems arising from
29. Gruppi, p* 28
CO. Ibid.
31. Hughes, op. cit., p. 99
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the complexity of social relationships and a profound respect 
for the position of the leaders of thought whose analyses 
must produce some valid contribution to the solution of the 
problems.
This tradition has formed one of the two dominant 
qualities of Italian Communism. Gramscifs ideas were not lost 
to his heirs, particularly his younger friend and colleague, 
Togliatti, who has himself, however, been accused of exploiting 
the Gramsci "myth" to conceal his own (and the PCI's) intel­
lectual intolerance to dissent. Yet, recently, an Austrian 
Communist who knew Togliatti in Moscow in 1935 recalled how 
the latter, upon learning that he like many knew next to 
nothing about either Gramsci the man or his ideas, lamented:
Unfortunately you are not the only one who knows little 
or nothing about Gramsci. Gramsci is one of the major 
Marxist thinkers of our time. I do not exaggerate in 
placing him, for the originality of his thought, next 
to Lenin. We Italians are reproached for a tendency 
toward vainness. Yet we have been less effective than 
other nations in making known what we have achieved in 
the elaboration of theory. When the historical-philo­
sophical works of Gramsci are translated, the fullness 
and profundity of his thought will be a surprise, 
Social-democracy has flattened out Marxism reducing 
it to a mere economism,,.Gramsci knew how to avoid 
this defect. He arrived at it through the study of 
philosophy: Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Hegel, Marx.
From Marxism he was able to cull its philosophical 
substance.•.No one before Gramsci underlined with as 
much conviction the importance of intellectuals in 
the formation of a nation. Certainly he did not 
idealize the intellectual, but he refused every 
form of anti-intellactualism. Discussions were not
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lacking between him and mo. But what a great man* what 
a precursor, what a teacher Antonio Gramsci wasH
Such are the ideas which, perhaps still inchoate,
were circulating and argued over in the editorial offices of
Ordine Uuovo. in the local organs of the Socialist party, within
the party as a whole, during lectures in the workers* schools,
32, Ernst Fisher, MUn debito di gratitudine” XI Contgmporaneo- 
Rinascita. (Rome) No. 34, Anno 22, (28 August, 19&5), P* 10
33* Earlier in the same article, Fisher recalled Togliatti*s
comments on the situation of intellectuals in some parties. 
They bear recording for their "Gramscian” tone:
The anti-intellectualisra which prevails in some communist 
parties, has nothing at all to do with bolshevization and 
does no good for the working class. We communist intel­
lectuals must overcome our own one-sidedness, we must know 
how to remain intellectual, as Hegel says. We must not 
strike poses in front of proletarians, we must not speak 
to workers in a manner differing from that which we use 
with other adult human beings, and at the same time we 
mu3t continuously improve ourselves through practical work, 
through action, through organizational activity. The work 
table must not be transformed into a wall between U3 and 
living beings. Not all books are worth reading but every 
human being deserves that one speak with him, that one 
listen to his opinions, that one promote his best qualities, 
that one find for him an activity through which he can 
express the best in himself. V»Te must continuously re­
establish in ourselves the balance between the intellectual 
and the man of action, between the individual who reads, 
who writes, who gives shape to his preparation in theory 
and the organizer who takes part in the organization, 
between the individual who brings to his thinking visions 
of the future and the man who works for the future: only
in this way can one train the party as a whole to achieve 
an analagous balance. If the communist intellectual 
neglects this duty, within a short time, the party will be 
managed only by the organizers, by party regulars and by 
tacticians which cannot bring about much good.
Ibid
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in tho unions and in the factories of Turin. And in the 
immediate post-war atmosphere these ideas attracted attention 
for their seeming relevance to tho situation in Italy and 
Europe.
The air soerned charged with the threat of revolution. 
Left-wing European Socialists were filled with hope by Laninas 
success in Russia and were poised to spread the revolution 
westward. The Great War had banished forever the 3erene com­
placency of pre-war bourgeois capitalist regimes. Their 
monument: thirteen million dead, twenty million wounded or
maimed, three proud empires crumbled, fearful devastation and 
suffering wherever armies had marched. Among the civilian 
populations in Central and Eastern Europe, exhausted and 
starving, epidemics of typhus, cholera and influensa claimed 
millions. And over the vrhole continent the weary demoralized 
and frustrated mass of common people were not prepared merely 
to restore with meelc docility the status quo of social privi­
lege and economic discrimination.
In Berlin, Bavaria and Hungary proletarian insurrec­
tions tried and almost succeeded in demolishing the 3haken 
capitalist structures, leaving the Bourgeoisie terrified of the 
Red peril. Indeed, the Bolsheviks were counting upon European 
successes to support the besieged revolution in Russia and to 
make the communist movement solidly international with a firm 
industrial basis in Europe which could be complimented by
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agrarian Russia and vies versa. Rut European Socialists were 
not united in support of the Bolshevik programme. Some were 
hopelessly ’'Opportunist*' and "Reformist,” others were unable 
to carry verbal violence over into action. Lenin decided in 
1919, to create a new alliance of Socialists, in a Third or 
Communist International where they could be coordinated and 
encouraged to act.
In March 1919 it was created, but by the summer of 
1920 it became clear that the spontaneous revolutionary move­
ments in Central Europe were losing their momentum. Therefore, 
European Socialists had to discipline themselves, they had to 
imitate the militant Bolsheviks in creating a unity of purpose 
directed to the single revolutionary aim under the direction 
of a central committee to be based in Moscow. During its 
Second Congress an ultimatum to these parties was laid down 
in the famous "Twenty-One Conditions" for membership in the 
Third International. In response every Socialist party in 
Europe was split into two hostile parties.
In Italy, Lenin*s manoeuvres only succeeded In 
accelerating the formal separation of the two already alienated 
wings of the Italian Socialist Party which had been maturing 
for a considerable time and which was being promoted by the 
dissatisfaction of the Bordighlsti and Ordinovisti with the 
tactical positions of the PSI. But in Italy the break was not 
clean for the uncertain Massimalisti assumed an ambiguous
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attitude between the Left and Right* Like a child in a suit 
for divorce, unable to choose between parents, hoping a recon­
ciliation would make it unnecessary, this wing was tormented 
by the breakup of the irreconciliable mates.
The breakup had begun in 1919 at the Sixteenth Con­
gress of the PSI where the outline of the three wings of the 
party clearly emerged. Significantly the party at this congress, 
dominated by Serrati and the Massimalisti. became the first and 
only European Socialist Party to affiliate with the Third 
International although the Italians* knowledge of what it stood 
for or what its intentions were was at the time still scanty, 
unclear and not officially communicated in the invitation.
The Comintern which had held only one congress, was still 
badly organized, had been hastily established and lacked 
official representation from numerous European Socialist par­
ties with which there was barely any correspondence.
The PSI voted unanimously to join but only the intran­
sigent Left was enthusiastic. The Massimalisti joined as an 
act of solidarity and emotional sympathy for the Russian 
Communists. The Right, for the sake of unity, gave only hesi­
tant and lukewarm support with misgivings. Its alienation from 
the Left was so great that the latter pushed for its expulsion 
from the Party. The motion failed but the break could not be 
long postponed. In the elections of April 1919, the first under 
universal manhood suffrage, 32% of the Italian electorate sent
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156 Socialist deputies to Parliament. The PSI became the 
largest political party in Italy. The outstanding parliamen­
tary personalities were still leaders of the Right while 
simultaneously Bordiga was denouncing Socialist participation 
in parliaments.
Between this event and the final rupture two events 
of dramatic historical Importance occurred in Turin which were 
to put Gramsci irrevocably on the side of Lenin. For the 
Italian workers the crucial year of their struggle was to 
be 1920.
Casting the die
In the atmosphere of the post-war period in Europe 
and hence in Italy, the significance of the times was not 
appreciated just by the revolutionary Socialists. The capi­
talist bourgeoisie was not blind to events and the Italian 
bourgeoisie was no blinder than elsewhere. The abortive 
communist insurrections in Germany and Hungary were not as 
distant as the Russian revolution which was stubbornly resisting 
foreign intervention to reverse it. It had merely been isolated. 
In Italy, the ivorker had won the vote and ha had used it to upset 
the old balance of parliamentary forces. His spokesmen in the 
Chamber were Socialists even if not the extremists on the party
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Left-wing. But the latter were openly militant and did not 
hesitate in staging bloody riots to express their views.
Their leaders were revolutionary and the Italian state 
repressed these demonstrations with difficulty. After the war 
the police were entirely reorganized and a crack guard corps 
was established to meet the situation for the threat came not 
only from the Left but also from the Right. The Fascists, 
however, were nationalists and rivals of the Socialists who 
were themselves frequently the target of Fascist club-swinging 
squads.
Northern Italian industrialists still saw the Red 
insurrection as their greatest threat and in early 1920 Confin- 
dustria, the organization of industrialists, was formed and 
recruited representatives from almost all industrial bodies in 
Italy. During the founding meeting a plan for action was laid 
to combat strikes and significantly to check the Factory Council 
Movement which had grown alarmingly in Turin. Confindustria was 
ready to throw down the gauntlet for it knew the unions were 
financially weak. Italy had entered a period of inflation and 
the workers could not financially afford a strike because the 
rise in the cost of living had reduced the purchasing power of 
their wages. For their part, the unions realized the unfavour­
able bind they were caught in and watched the industrialists' 
manoeuvres with apprehension.
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The first major confrontation occurred again in the 
bastion of worker militancy, Turin, and its outcome had massive 
importance for Italian Communism. On March 29, 1920 the 
management of a Fiat subsidiary plant dismissed its Factory 
Council. For what reasons this was done is still not exactly 
known. In retaliation tho same Council called for a sit-down 
strike in protest. The management answered with a lockout.
This chain of events was amplified in two days by imitations 
in all other Fiat factories in Turin. The result was not 
desired by the workers for, on April 11, they met with the 
industrialists to try to reach a settlement. The latter, how­
ever, insisted upon reducing Factory Council power to that 
possessed by the old Internal Commissions, a demand equivalent 
to depriving the Turin labour movement of all its gains and of 
repudiating Its programme. Against this showdown attitude, the 
Turin workers were drawn, unprepared, into a struggle over two 
alternatives; either accepting the idea of utter domination of 
factories by the Capitalists, or defending the principle of 
worker control of production. Their unanimous answer was a 
massive General Strike which was totally to paralyze the city 
and Turin Provinca for tan days. It was not on economic strike 
for It did not involve matters of wages or hours. It was the 
first political strike in Italian history, but, although the 
strike spread to embrace most of Piedmont, it was doomed to 
fail. Troops were sent to surround the city despite sympathy
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strikes by railroad workers who belatedly succeeded in halting 
troop transports. The Turinese strikers found themselves sur­
rounded and outnumbered and besieged by a situation which forced 
the choice of capitulation or open revolution. They were 
forced to choose the former and conciliation by third parties 
because it was clear that Turin was isolated from the rest of 
Italy.
Turin Socialists reserved their greatest bitterness 
for the timid national leadership of the PSI which left the 
Turin workers to meet their defeat alone without seeking to 
spread the strike or even to support it. On May 8, Ordine 
Nuovo printed the reaction of its editor, Grarasci, in one of 
the most important articles he was to write, stingingly accused 
the Socialist leaders of continually stiffling the revolutionary 
militancy of the rank and file by their incompetence, ignorance 
and indifference. Worse still, the Maximalists had given too 
much attention to the "respectable” opinions of the neo-bourgeois 
Reformist-wing, whose spokesmen held positions of authority in 
the party organisations but who did not speak for the mass of 
members. This was utterly inconsistent with the principles of 
the Third International. The party had thoroughly to rid Itself 
of these opportunists and had radically to revise Its tactics 
to become a tight knit disciplined body. The PSI leaders 
ignored Gramsci*s lacerating denunciation but it received the 
close and favourable attention of one important observer, Lenin.
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During the summer of 1920 the Third International 
held its Second Congress, this time with a large delegation 
from the important PSI. Lenin up to then had supported Serrati 
with the hope of keeping the Maximalists and PSI Left united 
against the Turati wing. After the Turin events, however, his 
attitude toward the PSI changed. The Italian party suffered 
from two maladies. First it was saddled with Reformist leaders 
who influenced the Maximalist leaders too much for the party’s 
good. They only prevented the exploitation of real revolution­
ary possibilities. But on the other hand, the Communist leader, 
Bordiga, was sun intransigent Abstentionist, a "left wing 
extremist*1' The latter attitude was not reasonable. It was 
T,an infantile disorder.” Communists need not shun parliaments.
They must use them to beat the Bourgeoisie at its own game, 
to gain a grip on the levers of poxirer even if only to be ob­
structionist and subvert parliament from within. In the mean­
time, however, the first aim was to expell the Reformists.
To this end the Comintern adopted the famous "Twenty-
One Points" several of which were directly aimed at the PSI.
Point Seven peremptorily demanded expulsion of Reformists:
The Communist International is unable to agree that notor­
ious opportunists such as Turati, Modigliani...shall have 
the right to appear as members of the Communist International.-5^
34. Jane Degras (ed.J, The Communist International 1919-1943. 
Documents. Vol 1, 1919-1922, (London: 1956), p. 170
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The conditions stipulated further that affiliated
parties had to be formally known as communist parties and had
to submit to decisions of the Executive Committee of the
International#
The most jarring thing the Italian delegation was to
hear, however, came directly from Lenin who stated openly:
In regard to the Socialist Party of Italy, the Second 
Congress of the Third International considers that the 
criticism of that party and the practical proposals 
submitted to the National Council of the Socialist 
Party of Italy in the name of the Turin Section of that 
party which were formulated in Ly0rdine Nuovo of May 3,
1920 and which fully correspond to all the fundamental 
principles of the Third International are in the main
correct.35
In the same speech Lenin also told the astonished PSI delegation, 
principally Maximalist, that it was to call a congress to purge 
itself of its ”non-Communist elements,” i#e, the Reformists.
Thus, Gramsci, who was not even present at Moscoiv, 
received Lenin»s authority in support of his views despite 
Grarasci’s relative obscurity on PSI national councils and, less 
so, within the communist wing which was still dominated by 
Bordlga. Gramsci had been described as too absorbed in the 
journalistic Turinese aspects of his work to assert himself more 
in both national bodies. His modesty and reticence were 
described as other impediments to his ambitions to positions
35. V.I. Lenin, ’’Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Second 
Congress of the Third International” Selected Works. 
(Moscow, n.d\), p. 177
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of party responsibility. But, from the time of the Second 
Congress, Gramsci’s ideas \ircre to loom large in the internal 
debates raging Xfithin the PSI, which wore finally settled at 
Livorno in January, 1921.
Before the Livorno Congress, one final occasion for 
the Italian revolution was to present itself to the divided 
Socialists* In the post-war economy of Italy inflation was the 
greatest nightmare for it ate away at fixed income groups as 
well as wage earners. The latter, however, could negotiate 
adjustments*
During the summer of 1920, in Milan, the Metallurgist 
Unions began to present demands for wage increases to the 
management of this industry which had been particularly depressed 
after the war. The latter flatly refused and the unions, by 
prearranged tactics, started a slowdown which reduced output to 
6Gyu of the usual level. The unions, which were financially 
weak, were not aiming for a costly strike and tha "Reformist" 
leadership wa3 not prepared to repeat the April events in 
Turin. The plan was to respond to a possible employer lockout 
with a sit-down strike. But it would be a sit-down strike with 
a difference, for tha plants ware to be kept running by the 
workers until the lockout was called off. As it was to happen, 
by the end of August 280 factories in the Milan area ware 
dramatically "occupied" by the employees. The hopeful expec­
tation of the union leadership was that the government would
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intervene to demand that the owners enter negotiations for new 
contracts. The government, however, chose to stay aloof.
On the other hand, on September 1, the Turin xyorkers, 
rather than isolate Eilan, tool: over their factories and quickly 
the movement spread to involve every industry in Northern Italy. 
This time, as contrasted to the Turin strike in April, the 
militancy of the workers was not contained in on3 city but 
covered the entire industrial heartland of the peninsula. And 
this time the workers were armed and ready to use tha factories 
as fortresses* In Turin, Giovanni Parodi, the young Fiat worker 
active in the Socialist Youth Federation, and a propagandist 
for Ordine Nuovo. sitting in the office of Agnelli, ran Fiat for 
a month in the name of the triumphant Factory Councils.
Again Italian Socialists were confronted with a choice. 
It soon became clear that the occupation of the factories had 
to be supported by an attempt to seize political power. The 
plants were surrounded by troops and the flow of raw materials 
and transportation of finished goods were being strangled by 
their presence. Production inevitably slackened. The momentous 
choice was to begin the revolution now or the opportunity would 
vanish from Socialist dreams for unforaseeable years. The 
government had not intervened to pressure the industrialists to 
accede to worker demands and the economic purpose of the strike 
had to be reconsidered. Insurrection or capitulation was the 
choice.
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The Maximalist leadership could not overcome its 
indecision while the Right was troubled already by the turn of 
events. The Left, which was not represented in the higher 
offices of the party and especially in the unions, could not 
influence the official course of the Socialist party. The out­
come of the wavering was an acceptance by the PSI and the 
unions of a late offer of government mediation, VThile a new 
contract won raises and other benefits, the Factory Councils 
were dealt a death blow* A promised government bill to 
legalize them was quietly lost in the Chamber under a pile of 
shelved projects. On September 25 the workers ratified an 
agreement to return the factories to the furious owners*.who 
began to look for some new political allies.who could protect 
their interests better than the weak Liberals. From the end of 
1920 Fascism would grow to become a major political force in 
Italy.
In Turin, Gramsci was later to recall, he had to 
restrain workers who were determined to break out vrith a violent 
insurgence by reminding them of their debilitating isolation 
during the strike in April, ^  But he became convinced that 
the existing PSI was dead as a revolutionary force in Italian 
society.
36. Spriano, op. cit., p, 377
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In January 1921 the party met in Livorno* On a vote 
to accept the Twenty-One Conditions, the Maximalists were unable 
to break with the Right who possessed some of the oldest and 
most illustrious names in Italian Socialism* Rather than unite 
with the Communists who were the second largest faction, the 
Maximalists, who were known during the Congress as "Unitarians," 
watched the Communists walk out of the auditorium and out of 
the party* The latter called for the first Congress of the 
Communist Party of Italy for the next day. Thus, the revolu­
tionary communist party was officially bora. But it was too 
late. The revolution in Italy had already failed to ignite and 
the chance would not present itself again for decades.
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C H A P T E R  II
THE LONG VOYAGE THROUGH FASCISM
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
The Nascent Party and the Fascist Offensive 1921-1926
When the secessionist Left wing of the PSI led by 
Bordiga met in Livorno’s San Marco Theatre on the morning of 
January 21, 1921, it felt confident that It was about to 
initiate a revolutionary communist party pregnant with the 
historical mission of emancipating the Italian masses. If 
Bordiga were to have his way the new party would single-mindedly 
consecrate its existence to this one aim of sparking the revolu­
tion while scorning the old parliamentary tactics of the party 
it had just repudiated. But the year was 1921, not 1920, 1919 
or 1917. The revolutionary wave which had rolled across Europe 
had crested and was withdrawing to Its Eastern source where it 
would be kept in reserve until it was unleashed again after 
another great war.
The melodramatic performance of the previous day in 
the Teatro Goldoni, although played to a packed house, was not 
going to prove to be the opening bars of a fiery Red tarantella, 
played fortissimo, which would send Italian society into revo­
lutionary convulsions. Rather, it was to be the introduction 
to a long political adagio with many improvisations and inter­
polations to elaborate the principal theme, played lento. ma 
risolutamente. For Italy the main tune to be played for the 
next twenty years would be a loud brassy martial number called 
Fascismo and the band leader was Maestro Benito Mussolini late 
of the PSI.
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Looking back with comforting historical hindsight, 
the split in Italian Socialism just at the moment when Fascist 
reaction was about to set in can be seen as a disaster to the
working class movement in Italy. One might ask, however, how
an undivided PSI, unable to act vxith decisive unity in the past, 
would have reacted to the threat of Fascism. The pre-Livorno 
PSI had been quite clearly two parties; one reformist, one 
revolutionary. Living together within the same organization, 
neither could fully make its own principles prevail over the 
entire body. Separation at least had succeeded in clarifying 
party lines. But at Livorno the lines were still not yet made
fully clear. Again the sentimental Serrati and his Maximalist
followers were the cause. The former was in sincere sympathy 
with the PSI Left and the Third International except with regard 
to their unyielding insistence on "purification," that is, 
expelling the Right. At Livorno, Serrati could not bring him­
self to support this expulsion, but the equally schismatic 
result was that the Left walked out on its own.
This act, it should be noted, was not according to 
Comintern or to Lenin’s desires. It was his tactic to "expel 
Turati then unite with him;" that is, to create first a "revo­
lutionary" party with a large mass following which could then 
coordinate its efforts, whenever possible, with a clearly 
identified social-democratic party to achieve specific goals. 
Serrati’s argument against this was that to expel one’s Right-
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wing colleaguea would envenom relations so much that post- 
schism relations would be impossible. As a result, for many 
years, Italy, unique in Europe for this, had two authentic 
Marxist parties existing side by side in the same body politic.
It is convenient to argue that the Italian Communist 
Party was created and manipulated by the direct interference 
in the PSI by Comintern, Though convenient, it is inaccurate.-*■ 
Nonetheless, while the birth of the PCI was the culmination 
of an Inexorable process which had been maturing for years, 
independently of the Bolsheviks, eventually the PCI did come 
to depend upon Comintern support to a notable degree. Almost 
from the start, duo to the ominous political situation in 
Italy, the PCI became a semi-clandestine and conspiratorial 
party concerned as much with preserving Its own existence as 
with political agitation among the masses. As Togliatti has 
admitted: "One can say that the greatest part of Italian
public opinion became aware of the Communist party, for what 
it really is, only in 1944."2
This dependence upon the support of the Comintern was 
not Immediate. It became clear by 1926 when Gramsci rather
1. This, substantially, is the thesis of Urquidifs disserta­
tion. Convincingly, he argues that, at Livorno, the Comintern 
obtained a party "which it neither anticipated nor fully 
accepted."
2. Togliatti, II partito comunista italiano. p. 5
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than Bordiga won full control of the party. And, soon after 
that the de facto leadership passed to Togliatti upon the 
imprisonment not only of Gramsci but also of Bordiga, Terracini, 
Scoccimarro and many other leading party figures. Until then, 
as Urquidi argues, it is questionable as to who used whom with 
regard to PCI-Comintern relations.
7/hen Comintern became seriously enough interested in 
the P3X to try to influence its leadership and programmes it 
was not very successful in having its will obeyed. It was not 
capable in the first instance, in having tha PSI Right-wing 
expelled. Rather, the PSI Left,under Bordlgafs leadership, 
walked out in the face of Maximalist inability to choose sides. 
That this was not the desired Comintern policy was proven when, 
with hopes of mending the split, it invited delegations from 
both the PCI and PSI (which had voted at Livorno not to cast 
off its Comintern membership) to attend the Third Congress in 
June, 1921. In October, 1922 the Maximalists finally did decide 
upon a belaued policy of "purification" and just barely succeeded 
in expelling the Turati faction which then openly became the 
Social-Democratic party of Italy.
Bordiga, however, did not rush to reunite with the 
Maximalists. The Communists in his view had to remain "pure" 
and avoid collaboration with the spineless Socialists who had 
even toyed with the idea of coming to an understanding with the 
Fascists. Earlier in the year, In March, when the Second
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Congress of the PCI was held, Bordiga had dominated the Con­
gress and his non-collaborationist, abstentionist ideas still 
prevailed. Again, this was in divergence from Comintern posi­
tions.
The Comintern naturally saw the political situation 
most clearly from the Moscow vantagepoint since the Bolsheviks 
were still the only successful Communists in Europe. If, in 
1920, Comintern sensed the opportunity for fostering the 
revolution in Western Europe by prodding "Communist" Socialists 
still wedded to "Reformist" Socialists to expel their Right- 
wings and get busy with revolution, by 1922 the situation 
appeared quite changed* The heady euphoria of 1920 was 
replaced now with a real 3ense of isolation and a sober under­
standing that the order of the day was not revolution but 
reaction.
Russia was still reeling from its own internal as 
well as external problems. The exigencies of a collapsed 
economy had even forced the Bolsheviks to adopt a partial 
restoration of Capitalism. Lenin himself, by now, was so 
wrapped up in the endless exhausting problems of the Russian 
revolution that it was increasingly difficult for him to devote 
very much of hi3 rapidly diminishing energy to international 
problems. 3—
3. This is the position of Adam B. Ulam in his book The 
Bolsheviks (New York, 1965), p» V93-51A-
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To his realist mind it must have been more than 
clear by 1922 that there would be no European revolution.
All attempts had failed, except in Russia, and there the 
revolution was fighting for survival. The necessity of the 
moment was not revolutionary adventure but consolidation.
As for European Communists, it was to be a question of pre­
paring to meet the ineluctable forces of reaction which 
were gathering strength increasingly. These forces seemed 
nowhere more menacing than in Italy. A new policy had to be 
adopted, and thus Comintern turned one hundred and eighty 
degrees from advocating schisms to promoting the policy of 
the ’’United Front" among all Socialist parties.
Western European Communists who, after years of 
struggle, had just succeeded in forming autonomous parties 
found this radical about face very difficult to accommodate. 
For his part, Bordiga objected vigorously for it went con­
trary to all his Instincts about cultivating a revolutionary 
elite, non-uollaboration and abstentionism. At first, 
Gramsci had dcubts also but his entire career as an acute 
analyst of soc:*.^-political problems equipped him with a 
greater intellectual sensitivity to changing circumstances 
than tha less flexible Bordiga who adamantly resisted
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tactical adaptations.^
Comintern used two principal arguments to try to 
convince the stubborn Italians, First, the PSI had finally 
expelled the Right and Serrati was not prepared for a fusion 
with the PCI. Secondly, while Italian Socialists had remained 
split, Mussolini had taken over the government. In November, 
1922 an agreement toward PSI-PCI fusion was finally negotiated 
at the Fourth Comintern Congress despite Bordigafs continuing 
objections. Ironically, Mussolini provided a solution to the 
test of wills. Upon his return from the Moscow meeting,
4, Gramsci*s doubts about Comintern policy stemmed from his 
conviction that the newly-formed party had an immediate, 
pressing task to accomplish, that of persuading the 
greater part of the proletariat to come over to the PCI 
and, in doing this, to put pressure on the Maximalists 
to come down one way or another for Right or Left Socialism. 
To accomplish this would require full energy being dir­
ected to organizational and propagandistic work and would 
amount to engaging in a real rivalry with the PSI. By 
changing over to a policy of collaboration would mean post­
poning this contest. On the other hand, Gramsci was 
acutely conscious that the menace posed by the violent 
Blaek-Shirted souadristi was being assisted involuntarily 
by the quarreling Italian Left which rather than combat 
Fascism was sniping at itself. Profitting from this 
lack of solidarity among the Socialists, Mussolini set 
his squads of thugs to attacking socialist cooperatives, 
unions, printing presses, Chambers of Labour and indi­
viduals in order to try to purge the latter of their 
beliefs with liberal doses of castor oil.
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Bordiga and the Executive Committee of the PCI were arrested 
and jailed.^
Togliatti had escaped the Fascist dragnet while 
Gramsci at tha same time was still in Moscow where he had been 
sent in May 1922 as PCI delegate to the Executive of the Inter­
national. Much of the time there, Gramsci spent recuperating 
from a collapse of what was normally less than robust health, 
but the Russian sojourn allowed him to study the Bolshevik 
experiment firsthand for the first time. When in Turin, he 
was able only to theorize on the system of Factory Councils; 
in Russia he could closely study their actual operation under 
the direction of Lenin, In his role as member of the Intema-
5. Upon his return from the Fourth Comintern Congress, Bordiga 
was as opposed to political collaboration with the Social­
ists as ever even though at the last PSI Congress held in 
October 1922 the Turati faction was expelled, albeit with 
a bare majority, and the PSI expressed a new willingness to 
seek a fusion with the PCI. This lack of any enthusiasm 
and procrastination by Bordiga was reciprocated in the 
P3I where in the meantime a new body of opinion against 
fusion was being formed and articulated by the editor of 
Avanti. Pietro Nenni. The continuing extremism and intran­
sigence by the Neopolltan Communist alienated him as much 
a3 anything from the Comintern (as well as the PSI). With 
his removal from the scene by his imprisonment the fusion 
of the two parties could continue and was finally (but 
only partially) realised in the latter part of 1923. By 
then, the antl-fu3ionist Socialists led by Nenni had gained 
the bare majority to vote against reunion. Thus, the 
"fusion" when it finally took place was with the Serrati 
faction rather than with the entire PSI.
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tional Executive, Gramsci was able also to observe "panorami­
cally" the international communist movement from its centre 
rather than from the "provincial” Italian angle, v.’hile pri­
vately noting the defects of the central body, its bureaucracy, 
its sense of authority and, disturbingly, the obscure rivalries 
shaping up in Moscow, he also acquired an appraisal of his own 
PCI and was able to appreciate its problems from another view­
point, a non-Italian one, one which permitted him, in a sense, 
to see himself through the eyes of others. Whatever he thought 
of this other analysis, Gramsci harboured a deep conviction that 
the PCI-Coniintern relationship was a vital one, especially to 
the former.^
6. There wa3, undoubtedly, at bottom a certain practical and 
political conviction, which the new position for observa­
tion reinforced and nourished; that one niu3t not and that 
one could not break with the Comintern. He knew that the 
party had a meaning, a position, a bond with the proletar­
iat only if it remained the Italian Section of the Inter­
national. More than once he would say that only, or rather, 
above all for this reason fifty thousand Socialist militants 
at Livorno followed the communist group and that, if the 
half of these resisted persecutions, continued to struggle, 
to nourish hope, to organise itsslf, it was oecauae the 
Communist Party of Italy was a part of that international 
front which was being guided by the Country of the Revolu­
tion (and) by the party of Lenin.
Paolo Spriano, Gramsci. p. 3#5
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It has been maintained that the source of Bolshevik 
influence, first in sections of the PSI and afterwards in the 
PCI, was not based on doctrinal superiority but rather stemmed 
from the immense prestige won by the Bolsheviks who alone had 
managed to carry out the only successful revolution.*^ Only 
when it became quite clear that the various attempts to ignite 
revolutions in Europe were failures did the Bolsheviks 
increasingly receive the mantle of complete doctrinal authority 
as well. And, once this became the situation, Comintern bless­
ing became a requisite for any communist party leader pushing 
a particular programme, for it bestowed on the individual or 
policy an inconfutable status and prestige.
If Bordiga, who had ju3t been arested by the Kussolini 
government still could not understand that the immediate 
problem to be faced by the Italian Section in 1923 was not 
revolution but Fascism and insisted on following his "purist" 
abstentionist programme, the Comintern could only see one 
solution; to remove Bordiga from the secretaryship of the PCI 
and replace them ivith someone else who was more attuned to
7. At the Livorno Congress, Turati, speaking before the whole 
party had declared "When the Russian myth has passed, our 
classical conception of socialism will again come to the 
fore." Cammett, op. cit.. p. 29
Urquidi maintains that: "The basic source of Bolshevik
authority was derived largely, if not entirely, from their 
successful revolution." op. cit.. p. 399
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events and adaptable to changed conditions. Since Bordiga was 
now in forced prison isolation the occasion to change the 
leadership presented itself conveniently. Bordiga*s position 
fell to Gramsci. As early as the Second Congress the Turinese 
leader had seemed to Lenin to have had adopted realistic
ti
attitudes, and now his candidacy for Bordiga*s position seemed 
the most suitable. Gramsci in turn appointed Togliatti, who 
was still in Italy, as ad hoc leader.
8. Vide supra, Chapter 1, p. 43
In his Ordine Nuovo article of May 8, 1920 for which Lenin 
publicly expressed admiration and agreement, Gramsci, 
writing after the collapse of the "occupation of the fac­
tories11 foresaw the consequences of the failure to push 
the occupation to its logical conclusions. The State had 
to be taken over by the working class and its party or: 
there will be a tremendous reaction on the part of the 
propertied classes and the ranks of government...no violence 
will be neglected in order to subjugate the industrial and 
agricultural proletariat...they will seek relentlessly to 
smash up the working class bodies for political struggles 
and to incorporate bodies for economic resistance within 
the gears of tha bourgeois state. Gramsci quoted by 
Togliatti "L*Anti-fascismo di Antonio Gramsci" Moment! della 
otoria d*Italia (Rome: 1963), p. 174
This passage written two years before the advent of Fascism 
was an acute prophecy of future events. Not only did the 
Fascist squadristl use violence to intimidate rank and file 
socialist supporters but within a year of holding office 
Mussolini and Confindustria reached an agreement permitting 
virtual autonomy of the latter within tha economy while 
suppressing non-Fascist unions and forbidding the formation 
of factory committees and the right to strike to the working 
classes.
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It is quite true that it is unlikely that Gramsci 
would have assumed party leadership without Comintern assis­
tance and influence and this would appear to confute the 
thesis that the PCI was not the child of Comintern or the 
"agent of Soviet Communism*' in Italy. It should be kept in 
mind that until Gramsci, (whose views lyere to begin with 
more in harmony with those of the Comintern than anyone elseTs), 
assumed party leadership, the PCI was not at all what Comin­
tern had hoped for.
As has been pointed out, Comintern had wanted "puri­
fication" of the PSI, that is, expulsion of the Right wing. 
Instead, the extreme Left wing walked out leaving Serrati to 
tergiversate about splitting with the Turati faction for 
another precious year.9 Subsequently, once the PSI Left became 
the new PCI, Comintern could not impose its views on party 
tactics upon the new leader. Bordiga insisted upon sustaining 
parliamentary abstentionism and, related to this, refused to 
collaborate with the old Maximalists, Finally, neither Bordiga 
nor Serrati had been considered by the Comintern to be really 
ideal for leading the PCI, Bordiga was too rigidly extremist
9. Speaking to the Third PCI Gongress as a full member Serrati 
explained his position in the period of schism thusly: "Even
in the course of our polemics and of our bitterest debates,
I felt myself to be spiritually closer to you than to many 
elements of my old party. No one will ever know what suffer 
ing those contradictory feelings provoked in me, I thought 
was right and instead I was committing a grave error, the 
gravest of all my life." Quoted by Togliatti in "Serrati” 
Momenti della storia d1Italia, p. 15
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in hi3 views and Serrati too sentimental about the venerable 
Partito socialists italiano with its great uninterrupted tra­
dition and its great parliamentary orators.^ Only the Ordine 
Nuovo group seemed to espouse the right policies and pursue 
the correct line of action. But Comintern was not certain 
until the Third PCI Congress in 1926 that the Ordine Nuovo 
group would prevail. By that time Fascism was entering its 
thoroughly totalitarian phase and the PCI was driven underground 
and into exile.
Noting these facts, it is difficult to claim that the 
Italian Communist Party was nothing more than a creature of 
the Communist International. This does not negate, on the other 
hand, the clear fact that Comintern did actively push forward 
the Ordine Nuovo group into the leadership. But it does not 
imply either that Gramsci was merely a puppet repeating what­
ever Comintern told him to 3ay. Gramsci assumed the leadership 
convinced of the correctness of his {and Comintern’s) position. 
He was increasingly convinced that Bordiga1 s ’’sectarianism1' was 
wrong and that the party had to change Its line. If this nec­
essitated an Inner-party struggle, so be it. And, if the
10. "...the Italians are notoriously soft-hearted and senti­
mental over old friendships. An Italian Lenin would to 
the end sneak out for a glass of wine with an Italian 
Martov..
Ulam, op. cit.. p. 502
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Comintern wars eager to help him vrin against the Bordighists, 
this aid would be welcome. Although Bordiga supporters were 
important personalities in the party leadership, the party press 
since Livorno was in the hands of old Ordlnovisti. In Rome, 
the party*s central organ, II Comunl3ta was being edited by 
Togliatti. And in 1924 I*Unita. edited by Gramsci, made its 
first appearance.
In these publications Gramsci and his colleagues 
could press for unity of action among Italy*s leftist parties. 
Ivith Bordiga in prison and assured of Comintern support Gramsci 
and his supporters set about to win control of the party 
machinery as well. It had been Gramsci, significantly, who 
had guided the merger of the Serrati faction and PCI in 1923 
while Bordiga was in prison, and, early in the next year, he 
again diverged from Bordiga*s abstentionist programme when he 
was elected to Parliament, where, a3 leader of the Communist 
group inthe Chamber of Deputies, his views received national 
attention and wide publicity.
VJhile he worked towards forming a united front against 
the Fascists, Gramsci simultaneously set about to apply to his 
already aeni-clandestine party some of the Bolshevik organiza­
tional structure he had studied while in Moscow. By adopting 
the cell system not only could the party be changed, if the need 
arose, from an open legal organization to a skeletal, illegal, 
clandestine one, but the molecular-sized cell could more easily
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penetrate places of work and other organizations, evade detec­
tion and escape suppression. At least in this way the party 
could maintain some semblance of organization even as a secret, 
conspiratorial grouping. As it turned out, this preparation 
gave the PCI the best underground apparatus of all the anti­
fascist resistance groupings.
Although Bordiga was released after several months 
imprisonment, the Grarasci-Togliatti-Comintern alliance utilized 
the period of absence to secure the appointment of an enlarged 
executive committee of the PCI to assure Gramsci of a majority, 
although the inner party rivalry continued about a year, until 
January 1926. During this time, the party organization rever­
berated with the jostling for positions, and party meetings 
rang with accusations and counter accusations. Finally, at the 
PCI Third Congress the Bordiga group was overwhelmingly voted 
down.
Meanwhile, Gramsci was using his parliamentary posi­
tion to the fullest in order to powmote the anti-Fascist front.
To Bordiga1s dismay, ha became a prime mover in Important par­
liamentary manoeuvres. This was occasioned by the murder of 
the Socialist deputy and critic of the regime, Giacomo Matteotti, 
in June, 1924 by order of Mussolini, The general uproar that 
followed this crime shook the regime so violently that for a
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a while its downfall appeared c e r t a i n . I n  protest the so- 
called ’'Aventine” was formed. It consisted of some one hundred 
and fifty anti-Fascist deputies who walked out of the Chamber 
vowing not to return until the Fascist government resigned (or 
hopefully until the king dismissed the prime minister). Gramsci 
took part in this opposition.
11. This murder led Gramsci to write about the actual politi­
cal situation in Italy with an analytical penetration 
that verified in part elements of the prophecies he made 
in his 1920 article (quoted above p. 57 footnote):
There exists a crisis in Italian society, a crisis which 
traces its origins to the same factors with which this 
society is constituted and to thoir insuperable contra­
dictions; there exists a cri3is which the war has acceler­
ated, deepened, rendered insurmountable. On one hand 
there is a State which cannot hold itself up because it 
lacks the support of the great masses and which lacks 
a class of leaders which is able to win for it thi3 
support; on the other hand, there is a raaes of millions 
of workers who have slowly been awakened to politics who 
seek to assume an active role In It, who want to become 
the footing for a new State which will incarnate their 
will. There i3 on one hand an economic system which no 
longer is able to satisfy the elementary requirements of 
the enormous majority of the population because it is 
built to satisfy the particular exclusiviat interests of 
a few restricted privileged classes; there are on the 
other hand hundreds of thousands of workers who cannot 
live under this system unless it is modified at the 
roots.
Quoted by Togliatti Anti-fascismo di Antonio Gramsci”, 
p. 173
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While the majority of the "Aventina" deputies hesi­
tated in pressing their moral advantage and wasted their time 
in irresolute debate, Gramsci vigorously proposed establishing 
a rival "parliament11 which would pass its ov:n laws in opposi­
tion to the government, putuing pressure on the king to take 
some action and spark a general uprising against Mussolini. 
Whan thi3 revolutionary proposal won no support, Gramsci led 
the Communists back into the Chamber and carried out his own 
fiery opposition to the regime. After six immobile months, 
the "Aventine" began to disintegrate and this gave Mussolini 
time to regain his shaken confidence. By the autumn of 1926 
by proclaiming his "Exceptional Law3," after an assassination 
attempt on him failed, ha reimpo3ed press censorship, deprived 
the rebel deputies of their se^ts and dissolved political par­
ties and every form of anti-Fascist organisation.
Earlier in the year, in January 1927, before the 
decrees were proclaimed, the PCI had held its Third Congress 
in Lyons, France to escape Fascist suppression. It was there 
that Gramsci proposed his "Lyons theses" which eliminated 
Bordiga*s "Rome theses" of the Second party Congress of 1922. 
These theses were a compound of Gramsci*s pristine political 
concepts especially with regard to the sysfc em of the Factory 
Councils and the general problem of the South and his more 
recent positions on collaborationist tactics which were influ­
enced by his Soviet sojourn, the experience of his personal
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participation in the Comintern, and the awareness that his 
worst expectations about Fascism were in the process of being 
realized.
Speaking at the Lyons Congress against the back­
ground of a discouraging disunity among the anti-Kussolini 
"'Vventine* Gramsci explained tha new party orientation:
In no country is the proletariat in a position to win 
power and to hold on to it solely with its own forces: 
it must therefore procure some allies for itself, that is, 
it must carry on such a policy that it will be able to 
place itself at the head of other classes which have anti- 
capitalist interests and guide them in the struggle. The 
question is particularly important for Italy where the 
proletariat is a minority of the working population and 
is disposed geographically in such a way that it cannot 
presume to carry out a victorious struggle for power 
except after having provided,an exact solution to the 
problem of its relation to the peasant classes. In the 
near future our Party vri.ll have to dedicate itself par­
ticularly to posing and solving this problem,
11 In the near future" however, was to be too late for 
Gramsci himself, who, despite his status as a deputy, was 
air ested along with most of the leading PCI personalities, 
except Togliatti, and the party itself wsb driven underground. 
Thus, Gramsci, who had been one of the first to predict the 
intensity of the inevitable reactionary counter-revolution 
while flailing the PSI leaders for not profiting from the revo­
lutionary situation in 1920, became one of its first and one of 
its most lamentable victims. His efforts, as an influential
12. Spriano, op. cit.. p. 339
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and responsible political leader, to organize a resistance to 
stem the increasing menace of Fascism by effecting an alliance 
with other antl-Fascist parties were too late. By the time his 
opinions and policy decisions carried any notable weight and 
could determine the political action of at least the PCI, the 
danger he had early foreseen had not only manifested itself 
but had acquired such power as to quash any belated opposition.
The Clandestine Existence
The incarceration of such a large number of important 
communist leaders was a painful blow to the PCI although it was 
not fatal. With Gramsci removed from active leadership, Tog- 
llatti assumed de facto control of the party. Two years after 
being arrested and after being shunted from prison to prison 
across Italy, Gramsci was brought before the "Special Tribunal 
for the Defense of the State" in 192$. Declaiming against 
Gramsci before the ribunal, the Fascist prosecutor demanded 
that: "for twenty years...this mind be prevented from opera­
ting." Obligingly, the judges condemned the accused to twenty 
yoar3, four months and five days imprisonment for treason. 
During the trial, Gramsci warned the Fascists that they "would 
lead Italy to her ruin" adding that "it will be left to us 
(Communists) to save her."
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After serving ten corroding years of his sentence, 
during which time his health broke down completely, Gramsci 
was released "for compassionate reasons" to enjoy three days 
of freedom before he died in April 1937* Despite his isolation 
and while prevented from receiving detailed new3 about "outside" 
events or all the books he wished, Gramsci did not resign him­
self to an arid, unproductive prison routine. He instead 
tried to organize his thoughts in as systematic a way as he 
could under the circumstances and set about recording them on 
hundreds of pages of notes to form what have been called his 
"juademi del Careers" or"Prison Notebooks." The subjects of 
his contemplations, often written in cryptic form to escape 
prison censors, were numerous and varied but, by intention, 
much of his effort was directed at one of his most enduring 
interests, an analysis of Italian intellectuals, their role in 
Italian society of the past, and, leading from this, a consi­
deration of Machiavalli, the Risorgimento. the philosophy of 
Croce, the nature of Italian institutions and countless other 
varied subjects.
After the Second World V/ar, the "Notebooks" as well 
as hundreds of his letters were painstakingly collected and 
systematically published.^ The effect of these writings on
13. In 1947 Gramsci*s "Lettere dal carcere" or"Letters from 
Prison" won one of Italy13 major literary awards, the 
Viareggio Prize.
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wide sections of the post-war intelligentsia of Italy was so 
profound that unknowingly and unintentionally by his own in­
tellectual accomplishment Gramsci single-handedly succeeded to 
a remarkable degree in attracting the intelligentsia of the 
country into forming that alliance of the workers and thinkers, 
the "hegemony of the proletariat," he had so deeply committed 
himself to work towards back in Turin as a young, idealistic, 
university student. Gramscirs thought Is hardly known outside 
of Italy, but there its influence has been real and deep. 
Referring to the "Quaderni” a young Italian historian of the 
working class movement had written that:
their significance (and) influence in the formation of 
new generations of scholars and militants cannot as yet 
be fully appraised. But, it can already be said that 
without them one could not conceive of the renewal of 
the intellectual life of our country over two decades 
(whatever the political, ideological orientation of 
individual intellectuals has been),..1^
In Italy today it is certainly not the case that 
every intellectual is a communist. But, it can be said that, 
in general, quality intellectual life, intellectual achieve­
ment in all Its manifestations often doe3 take its flavour 
from the Left. Numerous intellectuals may well harbour suspi­
cions about the PCI as a party for various reasons (such as its 
long identity with unpalatable Soviet policies) or may prefer 
not to pledge formal political allegiance to any political
14. Sprlano, op. cit. p. 3^9
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party whatsoever, but these same individuals will almost 
invariably express admiration and respect for the human example 
and the thinking of the Sardinian hunchback, Antonio Gramsci.
That there should exist a suspicion or perhaps an 
ambivalent uncertainty toward tha PCI can be explained. It, 
too, is a product of the historical vicissitudes the party 
experienced after 1926. If Gramsci gave the PCI one of its 
qualities or traditions, the other emerged from nearly two 
decades of exile, conspiratorial struggle, and dependence on 
Soviet support for its only claim to "legitimacy” in absence 
of any demonstrable mass support during the long Fascist reign. 
With Gramsci, Bordiga, Terracini, Scoccimarro as wall as other 
principal Communists imprisoned, Togliatti assumed what was to 
become an uninterrupted career as PCI leader which lasted 
almost forty years. Being in Moscow at the time of the arrests, 
Togliatti was able to escape the fate of his comrades.
Lenin had died two years earlier in 192!* and although 
Stalin had already assumed affective control of the Soviet 
party and state machinery, his authority was not yet undisputed 
by rivals. The struggle for power had already begun before 
Gramsci was arrested. As absorbed as he was with his own pro­
blems in the Italian party, Gramsci observed the Moscow 
rivalries with some misgivings and apprehensions for the 
jostling of Right and Left groups in the Russian party, and
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the manipulations Stalin made with one and the other was con­
fusing the other sections of the International. One of Gramsci,s 
last acts as party leader was a letter he wrote to the Bolshe­
vik leaders:
Comrades*..today you are in the process of destroying 
your work* You are degrading and running the risk of 
nullifying the directing functions which the Communist 
Party of the USSR had conquered through the work of Lenin.
It seems to us that the violent passion of the Russian 
questions is causing you to lose 3ight of the interna­
tional aspects of those very Russian questions. It is 
causing you to forget that your duties as militant Russians 
can and ought to be carried out only within the framework 
of the interests of the international proletariat*^5
However, Gramsci1s protests went unheeded. Unlike 
most Russian Communist leaders who had lived in Western Europe, 
were often multi-lingual and outward-looking, Stalin was not an 
international-minded thinker. His experience had been internal, 
Russian. If the international movement was failing, Stalin 
believed, unlike Trotsky, that the revolution would have to 
depend on Russia itself. The hostile capitalist states refused 
to recognize the Soviet regime and tried to prevent it from 
infecting the rest of the world. Thus for a decade this regime 
concentrated on assuring its own survival. Stalin declared 
therefore that the task of world Communists, for the moment, 
would be to promote the success of Socialism in one country."
To assure this Stalin had at his disposal the authority of the
15. Gramsci in Cammett, op. cit. p. 243
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Gcviet-dominatod Comintern. For parties auch as the* PCI which 
hatl just suffered almost fatal blows in their own countries 
and lookod for cover under the win^ of the nourishing maternal 
body, the Communist International, the prudent policy was to 
accept Soviet policies as they were decided without alienating 
the beneficence of the senior party. Consequently, the Soviet 
influence on the PCI became increasingly evident. As tha 
years of exile passed, the party became identified more and 
more as a "Soviet agent" and as "an obedient tool of Soviet 
foreign policy." As PCI leader and eventually as a member of 
the Praesidium of the Comintern, Togliatti resigned himself to 
the exigencies of the political situation and sought to guide 
party activities as effectively as the limitations on his init­
iative permitted. The Turinese idealism ha shared with his 
university friends as a young man took, in those discouraging 
years, a secondary place to the practical, detached, tactical 
calculations exacted by a bitter struggle against rival 
Fascism, But, the non-Bolshevik, Gramsaian elements in his 
Intellectual attitudes were not entirely smothered by the con­
formist, authoritarian, Stalinist atmo-phera.-1-^
Vthen the PCI was forced undarground the precautions 
It had taken to create a oami-clandestine structure proved
16. Vida Grnst Fisher "tin debito di gratitudine" Rlnasclta. 
Vol. 22, No. 3'+,(“August 26, 1965) pp. 9-11
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prudent.^ A "Foreign Centre" had already been established in 
Switzerland in the early twenties. Later it was moved to Paris 
where it remained in contact with both Moscow and the secret, 
skeletal remnants of the party in Italy, The base for the most 
important offices of the "Internal Centre" was Milan. The 
party managed for a while to continue clandestinely to publish 
and distribute its newspapers and, to stir up labour unrest, 
tried to infiltrate the Fascist-controlled unions. In 1927 
and 1928, however, the party was dealt two more painful blows. 
Dozens of "internal" party leaders were caught by poJi ce drag­
nets and the Internal Centre itself was discovered and smashed.
The dilemma of the PCI as a victim of relentless 
hounding by the Fascist police was not aided by the new policies 
it had to adopt after 1928 as directed by Comintern. Reflect­
ing new Soviet attitudes, sections of the International scorned 
those parties which had scorned the Iiternational, such as 
Social Democrats, whose hoji, r to revolutionary Communism 
and it3 institutional incarnation the U33R had only helped the 
growth of Fascism.
The motivation of this new attitude of the Interna­
tional stemmed also from an analysis of the economic situation 
which concluded that the world of capitalism was on the brink
17. A most useful book to consult on the resistance period Is 
Charles Delzall*s Mussolini*s Enemies The Italian Anti- 
Fascist Resistance" [ Princeton, 1961). Much of* the infor­
mation In this section of the paper, I owe to this 
excellent study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
of a major collapse. Therefore, communist parties, to pre­
pare to exploit this impending crisis, must prepare their own 
ranks and cut off relations v;ith those socialist parties v;hich 
in the past had only held back the revolutionary energies of 
Communists.
This policy which was promulgated nt the Sixth Comin­
tern Congress went against everything Gramsci had worked for 
as PCI leader when he worked to reunite with the PSI, when he 
was a member of the initial "Aventine” and contradicted what 
he had declared before the Lyons Congress.^ Togliatti's 
views on the question of combatting Fascism were similar to 
Gramsci,s and at the 192c Congress he quoted Goethe's last 
utterance ’'Light, more light” in the face of the adamance of 
the International in pushing the new attitude. It was Togliatti, 
however, who submitted to the views of the Comintern and, for 
the next six years, guided the PCI in its political isolation 
until 19 k when it resumed its collaboration with the PSI in a 
■'unity of action” pact.
During the intervening period, In Italy, the PCI con­
tinued to try to infiltrate Fascist bodies with undercover party 
agents to cultivate discontent among workers who were being sub­
jected to pay cuts. In some cases, party influence could be
16. See quotation p. 63,
19. It was during this period that nngalo Tasca, who had over a 
long while slov/ly become alienated from the course of the 
party was taking broke with the PCI on the question of the 
new isolationist t.ctics after incurring his public denun­
ciation by Stalin.
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detected in attempted strikes. Simultaneously the party was 
attracting to itself numerous young idealistic nnti-Fascist 
students. Some of them bore famous Italian political names.
One was Giorgio Amendoln, son of the Democratic deputy,
Giovanni Amendola who had been leader of the /.ventine and who 
had died from beatings he received from a Fascist gang.
Many of these young men, such as '\mendola, were in the futur° 
to become outstanding lenders of the post via r PCI. Also at 
this time Luigi Longo, the present PCI secretary, was assuming 
increasing responsibilities as head of the Communist Youth 
Federation.
In 19^1 the party held its Fourth Congress in s^mi- 
secrecy in Germany. This was the first gathering of all major 
party leaders in on° place since the Lyons meeting and wag an 
encouraging proof of party continuity. Many delegates had 
managed to come from Italy and saw for the first time the man 
behind the pseudonym "Ercoli." The Congress vias principally 
used as an opportunity to plan strategy and as a result the 
delegates returned to Italy with the goal of reestablishing 
much of the "internal" organisation which had been suppressed 
by the police. But the latter was able, with discoursgingly 
efficient doggedness, to smash the party apparatus and continued 
arresting numerous Communist activists. Their suppression was 
so thorough that the PCI experienced its lowest point of effec—  
tive internal activity since its formation in 1921.
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By 1934 the policy of isolation was finally discar­
ded. The dangerous assumption of power by aggressive German 
Na-.ism, which could form a bloc with Fascist Italy, the near 
degeneration into Fascism by a still democratic but weak and 
bitterly divided Third French Republic, the existence of n 
quasi-Fascist, pre-Nazi regime in austria, the clerical 
Fascism in Portugal and the mounting threat from the Right in 
Spain, as well as the constellation of anti-Russian Right-wing 
regimes in Eastern liurope, all united in bitter hostility 
towards Soviet Communism, upset the uneasy equilibrium in 
Europe.
When Soviet leaders turned from the absorbing work 
of building a Socialist system to take a deep hard look at 
developments in Europe, what was seen was alarming. The vivid 
contemplation of a menacing alliance of Fascist states united 
against it was a fearsome threat to be urgently undermined. The 
collapse of the capitalist economies with the consequent revo­
lutionary possibilities which had been predicted at the Sixth 
Comintern Congress had indeed materialised but the swelling 
ranks of the unemployed were not all automatically pledging 
their allegiance to the Left. The Communists, Socialists .and 
Social Democrats were facing an energetic competition for 
support from a militant Right and this competition alarmed not 
just the Communists but the rest of the Left as well.
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Pressed by the French Communist Party and the PCI, 
who joined the French and Italian Socialist Parties in pacts 
of "unity of action" in mid-1934* the Comintern assented 
officially to this policy at its Seventh Congress in 1935.
The USSR itself, facing the threat of the Fascist advance 
willingly cultivated anything which would strengthen and defend 
what it had already accomplished with 3uch painful sacrifices 
and internal convulsions toward creating "Socialism in One 
Country." For now, behind the consolidation of Fascist regimes 
in Europe, it perceived not just an undirected play of poli­
tical forces, but a concerted effort by Capitalist Reactionaries 
to manoeuvre for a war against the Soviet Union and to accom­
plish what it could not do in 19143-21; that is, to destroy 
Communism at Its source once and for all.
The devalopmonts in Germany more than anything worried 
the Soviet leaders who had heretofore come to 3ome understandings 
with capitalist states to the point of entering commercial rela­
tions with them in order not only to mitigate the economic 
straits within the USSR but also to try to weaken the "Capi­
talist Encirclement" of those states which quarantined it into 
its isolation. Tha Hitlerian intention to renew Germany^
Drang nach Oaten at Soviet expense was a grave danger to European 
peace.
Thus, international developments, inaugurating a 
change in Comintern policy, permitted the PCI to pick up the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
threads of its old struggle against Fascism in collaboration 
with the Socialists and according to the policies Gramsci had 
promoted almost a decade earlier at Lyons. The ’’Popular Front" 
defensive policy was basically an actuation of the axion "united 
we stand, divided we fall," which contained within it an impli­
cation of preparing for an impending engagement of the enemy. 
Within Italy, the PCI {in concert with the PSI) directed its 
propaganda against Italian aggression in Ethiopia and urged 
strikes, array desertions and sabotage of the military prepara­
tions. This met with only limited success while among Italian 
emigres in Europe the Communists were much more effective in 
launching anti-war demonstrations. The PCI also sent its agents 
to infiltrate the Italian Royal Armed Forces to insinuate paci­
fism and cultivate resentment of the rival Fascist Militia.
None of this succeeded in preventing the subjugation of Ethiopia 
by Fascist Italy.
The real chance for open combat with the Fascists came 
in Spain where a Popular Front government was being faced with 
a revolt by the clerical-military Right led by army general 
Francisco Franco who was in sympathy with the Fascism of Musso­
lini and Hitler. The latter assisted their protege with generous 
support in arms and men while on the other side the "Loyalists" 
requested help from the European Left. The Soviet Union sent in 
materiel and agant-advisers. Thousands of left-wing volunteers 
poured into Spain to form "international brigades" of antl-
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Franco forces. Many of the brigade commanders were leading 
personalities of other communist parties such a3 Luigi Longo 
from the PCI. Togliatti himself became the chief political 
delegate of the Comintern in Spain and wielded a great influence 
in the Spanish CP. The Spanish Civil L’ar was to give Italian 
Communists an experience In civil war which was a foretaste of 
what was to occur in Italy in the near future.
Despite the ultimate defeat of the Spanish Loyalist 
cause, the Civil War taught Communist leaders in Spain an impor­
tant lesson, one which would be helpful in the future. Regardless 
of the deep differences which normally kept parties of the 
Left bitterly divided amongst themselves, unity in defense of 
a common interest, in the struggle for a common goal, in the 
face of a common enemy had been the most powerful weapon in the 
arsenal of the entire Spanish Left. This unity 3hould therefore 
be constantly promoted and reinforced amongst all parties of 
the Left in all countries.
In the larger European scene moreover, developments 
in the late Thirties indicated the trend toward a showdown war 
with Fascism was gaining momentum. Spain had been a prelude. 
During the late Thirties, with all the Popular Front engagements 
against Fascism in the Iberian peninsula, communist successes 
in tha Italian one were not encouraging. The internal party 
activity had been effectively quashed by the police and Communists 
directed most of their efforts at infiltrating Fascist organi-
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zations where largo numbers of members, who were not necessarily 
Communists, ware passive participants out of convenience. The 
younger generation especially became increasingly disaffected 
from the hollow porap and inflated rhetoric of the Fascist 
regime and were more and more attracted to the appeal of the 
Left •
In 1939 an event occurred which seriously strained 
the alliance between Communists and Socialists. The cause again 
derived from a change in Soviet strategy in Europe. For a 
period of time the Soviet Union had been cooperating with West 
European states in the policy of "collective security" against 
Germany. The USSR had even been allowed to enter the League of 
Nations after Germany walked out. However, by the end of the 
decade Stalin grew suspicious of his western allies especially 
after they pacified Hitler at Munich by offering up Czechoslovakia. 
The Soviet Union had been shut out of tha Munich talks and it 
appeared to Stalin that the West was treacherously seeking to 
encourage Hitler*s appetites in Eastern Europe and scheming to 
set Germany and the USSR at each other’s throats. Not to be 
outdone in perfidy, Stalin cynically concluded the notorious 
Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact which stunned Europe and especially 
the Socialist Left which had thrown in with the Communists in 
order to fight Fascism.
For Comraunist3, the significance of the Pact was 
clear. Keeping foremost the constant need to protect and
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defend the cradle of Revolution, the Popular Front had to bide 
time and not provoke, by its anti-Fascist intensity, an attack 
by the Axis on the USSR. When the inevitable war "between 
imperialists" exploded, the Communists would promote a policy 
of defeatism among the proletariat who must escploit the revo­
lutionary possibilities of the war. The overwhelming cynicism 
of this manoeuvre of Realpolitik appalled all but the most 
disciplined party comrades who bowed to the turn of events. In 
the rest of the Left countless numbers, who had idealistically 
conceived of a united struggle of all "democratic" forces 
against Fascism, could not blandly accept the apparent communist 
duplicity and broke away from the Front in dismay and out of 
an increasing aversion to events in the USSR— the purges, the 
collectivization of agriculture, the conformity all of which 
gradually had revealed an unhesitating ruthlessness in Soviet 
methods.
If Communists internally harboured similar emotions, 
few chose to break with the Party. Most chose not to aggravate 
a critical phase in international movement. Although the P8I- 
PCI relationship suffered serious strains from these events, it 
was never completely ruptured. While there was no lack of 
support for such a move among some Socialist leaders, figures 
such as Nenni chose to see the Non-Aggression Pact as a tem­
porary stalling for time by the Soviets who would resume the 
antl-Fascist offensive in short time, Nenni was not incorrect
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Tor as soon as Russo-German solidarity broke and Fascist Italy 
entered the war the PCI-PSI collaboration went into full gear.
Toward the Year of Reckoning —  19^3
For the PCI, the PSI and for all the anti-Fascist 
fuorusciti or exile groups the war was not just a chance to 
coordinate their common resistance to Fascism. It was the 
chance to demolish Fascism completely* For the PCI it was long 
awaited chance to promote its leadership to the working classes, 
to launch Communism in Italy, to vindicate the sacrifices, the 
years of struggle, the disciplined obedience invested to maintain 
Soviet support. It was also a chance to ra-assert and re- 
articulate Gramscifs noble concepts to begin building a new 
proletarian civilization. This was the significance of the 
war and the war and the PCI leadership realized it fully.
For Togliatti, personally, the years of exile and 
total dedication to his cause must have provided abundant 
occasion to Apply the lessons he had learned from Farinelli 
many years before at the University of Turin, Nov/, finally, 
it would bear fruit but not yet without more bitter struggles.
For the PCI, as much as for those to whom Churchill had directly 
addressed his famous words, the war would bring "blood, tears, 
toil and sweat."
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Italy*3 entrance into the war was to prove a disaster 
for Fascism and for Mussolini. Both were to become its victims 
but not without causing immense suffering to the country and to 
its people. Against the advice of his generals, who pleaded 
that Italy was not militarily prepared for such a foreseeably 
long and exhausting war, II Puce, declaring that it was better 
to live a day as a lion than a thousand years as a lamb, led 
his hopelessly un-martial people into the thick while there were 
prizes yet to be had.
Not only was the general civilian population, tired 
of years of war discipline stemming from Ethiopia and Spain, as 
apathetic and gloomy as it was over Italy’s participation before 
W.W.I, but the men in arms, who were poorly equipped because of 
th9 heavy draining of arms into Spain.and earlier Ethiopia, did 
little better than go through the motions of combat and in the 
process won a widespread reputation for military mediocrity.
Led by officers for whom they held little respect and who seemed 
bettor at organizing parades than solving problems of logistics, 
the Italian armies suffered humiliations and defeats right from 
the beginning. The African Empire, which Kussolini had wasted 
no time in monumentalizing in the hardest Ozymandine marble with 
new Roman fora and broad avenues slashing the Eternal City, was 
being lost piece by piece. The British Navy was successfully 
insisting that Mare Nostrum was as much theirs as Fascist Rome’s 
whose navy was substantially sunk at Taranto over this nasty
property contention.
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The effect of the accumulating disasters, especially 
after Italy itself began to be bombed, was to sink civilian 
morale even lower into defeatism, to give heart to the anti- 
Fascist exiles, and to stir hostility and opposition to Musso­
lini within circles of the government and among top Fascists 
rivalling around the dictator. Even Victor Emmanuel III, whose 
moral stature was even lass exalted than his physical one began 
to stir, if for no other motive than from an abiding and utmost 
concern over any threats to Savoy occupancy of the throne and 
anger over the regime *s increasingly unconcerned lese majeste.
YJhlle all this internal ferment was catalyzing the 
"loyal opposition" to the regime, the PCI along with other parties 
of the exile opposition, was intensifying its efforts to transfer 
the centre of operations to the peninsula. This required no 
little exertion in the face of new difficulties for, with the 
establishment of the Vichy regime, many leading Italian 
Communists in France, including Longo, were arrested and deported 
to Italy where they were put in confino on an island off the 
mainland coast. 'gliatti, after a brief French arrest upon 
hi3 return from Spain, took up residence in Moscow until he 
could return to Italy.
The party did succeed in its immediate aim which was 
to send infiltrators into Italy to agitate among the population 
and particularly to stir unrest among the workers of the indus­
trial heartland. These infiltrators, with great risk, managed
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to reestablish cells in crucial places such aa Fiat to try to 
sabotage military production and to stimulate industrial unrest 
by exploiting the brooding discontent among employees who, under 
increasing air raids, became intimate protagonists of war. 
Thousands of pamphlets and leaflets were distributed by the 
PCI over northern Italy. These relentless efforts were finally 
capped with success.
Largely because of communist exertions, by the end 
of 1942 northern industries were subjected to numerous "hiccough" 
strikes which were only ostensibly economic. Finally on March 6 , 
1943 the industrial workers of Turin, the traditional strong­
hold of the PCI, "came through" and thousands of workers of 
the immense Fiat works at Mirafiori {some 21,000 strong) led 
other Turin factories on strike. Thousands of Turinese women 
joined their husbands and staged their own public demonstrations 
calling for the regime to sue for peace now that Sicily itself 
was being invaded. Quickly, major Milanese plants were sub­
jected to similar demonstrations which lasted into April.
Not only did these massive strJ.kes unsettle the already 
shaken confidence-of the.regime i/hich had forbidden strikes 
for twenty years since the Confindustria-Mussolini agreements 
in 1923, they interrupted production and galvanized the palace 
plotters against the Duce. For the PCI the strikes affirmed 
it3 leadership and control of the workers of the North who 
responded to its appeals even before the regime was toppled.
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The latter was not long in coming, for, on July 25 of 1943» 
i'iussolini fell from a coup d*etat, filling the streets with 
demonstrations of approval.
Although the coup did not abolish the entire regime, 
the new royalist government released ail anti-Fascist political 
prisoners who wasted no time in assuming their activities. One 
of the first important achievements of the PCI was to win leading 
control of positions in the old Fascist labour confederations 
with Socialist and Catholic support and, by this, quickly obtain 
an open, recognized, public position of influence and adminis­
trative control within the tolerated political structure. As 
soon as the Allies invaded the mainland at Salerno, Togliatti 
as well as other exile leaders were allowed to return to Italy.
The long wait had finally ended. The hour of victory 
was at hand, but not just yet. The coup had not been a revolu­
tion. The dictatorship of Palazzo Venezia was merely transferred 
to the Palazzo del Quirinale. The nev;  ^ . rnment. under Karshall 
Badoglio, was not revolutionary nor even liberal, kussolini had 
been taken into custody but not imprisoned. Rather, he was con­
fined to an eyrie on top of the highest peak in the Appenines 
where he was soon rescued by Germans. The latter, quickly 
sensing the treacherous intentions of the king, soon turned 
from allies into military occupiers of the country. Badoglio*s 
intentions which were first to neutralize Italyfs belligerent 
status then join the Anglo-Americans after evading possible
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German retaliation vrere foiled. The Allies were not much more 
eager to cooperate with Badoglio and insisted on complete capi­
tulation prior to armistice and invasion.
Finally, on September 9- a day after the Armistice 
was declared, while the Allies were landing, the Italian Royal 
Family and Badoglio courageously fled south abandoning Rome to 
German control. During the previous "Forty-five Days" political 
formations were slowly reemerging in Naples around the venerable 
and prestigious old philosopher Croce who had maintained a 
"quiatist" opposition to the regime during its two decade long 
existence. The Communists took part in this but in the North 
their difficulties were .just beginning. Under Nazi patronage, 
Mussolini proclaimed the formation of the puppet "Italian 
Socialist Republic” based near Verona. While the Fouth was 
being liberated by the Allies, in the North an armed guerilla 
partisan resistance was quickly taking form. Although its 
leadership reflected every political hue, the role of the 
Communists was primary. Mot only would its activities be 
directed against the Nazi occupiers, but for two years, Italy, 
or at least the North, would suffer the worst experience a 
nation may sustain, Civil 'Var.
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C H A P T E R III
A noi comunisti spettera di salvarla!"
  Gramsci addressing the
Special Tribunal 
May, 1928
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Return to Legality
Italian democrats like to consider "la resistenza armata" 
to have been one of the great periods of modern Italian history, 
the culmination and fulfillment of the Rlsorgimento which had 
been left "unfinished." The moral resurgence incited by the 
final, bloody combat against Fascism during the Resistance 
affirmed the ideals of democratic, economic and social justice 
with the same intensity with which the Risorgimento had celebra­
ted the ideals of national unity and the independent liberal 
state. And these later commitments to ordain the Rights of the 
Common Man were consecrated by the amplitude of the sacrifices 
exacted to legitimize them.
In the vanguard of this struggle for the future of 
Italy, which had enlisted thousands into its ranks, were the 
Communists. Although the Communists constituted about half the 
partisan brigades they were not alone in this movement. At 
their side stood all the other anti-Fascist movements of vary­
ing size and varying degrees of political radicalism.
For the PCI itself. the Resistance was a great turning 
point, the start of a still continuing metamorphosis. During 
the years of the clandestine struggle the PCI had assumed a 
Russo-bolshevist character which served well to protect it in
1. Of ovor 200,000 more or less regular participants in the par­
tisan movement it has been estimated that over 70,000 were 
killed and 40,000 severely wounded. Vide G. Mammarella Italy 
After Fascism A Political History 1943-1963 (Montreal, 1964),_3I
lhe iiifth Army sustained 54.000 losses in the Italian campaign. 
Delzell, op. cit. p. 543
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times of weakness and adversity. Now this chrysalis stage 
was ending and out of the political cocoon of anti-Fascisia was 
emerging a new imago ready to spread its red emblazoned wings 
before a fascinated public which had been used for twenty years 
to the colour of Black.
One of Togliattifs last important acts in Moscow 
before his return to Italy in early 1944 was to help prepare 
the dissolution of the Third International of which he himself 
was Vice-Secretary.
On May 15s 1943 the Executive Committee passed a 
resolution:
The development of events in the last quarter century has 
shown that the original form of uniting the workers chosen 
by the First Congress of the Communist International (in 
1919) answered the conditions of the first stages of the 
working class movement, but has been outdated by the growth 
of the movement and by the complications of its problems 
in individual countries, and has become a drag on the fur­
ther strengthening of the national working class parties.
The Praesidium of the ECCI submits for the acceptance of 
the sections of the Communist International:
(i) The Communist International, as directing centre of 
the international working-class movement is to be 
dissolved.
(il) The sections of the Communist International are to
be freed from the obligations of the rules and regu­
lations and from decisions of the Congress of the 
Communist International...^
2. David Floyd Mao Against Khrushchev. A Fhort History of the 
Sino-Soviet Conflict (New York, 1964), Part Two (Documents),
pp. 209-210
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Even if >iachiavellian motives led to the dissolution 
of the Comintern^ its effect, in the case of the PCI was to 
allow a great deal of room for manoeuvre. On the other hand, 
after being used for twenty-four years to the idea of an 
international cosrjnunist centre, the absence of one was a now 
factor to which communist parties had to adjust.
The International had been a source of legitimacy 
for exiled communist parties and it had given member parties 
a sense of unity and strength, a sonse of charing in the 
success and prestige of the USSR in building the first socialist 
society in history and a senso of furthering the cause of 
"proletarian internationalism" by remaining loyal to the 
cradle of the revolution, flow, parties v/ould not be obliged 
formally to follow tho policies of si Central Committee In 
Moscow despite the habit of doing so for almost a quarter of 
a century. Togliatti was aware of the importance of this
3. See Leopold Labedz "The End of an Ipoch" Survey £54» 
(January, 1965) p. 7
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new situation.^ He was especially attuned to the exigencies 
of political conditions in Italy in the context of the general 
European situation and with regard to the post war aims of 
both the USSR and the Anglo-Americans* When in March, 1944 
Togliatti returned to Italy to assume the leadership of the 
PCI he held no illusions about the limits of his immediate 
powers*
His prominent position in the International had 
afforded him a vantage point to observe the political objectives 
which motivated the military operations of both sides of the 
Allied effort. If, by mutual understanding, the USSR would be 
permitted to exercise its influence in East Europe it was clear
4. "During the discussions (on the commission charged with dis­
solving the International) Togliatti posed for the first 
time the issue of collaboration among communist and worker’s 
parties after the victory over Fascism, in the absence of 
a Communist International. Few know that the ideas under­
stood subsequently by the nominative "polycentrism" were 
born at that time, from the reflections which Togliatti 
made in those days while the International was being nulli­
fied. Even then he was wont to draw attention to the 
importance of bilateral, multilateral and, even more, 
regional collaboration. Even then he used to underline 
the importance of collaboration among parties which were 
operating and struggling in analogous conditions.*1
Veljko Vlahovic "A Mosca nel 1943: Prima formulaaione del
policentrismo" II Contemporaneo/Rlnascita (Rome), XXIX.
No. 34»(August 2tT, ) P* 12. Even if this recollection 
was made after "polycentrism" became common currency in the 
communist movement there is no reason to assume that Togliatti 
did not hold such ideas in 1943 and helps to understand 
postwar tactics of the PCI.
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that Western Europe was to remain under Anglo-American influence. 
The Mediterranean zone in turn was of particularly British 
interest for it was the strategic anteroom to the Suez canal 
and the Empire in Asia and East Africa, Italy clearly fell 
into this latter zone, as did Greece, and in neither area 
could the Red army guarantee, as in East Europe, the success of 
communist control of government even if in the case of both 
countries this accession to power was more than just a remote 
possibility. 'When Togliatti landed in Naples the solution of 
the "institutional problem" concerning the form of government 
for liberated Southern Italy was already largely decided by 
the British (i.e. Churchill).
Churchill, who was well aware of the potential power 
of the Left in Italy, was adamant in his support of the dis­
credited King and Badoglio whom the Allies had installed in a 
minuscule "Kingdom of the South” at Brindisi. The British Prime 
Minister, who prevailed over his American colleagues in 
Italian matters, resolutely backed Victor Emmanuel in resisting 
the bids for power of the anti-Fascist leaders on the Committees 
of National Liberation (CLN) who had loudly demanded his abdi­
cation at a CLN Congress in Bari. In the face of this refusal 
by the tenacious Savoyard, the leaders of the various parties 
refused to serve in 3Badoglio,s government. Thus the political 
situation in Liberated Italy in early 1944 was in total paralysis. 
The break in this political deadlock came from the least expected
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source* Two weeks prior to Togliatti*s return, the USSR 
announced formal recognition of the Dadoglio government, catching 
the Anglo-Americans by surprise and thoroughly confusing the 
CLN parties.
Clearly, such an action 'was not motivated by sympathy 
for the royal government. The Soviet recognition foretold the 
attitude which would be adopted by the PCI upon the return of 
its leader. On March 2£> the Italian Communist Party secretary 
carried out what has been known as the "svolta di Salerno" or 
the turnabout at Salerno.5 Togliatti declared that for the 
moment the question of the monarchy was of secondary importance. 
The primary task facing free Italy was to create a united and 
representative National Front to prosecute the war against the 
Nazis and the quisling Fascist Republic still in control of 
more than half of the peninsula. Until the war was over, there­
fore, the PCI would be willing to enter the King’s government 
and to postpone institutional questions for the time being since 
it was all too clear that the Allies were not yet prepared to 
dispose of the compromised royal government.
Both the Soviet diplomatic recognition of the Badoglio 
government and the "svolta di Salerno" were evidence that 
neither the USSR nor the PCI nourished the illusion that a
5. After the Allies achieved general control of Southern Italy, 
the seat of the Royal Government was moved from Brindisi to 
Salerno.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
revolutionary communist assumption of power in Italy was 
imminent. At this stage PCI tactics were dictated primarily 
by the realities of the situation rather than purely theoretical 
considerations and the ,fsvolta” was in communist terms the most 
favourable extrapolation of a difficult political problem. The 
"svolta" became in effect the first step made along the "Italian 
Road to Socialism" which the PCI would travel for the next two 
decades under the navigation of Togliatti.^
This first step could hardly have been more auspicious 
for the party. In a stroke it promoted itself into the fore­
ground of the political stage and demonstrated to the other 
Italian parties the quality of the political leadership with 
which they would have to rockon. The PCI immediately became 
one of the principal elements in the nov/ government formula.
The other parties, perched firmly and stubbornly on their plat­
form of non-participation, found their position cut off from
6 . "Unlike the Bourbons— of whom it was said when they returned 
to France in 1814 that they had learned nothing and forgot­
ten nothing— Togliatti had learned much and managed to 
forget what might be embarrassing in the future. From 
Gramscl and the Ordine Muovo experience of 1920-1922 he 
had derived the lesson that revolutions are determined by 
the balance of social forces and not by violent words.
From the long struggle against Fascism he had learned the 
danger of isolation from the other left wing parties; and 
from Spain, the potent force of nationalism and the possi­
bilities of multi-class anti-Fascist government which 
would call itself democratic and not Socialist."
Robert Wohi "Togliatti, Master of Manoeuvre" Communist 
Affairs, Vol. 1, Mo. 9, {Mov,-Dec. 1963/, p. 24
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behind and were quickly constrained to come to a temporary 
compromise on the issue of the monarchy. This flexibility by 
the PCX was to remain one of its most important instruments 
in promoting its own cause. V/oll aware that the British, with 
Vatican concurrence, were promoting a conservative, preferably 
royal government in the liberated touth, the constant policy of 
the PCX was to maintain its presence in various cabinets and 
in government generally. V/hile this collaborationist attitude 
appears cynical and hypocritical it was prudent. The British 
on their part had not hesitated in vetoing participation in 
the government of an outspoken Republican, Carlo Sforza, who 
was unacceptable to them, but whom the CLN had wished to make 
Foreign Minister.
Wot to have collaborated would have meant abandoning 
the field to the spokesmen of conservatism; notably to the 
Christian Democrats and, to their right, the Liberals. In the 
pasc these parties had adopted an equivocal attitude towards 
Fascism and had not had any scruples about entering the first 
Mussolini ministry. In the South, moreover, the forces of con­
servatism had an initial advantage over the Left since the 
Anglo-Americans were clearly on the side of the conservatives.
In the war-torn Worth, however, the Left was deeply 
engaged in carrying on with the Resistance. Its military 
efforts were by no moans negligible; but the Resistance also 
symbolised a radical, reform-minded and, at its extreme, outright
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revolutionary, political-social movement in which the pre­
vailing vision of future Italian society was decidedly 
socialistic. At its maximum strength in the latter part of 
1944 and early 1945 the partisans succeeded actually in routing 
the German armies out of a number of Alpine valleys long before 
Allied armies arrived.
In the liberated areas tiny "republics" were created 
and the sweeping reforms inaugurated In them Illustrated the 
general orientation partisans expected Italian society to take 
after the war. The headquarters for Northern Resistance was 
in Hilan where the CLNAI (Comitato della liberations nazionale 
per l*alta Italia —  Committee of National Liberation for Upper 
Italy) was centered. One of the most outstanding of the leaders 
of this most radical of the Liberation Committees was Luigi 
Longo. Thus, aside from whatever military value the northern 
partisan movement possessed, its political extremism and Red 
sympathy was not ingratiating to the Allies, who feared another 
Tito-type movement in Northern Italy. Until the Normandy front 
was opened on June 6, 1944> causing several Allied divisions to 
be removed from Italy to France, the Resistance did not receive 
extraordinary support from the Allied Military Command. Toward 
the final days of the war in Italy the partisans nevertheless 
succeeded in liberating on their own virtually every important 
northern city: Bologna, Venice, Genoa, Milan and Turin, winning
in the process of leading the insurrections an immense moral 
prestige with the population.
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The symbolic end of this long and painful purifica­
tion by fire which reduced Italian Fascism to ashes was the 
exposure of the suspended corpse of its champion to the vengeful 
abuses of Milanese victims of past Fascist terror.
”11 vento del nord”
At the end of hostilities in Italy domestic politics 
were characterized by a resuscitation of pre-Fascist parties 
which represented basically two opposing viewpoints about the 
manner in which post-v/ar Italian political life should be 
organized: the old Right, symbolized in Croce, wanted to
revive the orthodox pre-Fascist liberal state and, taking a 
lesson from the past, to start again along the old lines while 
avoiding the errors which led to Fascism; the Left, symbolized 
by the Resistance and especially by the revived revolutionary 
parties, sought to lay entirely new political and economic 
foundations upon which postwar Italy would be built. It did 
not 'want merely to rebuild upon the old foundations buried under 
the debris of Fascism,
For two years from the time of MussoliniTs fall to 
the end of hostilities two differing ideals concerning the 
future of Italy rivalled each other. In the North the partisans 
fought for the sake of one ideal whilo in the South the conser-
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vatives, under Allied aegis, began applying their concepts 
about the governing of Italy. Thus, by the end of the actual 
fighting, the two halves of Italy had undergone profoundly 
different experiences. Ordinary Italians in both areas became 
even more isolated from each other by these experiences.
In the South the passive, apolitical peasantry, little 
changed from the way Gramsci described them, strove desperately 
to make ends meet under wartime conditions but they experienced 
little of the viciousness of the partisan vs. Fascist blood­
letting. In the North the peasantry became intimately involved 
in the civil strife. While the South was being governed oy the 
spiritless king and the conservative minded Allies, neither of 
whom were immediately concerned with changing the status quo, 
the North was being governed by the Leftward-looking CLNAI 
which lost no time in making changes in the existing order.
In areas liberated by the partisans, industrial workers, for 
example, were encouraged to group themselves into consigli di 
gestione or management councils to run the factories. This was 
an indication of Communist influence in the CLNAI (and the unions) 
and revealed a durable commitment to Gramsci*s early ideas of 
the Ordine Nuovo period. V/herever the partisans gained control, 
government was purged of its Fascist bureaucracy and local 
offices were filled by CLN appointees.
VJhen finally the military role of the CLNAI was 
finished and its leaders could concentrate more fully on the
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political consequences of the armed Resistance they had just 
finished leading, their attention was directed toward the con­
servative government in Rome about which they scarcely concealed 
their hostility. Considering the politicians of the South to 
be stale and timid old men not fully committed to the idea of 
renewing the Italian political, economic and social structure 
and to have begun this renewal only half-heartedly the CLNAI 
declared that it would direct the ’'wind of the north” toward 
Rome to clear the air of the putrid atmosphere of compromise 
and end the hesitancy about reform.
The militancy of the CLMAI leadership, which was 
underlined by sporadic acts of violence against wealthy Fascist 
sympathizers by extremist squads of still-armed ex-partisans, 
caused panic among propertied upper and middle classes who had 
not fared badly under the orderly regime of Mussolini, For a 
period these classes lived in real fear of a revolution in which 
their privileges and possessions would be swept away. The 
brigades of hardened partisans were still armed in early 1945 
and among the communist-dominated brigades a real effort was 
made to retain these weapons despite Allied requests to surren­
der them. Thus it was that the threat of revolution appeared 
to the frightened upper and middle classes to be most seriously 
posed by the Communists and fellow travelling Socialists (and 
to a lesser degree by the other partisans led by the Action 
Party). This fear, la grande paura, lasted for the duration of
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1945, a year in which revolution in Italy seemed not only 
possible but very probable.
Yet the expected did not take place. The principal 
reason for this was the policy adopted by the PCI itself under 
Togliatti*s leadership. Upon his return to Italy, Togliatti 
stated to his followers that for the PCI the days of clandes­
tine conspiracy were ended. Without alluding to theoretical 
motivations he declared to the PCI National Council in April
1944 that: "We are no longer a sect of agitators but have
7
assumed the responsibility of a great party.” Responsibility 
did not suggest inciting revolution as a means of gaining power. 
The PCI did not discard its aspirations to power but in pursu­
ing them the party was to choose different tactics. In judging 
its chances for success the PCI was to play its hand carefully, 
always keeping in mind the final stakes of the game in order 
to forego the temptation of quick, easy and temporary gains.
The party was not weak: after sustaining twenty years
of Fascist violence against it, it was, in terms of organisa­
tion, stronger than any of the other Italian parties; it had 
won an immense prestige during the Resistance and it had demon­
strated the real support it possessed among the industrial 
workers of the North who had overwhelmingly accepted its leader­
ship in staging the great strikes of 1943. Nevertheless,
7. Fulvio Bellini "The Italian CP: The Transformation of a
Party 1921-1945” Problems of Communism, Vol. V, No. 1, 
(Jan.-Feb. 1956), p. 42
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certain facts remained to be taken into account. These facts 
ruled out revolution regardless of impatient militancy 
especially among ex-partisans who feared a restoration of the 
old order. Revolution in occupied Italy was quite simply out 
of the question. Such an adventure would never be tolerated 
by the Anglo-Americans even if its success were possible.
Soviet military power could not guarantee the success of any 
revolutionary insurrection in Italy and the civil war in Greece 
provided sobering evidence to Italian Communists of the futility 
of going it alone.
Even if Communism had successfully been replanted in 
fertile Italian soil, in 1944 it was still a relatively weak 
plant. The prestige of Soviet solidarity and support for the 
resurgent PCI was necessary until it could bore its roots 
deeply enough into the political loam of postwar Italy to be 
able to sustain its own growth and development. With revolution 
ruled out, therefore, the PCI pursued two goals which in differ­
ent manner it still pursues today: one was to achieve a "unity
of action" with Italian Socialists; the other was to arrive 
at a working understanding with the mass-based Catholic party 
to persuade it to govern Italy i.i concert with the other two 
"mass parties," the Communist and Socialist.
While a Catholic confessional party would seem to be 
an unlikely candidate to enter a government coalition with 
Social-Communists, it was not an entirely inconceivable arrange-
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Kent especially* in the eyes of Communists. The Democrazia 
Crlstlana was an extremely heterogeneous political alliance of 
disparate elements united by little more than a common Catho­
licism which was exploited effectively by the party to win the 
allegiance of the church-going masses. There was reason to 
believe that a greater identity of views concerning economic 
and social reform could be found between the anti-clerical 
Left and populist Left-wing Catholics than between the latter 
and the reactionary Right in the DC party. Taking the long- 
range view the PCI leadership concluded that the forces to be 
reckoned with in future Italian society would be three: Catho­
lic. Communist and Socialist. If these forces could be brought 
to cooperate in shaping public policy Italy could rapidly 
experience progressive reforms. Hence, PCI policy was directed 
toward achieving this long-range goal.
As for the Action Party, Togliatti correctly concluded 
that despite its appeal to democratic-minded professionals and 
intellectuals, it lacked fundamental mass support. The Action 
Party was a great hope and a great disappointment to radical- 
minded Italians. Ferruccio Parri, the former Actionist head 
of the CLNAI and Prime minister for some five months in 1945, 
tried to bring about the changes in political orientation 
implicit in the phrase Mil vento del Nord.” This included among 
other projects, for example, breaking up the powerful monopolies 
which had thrived under Fascism, instituting new taxation plans,
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR UBMRY
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land reform, controlling distribution of scarce raw materials 
to favour small and medium concerns, and hastening the establish­
ment of a republic, all of vrhich aroused implacable hostility 
from the privileged conservative classes and their political 
parties.
On the other hand, the desperate economic misery 
among the general Italian public caused massive demonstrations 
by the unemployed and landless who often had been part of the 
Resistance and who demanded relief from their economic plight. 
Unwilling to repress the latter and unable to carry out pro­
jected plans against the former, Parri was caught in a bind.
The impasse was abruptly terminated when the conservative 
Liberals and Christian Democrats pulled out of the radical 
Parri government whose programme the latter felt was too 
closely aligned with that of the extreme Left. Before giving 
up his office, however, Parri took the occasion to denounce 
before the public "the fifth column inside his government (i.e. 
Christian Democrats and Liberals) which after having systemati­
cally undermined his position, was now preparing to restore to 
power those political and social forces that had formed the 
basis of the Fascist regime."^
The fall of the Parri government signified not simply
8. Mammarella, op. cit. p. 104
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the failure of the Action Party to i tfill its potential as an 
important moderating influence in Italian politics, to become 
a bridge between the clerical Right and Marxist Left; it meant 
the end of the period when the militant reformist idealism of 
the Resistance motivated the leaders of subsequent post-war 
Italian governments. Parri*s fall did succeed in illustrating 
to extreme ex-partisan Communists the prudence of Togliatti*s 
moderation. Seeking above all to maintain Communist partici­
pation in government, Togliatti urged caution in order not to 
alienate the middle-classes and their parties. An open clash 
with the already hostile bourgeoisie was to be avoided. The 
moment was not opportune for the kind of extremism which would 
frighten off potential allies. Thus, the party was not upset 
when Christian Democrat Alcide de Gasperi was called upon to 
form his first government since it v/as to be basically a tri­
partite government of Christian Democrats, Socialists and 
Communists. The PCI ambition to share influence and control In 
shaping and applying public policy would not be frustrated in 
such an arrangement. It was the occasion to carry out the 
responsibilities of a "great, national party."
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Premises and Postulates
In September 1917, almost on the eve of the Bolshevik 
Revolution, Lenin warned in State and Revolution that "it is 
obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible 
not only without a violent revolution, but also without the 
destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created 
by the ruling class."9 as Marxist-Leninists, Italian Communists 
were well acquainted with this classic text. One of its chief 
aims was to defend Bolshevik revolutionary tactics while 
attacking the "revisionism” of certain Marxists, particularly 
some leaders of the German iiocial-Democratic party, who were 
urging the adoption of gradualist, non-violent tactics to create 
Socialism by utilizing existing bourgeois institutions, 
especially parliaments and trade unions.
It might appear that, in 1946, the PCI by following 
a policy of collaboration with bourgeois parties which had 
revealed their hostility to change by toppling Parri*s reform- 
minded ministry, was moving away from Lenin and actually 
moving towards Eduard Bei-nstein. This was not the case and 
certainly the idea would have been ridiculed by Communist and 
non-Communist alike. True, the PCI was not about to launch a 
violent revolution and the reasons have already been stated.
9. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 25 (London: 1964), p. 368
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Italy, 1946, simply was not Russia, 1917. This did not mean, 
however, that violent revolution as such was being permanently 
rejected: it had its validity under certain conditions.
Those conditions, principally a sure chance of success, x*ere 
at the time lacking in Italy, To have tried and to have failed 
was felt to be more dangerous and potentially disastrous to 
the cause than not to try at all. There was, moreover, subtler 
reasoning behind PCI policies.
In 1946 the PCI had cause to be optimistic about its 
chances of gaining power for "the destruction of the apparatus 
of state power which was created by the ruling class" had 
largely occurred in Italy as a result of the x*rar.
The Italian military capitulation, the collapse of
the national government and the internecine war of the Resis­
tance were the substantial equivalent of the "violent revolu­
tion." Of course, the particulars of the Italian debacle were 
somewhat unusual and it cannot be said that the Allied invasion 
caused everything that was to be swept away before it. In 
being allowed to "earn its passage" back into the good graces 
of the victorious allies, Italy was permitted to carry on with 
something like limited self-rule while the war-front was pushed 
up the peninsula. But the only instruments of government 
tolerated by the Allies were the leftovers from the previous 
state apparatus; the king, his ministers and the bureaucracy
and, as has been pointed out, this ’was not a regime which was
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about to ’'utterly destroy the bourgeois state," Nevertheless, 
by the time the fighting ended and the smoke had cleared away 
it was unmistakable that the old order in Italy had emerged from 
the ordeal in a tottering condition and could not survive intact. 
In the wake of './orId Y/ar II, the Italian political 
situation v/as one i^hich Gramsci would have described as an 
"organic crisis" of the State. The unity of dominio and dire- 
zione, the prerequisite condition for any ruling group to 
exex'cise power, had been ruptured: nor was populai’ consent to
be governed under the status quo forthcoming either spontaneously 
or by coercion. Much like the situation after World War I, the 
balance of forces for change versus the forces of reaction were 
even. It would require little added to either side to upset 
the delicate equilibrium. In prison, Gramsci had theorized 
upon this:
...a crisis of hegemony of the ruling class...comes about 
either because the ruling class has failed in some big 
political undertaking for which it asked, or imposed by 
force, the consent of the broad masses (like war), or 
because vast masses (especially ox peasants and petty 
bourgeois intellectuals) have passed suddenly from poli­
tical passivity to a corbain activity and put forward 
aims which in their disorganic complex constitute a 
revolution. One speaks of a "crisis of authority” and 
this in fact is the crisis of hegemony, or crisis of the 
State in all spheres.
The crisis creates immediately dangerous situations, 
because the different strata^f the population do not 
possess the same capacity for rapid reorientation or for 
reorganizing themselves with the same rhythm. The tradi­
tional ruling class which had a numerous trained personnel, 
changes men and programmes and reabsorbs the control which 
was escaping it with a greater speed than occurs in the 
subordinate classes; it makes sacrifices, exposes itself
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to an uncertain power, strengthens it for the moment and 
makes use of it in order to crush its opponent and dis­
pose its leading personnel which cannot be very numerous 
or well-trained,1^
Thus it happened in specific historical instances, 
such as after world tfar I in Italy, that the ruling group(s) 
could not make the changes quickly or well enough to maintain 
power in its own hands, i.e., in the hands of its traditional 
political parties and/or spokesmen. Seeing the handwriting 
on the wall, it therefore places its confidence (and its 
interests) in the hands of a single leader. The Leader, heading 
a party with a heterogeneous social base, succeeds in convinc­
ing a whole range of social classes of diverse or even opposed 
interests that he possesses the theoretical and practical solu­
tion of likely disastrous social, political and economic rival­
ries. Mussolini, in his ideology Fascism, claimed to have solved 
the problem of the class struggle with the concept of the 
"corporate state":
V/hen thg crisis does not find.., / the7«,.organic solution, 
but.../finds/...the solution of a divine leader, it means 
that there exists a static equilibrium (whose factors may 
be unequal, but in which the immaturity of the progressive 
forces is decisive); that no group either conservative or 
progressive had the force for victory and that even the 
conservative group needs a master,11
10. Gramsci "The Modern Prince" In Socialist Thought: A Docu­
mentary History, A. Fried and R , Sanders Eds. (Chicago 71^64),
pp. 521-p22
11. Gramsci, ibid. p. 522
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After World. War II, resorting to the solution of the 
Leader, il Puce, was out of the question: not only were the
conservative leaders not prepared to capitulate again, but 
Italy was now reaping the harvest of having chosen this solu­
tion twenty years earlier.
Thus, in arriving at its postwar policy decisions, 
the Italian Communist Party v/eighed not only the practicality 
of the available choices on the basis of a gauge known as 
possibilismo: it did have a theoretical framework from which
concrete policies could be deduced and justified. Such con­
clusions, moreover, were not based upon irrelevant theoretical 
fabrications. They were based upon the cogitations of a first 
class mind which was contemplating a situation with which it 
was intimately familiar. Gramsci*s Marxism was not revisionism: 
in its emphasis on the voluntaristic side of Marxist philosophy, 
that is, in not insisting upon the rigidly supine relationship 
of politics to economics, Gramsci and Lenin shared a similar 
view. That Grarusci,s thought was an Italian variant of Marxism- 
Leninism was a source of encouragement and legitimation for 
the PCI to pursue the policies it laid out for itself, because 
for Gramsci:
Politics will always have a philosophical dimension, and 
revolution will always include cultural creativeness. In 
plainer terms, the simplification of revolutionary action 
by (or at least since Lenin), to the stretegy and tactics 
of a minority intent on seizing power is a dangerous 
approach to the vast work of liberation which must begin 
\\rith a revolution of ideas, progress through the adoption 
of a new morality by the masses, and culminate in the
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social hegemony of that new ethic.***2
If, therefore, the PCI was to make a truly enduring 
impression on Italian society it must seek to make its ideals 
permeate the social and economic, intellectual and cultural 
institutions of this society so deeply that the presence of 
its ideology, throughout the social fabric became almost pal­
pable. Only in this way could the ultimate hegemony be realized 
within "civil society," and, consequent to this, be reflected 
in its political institutions. And, to follow this method meant 
not to misunderstand the real meaning of revolution: revolution
is not a panacean coup dfetat, a "thaumaturgical act" as Gramsci 
would say, in which the degree of success is confused with the 
amount of violence. Violence per se is a chimera. It has 
value if it brings about the changes desired but there is no 
reason to prefer it to less painful but equally effective means. 
There should above all be no prejudice against participating in 
parliament.
It was true that, in the shadow of an impending up­
heaval in Russia, Lenin could excoriate "revisionists" and 
"renegades" who would hold back from demolishing a bourgeois
12. "Hegemony" is a key word in Gramsci, implying opposition 
to "dictatorship" in the sense that cultural predominance 
can be distinguished from political power. When they 
coincide, that is revolution. 121aJ
12(a) Meil Mclnnes "Antonio Gramsci" Survey, Ho. 53, (Oct. 19b^), 
p. 11 and p. 11 footnote
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state by revolution on the grounds that it was necessary to 
wait until Capitalism matured mechanically and collapsed under 
the weight of its own insoluble economic, social and political 
contradictions. In Russia, this would have taken who knows 
how long? Furthermore, the possibility of realizing structural 
reforms within a Russia of which Gramsci had written that "the 
State is everything and civil society nothing” was not encour­
aging. Russia lacked the well-rooted, tested public institutions 
and organizations through which formal political action, antag­
onistic to the existing State power structure, could legitimately 
be articulated and projected.
Russia was not an England or a Germany equipped with 
highly developed legislative bodies; an all-powerful Parliament, 
control of which was theoretically accessible to a mass-based 
working-class party; a system of regional self-legislating 
Lander whose measure of political autonomy was a countervailing 
force to the central authority; widespread suffrage, giving 
such bodies a relevance to organized Labour and Social Democra­
tic parties; large, militant and powerful trade union movements 
to win steady concessions from the Capitalist owners of industry: 
all these things in centralized, bureaucratic Russia remained 
in what Gramsci had called a "gelatinous stage." Lenin could 
not be impressed by the transform!st promises of parliament 
as constituted:
Take any parliamentary country, from America to Switzer­
land from France to Britain, Norway and so forth— in these
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countries the real business of "state" is performed behind 
the scenes and is carried on by the departments) chancel­
lories and General Staff. Parliament is given up to talk 
for the special purpose of fooling the "common people.”
This is so true that even in the Russian republic, a bour­
geois democratic republic, all these signs of parliamentarism 
came out at once, even before it managed to set up a real 
parliament.13
But, stated Lenin:
The way out of parliamentarism is not, of course, the 
abolition of representative institutions and the elective 
principle but the conversion of the representative insti­
tutions from talking shops into working bodies, *
The "working bodies" were the Soviets. However, the
existing Russian republic was nothing but the oppressive ruling
apparatus of the bourgeois classes. It could not be transformed
"legally" from within itself, and, therefore there was not any
alternative but to attack and smash it "illegally" from without.
Having done this the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie would be
replaced by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" organised in
the system of Soviets. In State and Revolution such was Lenin*s
conviction that he insisted that:
A Marxist is solely someone who extends the recognition of 
the class struggle to the recognition of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat.15
Lenin did not finish State and Revolution. In October 
he went from v/rit±ng about revolution to leading one. But
13. State and Revolution, p.74
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
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three years later, on the eve of the Second Congress of Comin­
tern, be returned to the subject of proper revolutionary tactics: 
on t h o c c a s i o n ,  however, he directed all his polemical skill 
against certain leaders of '.Vest European Socialist parties who 
had adopted extreme revolutionary postures in emulation of what 
they understood to be the characteristic attitude which brought 
triumph to thejr Bolshevik comrades:
In "Left Y/ing" Communism. An Infantile Disorder 
Lenin directed some of his words specifically to the extremist 
Italian socialist leaders to consider:
...Comrade Bordiga and his "Left" friends draw from their 
correct criticism of ilessrs. Turati and Co. the wrong con­
clusion that participation in parliament is harmful in 
general.,.They simply cannot conceive of a "new" method of 
utilizing parliament...
The childishness of those who "repudiate" participation in 
parliament consists precisely in the fact that they think 
it possible to "solve" the difficult problem of combatting 
bourgeois democratic influences within the working class 
movement by such a "simple" "easy," supposedly revolution­
ary method, when in reality they are only running away 
from their own shadow..
While admitting that a bourgeois institution such as 
parliament can embourgeo?s working-class participants, Lenin 
warned that even successful Communist parties such as his own 
v/ould be "invaded by a still larger number of bourgeois intel­
lectuals." And since Communism could not be built without the
16. Lenin, "Left Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder. 
{Moscow, 1947)1 P* lid, 119
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!faid of the human materiel created by capitalism" this human
materiel, (particularly the intellectuals) must be "vanquished,
remolded, assimilated and re-educated," just as it would be
"necessary to reeducate the proletarians themselves." This
would not be an easy think to do but sooner or later it must
be done. Such problems could not be ignored as trifling, to
be brushed aside with an easy wave of the hand. Communists
by no means must consider themselves to be above this task,
immune and uncontaminated by bourgeois parliamentarianism,
to consider themselves somehow "pure" in their utter dedication
to the proletarian revolution:
You think, my dear boycottists and anti-parliamentarians 
that you are "terribly revolutionary" but in reality you 
are frightened by the comparatively small difficulties 
of the struggles against bourgeois influences within the 
working-class movement... Like children you are frightened 
by a small difficulty vfhich confronts you today, not under­
standing that tomrrow and the day after you will anyhow have 
to learn, and learn throughly, to overcome thensame diffi­
culties only on an immeasurably greater scale. 1
The immediate audience to which Lenin directed State 
and Revolution one month before the October Revolution was not 
the same audience he had foremost in mind when, one month before 
the Second Comintern Congress, he wrote Left Wing Communism.
In the latter work he made it clear to a ivorld wide audience, 
parts of which he named specifically, that this was a work to 
which they must pay close attention. It was this Leninism of
17. op.cit.p. 120
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Left-Wing Communism which contained elements close to Gramsci’s 
own thinking and it was this Leninism which had most validity 
for the PCI in the situation in which it operated after World 
War II,
It would do irjustice to Lenin, Togliatti wrote in
Rinascita. the PCI weekly:
to retain his direction and guidance applicable to the 
tzarist or Kerensky regime and use it in present da.y 
situations of the advance capitalist countries or newly 
liberated nations. s
To be sure Italian Communists considered themselves 
to be Leninists but this was not to say that the Russian P.evo- 
lutionary had said everything that was to be said on every 
problem to be faced by Communists f oreverinore. To believe 
this would be a false kind of loyalty and was certainly not 
Marxism. From Gramsci, Italian Communists inherited an 
essential lesson that Marxism, ,rthe philosophy of praxis," 
rather than being an already codified body of canonical dogma, 
was instead a creative method of dialectical analysis. It was 
a theoretical instrument by which complex social-political-
18. Quoted by E. Demaitre "Italian Communism., Debate and 
Dilemma" Communist Affairs, Vol. Ill, No. 4, (Aug. 11, 
1965), p.'“5
From this statement Demaitre draws the conclusion that 
"the destruction of the bourgeois-capitalist state and 
the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
wore no longer indispensible for attaining the goals to 
which ’the Italian road to socialism’ was expected to 
lead."18(a)
lo(a) Ibid.
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economic realities could be .reduced to their basic factors, 
be studied in their particulars, be understood in their chang­
ing relationships and be re-synthesized into their macrocosmic 
pattern. Thus it was not only possible but foreseeable that 
any given situation ’would change enough in time to warrant neiy 
relationships for previously discerned factors as they 
acquired differing relative importance to each other and there­
fore required that different emphasis be placed on them.
Ho one had demonstrated the truth of this better 
than the last survivor of the duumvirs of pristine Marxism, 
Engels, Engels lived almost into the twentieth century, sur­
viving Marx who died in 1383 by twelve years. Much had taken 
place since the two men collaborated in writing the Manifesto 
almost half a century earlier. In March 1895 Engels wrote a 
preface to Marx*s Class Struggles in France 1843-1850. Since 
he died within a few months of its v/riting. the preface has 
sometimes been considered to be Engels* "political testament."
It is an important document containing a number of striking 
statements. It reveals Engels* unsubdued ability to analyze 
Incisively the actual political scene to the extent of realizing 
how much changed conditions had opened up new horizons for the 
political advancement of the working class and led him to admit 
honestly that some earlier conclusions about the revolution 
had to be reevaluated.
According to their original analyses, revolution had
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always boon tho work of a minority, wrote Engels, "tho ruled
majority either participated in tho revolution for tho benefit
of tho fomor or Glee calmly acquiesced in it.":
but history#. .has coiaplotely transformed the conditions 
under which tho proletariat lias to fight. Tho mode of 
struggle of lb4£ is today obsolete in every respect and 
this is a point which deserves close examination on tho 
present occasion, y
Tho factor which had undergone such a profound trans­
formation was tho question of the utility of universal suffrage 
to worker parties. The power of the franchise had long been 
underestimated by Marxist political leaders. Suffrage was 
a "snaro" an "instrument of government trickery." As consti­
tuted . bourgeois parliamentt: wora polito charades where tho 
hypocritical bourgeoisie engaged in games of "parliamentary 
skittles." It was common knowledge that the roal lovers e m ­
power lay elsewhere. Lenin was particularly vehement in 
denouncing the "venal," "rotten," "disgusting" "pigsty" of 
"bourgeois parliamentarianism" and, according to hja own 
exportonco, those words v;ero not too strong. It was othorwiso 
In Germany, wrote Engels in 1692 • After bisr.mrk*s anti- 
:ocialist laws were repealed and the Gorman GPD could openly 
resume its political activities and rocap tho votes of tho 
huge German proletariat, it
...used the franchise in a way which had paid thoiv. a 
thousandfold and lias served as a model to the workers 
of all countries. Tho franchise had boon...transformed 
by them from a moans of docoption v/nich it was before, 
into an instrument of emancipation
.../thus7.••
19. Marx and Engels Selected Works. Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1962) p. 123
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With this successful utilization of universal suffrage... 
an entirely new method of proletarian struggle came into 
operation, and this method quickly developed further. It 
was found that the state institutions, in which the rule 
of the bourgeoisie is organized, offer the working class 
still further opportunities to fight these very state 
institutions. The workers took part in elections.(and) 
so it happened that the bourgeoisie and the government 
came to be much more afraid of the legal than of the 
illegal action of the worker*s party, of the results of 
elections than of those of rebellion.20
Rebellion itself "in the old style" had become to a
great extent "obsolete." It had become painfully clear in
worker insurrections all over Europe that raising the barricades
was a brave but futile act. The spontaneity and determination
of angry proletarians was still no match against well-equipped,
highly trained and disciplined troops who obeyed orders to
fire on the insurgents. The weapons of military suppression
were being more and more refined:
even the newly-built quarters of the big cities have been 
laid out in long, straight, broad streets, as though made 
to give full effect to the new cannon and rifles. The 
revolutionist would have to be mad who himself chose the 
new working class districts in,the North and East of 
Berlin for a barricade fight.
Still, the "right to revolution" as the only "really
historical right" could not be denied, and resorting to rebel­
lion could not in principle be cast aside if, in a given
situation, the chances of success were clearly favourable.
20. op. cit., p. 129
21. op. cit., p. 133
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The experience of the Paris Codamine of 1870, however, had shorn 
how appallingly dreadful a condition a proletarian insurrection 
could be driven into by a superior military force. By 1895, 
few workers could remember, much less have participated in, a 
raising of the barricades in the streets. No, even in nthe 
Latin countries" more and more was it being realized that "the 
old tactics must be revised." Nov/ that the capitalist bour­
geoisie had armed its guards to the teeth and perfected its 
methods of suppression the latter could only hope the prole­
tariat would mechanically resort to the old methods of insur­
rection so that it would be crushed in the streets. But, "to 
shoot a party which numbers millions out of existence is too 
much even for all the magazine rifles of Europe and America.” 
Engels at seventy-five, looking back on his ovm lifespan, 
could well write:
The irony of world history turns everything upside down.
VJe, the "revolutionists," the "overthrowers”— we are 
thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal 
methods and overthrow. The parties of Order, as they 
call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions 
created by themselves. They cry despairingly with Odilon 
Barrot: la legalite nous tue. legality is the death of
us; whereas we, under this legality, get firm muscles and 
rosy cheeks and look like life eternal. And if we are 
not so crazy as to let ourselves be driven to street 
fighting in order to please them, then in the end there 
is nothing left for them to do but themselves break through 
this fatal legality,22
To break "this fatal legality" was not as simple as 
it might seem, for to do so would negate the very "logic" of tho
22. op. cit.. p. 136
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liberal-bourgeois-capitalist state. It would be a step back­
wards for the bourgeoisie as much as for the proletariat. The 
liberal state, in dialectical terras, was the superstructural 
reflection of its economic base, Capitalism. Manufacturing, 
with its greater efficiency and increased productivity had 
come to supplant the economic basis of feudalism which rested 
upon land ownership for agricultural exploitation and on a 
static system of limited guild production which was not res­
ponsive to the market.
But, although the economic foundation had radically 
changed, the political order did not respond to the needs of 
the new economic system. The capitalist market economy could 
not function efficiently, much less expand, if it was required 
to obey the laws, pay the taxes and tariffs and use the out­
dated state services created for the benefit of the politically 
entrenched feudal nobility. The hierarchical autocracy charac­
teristic of feudalism would not do: government had to be made
to respond to the needs of the new economic order. It must be 
open to the influence and control of the new economic Establish­
ment, the bourgeoisie, -which had become the richest, most 
dynamic and most ambitious part of the population. To promote 
its own interests the capitalist bourgeoisie, socially still 
part of the "Commons," had to wrench certain freedoms or rights 
from the "First and Second Estates." It demanded to be 
represented in the legislating organs of the state which must
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be made subject to periodic elections. It must be granted cer­
tain rights so that its participation in the parliaments could 
be facilitated; be free to organize groups to put pressure on 
government; have the rights of free speech and free press to 
fortify the complimentary right of assembly and make it mean­
ingful :
These freedoms could not very well be limited to the men 
of the directing class. They had to be demanded in prin­
ciple for everybody. The risk that the others would use 
them to get a political voice was a risk that had to be 
taken.^3
If the MThird Estate" should be granted these new 
liberties because all men deserved them, although at the time 
the demands were made only a part of the "Third Estate" really 
needed them, this could lead to consequences the bourgoisie was 
unprepared to tolerate. Universal rights could not "logically" 
be restricted to a limited class otherwise there was no reason 
for even the bourgeoisie to have them anymore than anyone else. 
Such was the "fatal legality" which Odilon Barrot decried. Thus, 
out of the capitalist economy rose the liberal state and from 
its inception the liberal state carried within itself the seed 
of the democratic state which inexorably must germinate and 
bear its own fruit. It was in the impossibility of reconciling 
itself to the two concepts that the nineteenth century bour­
geoisie appeared to deceitful and hypocritical in its loyalty
23. C.B. Macpherson, The Real IvorId of Democracy (Toronto: 
1965), p. 9
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to the legal "pigsty” of parliamentarianisrn. It could not
repress the pressure for full democracy yet it could not
willingly accede to them. Conservatism and Reaction ruled in
the name of freedom:
Thus society was left to its own devices which caused pro­
gress to be made by degrees and in waves. The assumptions 
of the proceeding (eighteenth) century were taken up by 
the democratic movement.. The latter upheld an ideal and 
this ideal was of a new society based on the principles 
of distributive justice and equality before the law; and, 
for those holding the most advanced views, upon equality 
in fact. Out of the concept of equality was b o m  the 
concept of "the people;" coupled then to the concept of 
the people was that of freedom, and in this way freedom 
was no longer that of procedure or method but that of
substance,^4
Togliatti’s "democratic movement" was not specifically 
synonymous with the Marxist school; it embraced the whole spec­
trum of the Socialist movements which were of such great impor­
tance to the development of nineteenth century thought. It 
was the "democratic movement" which grew, under the political 
and economic hegemony of bourgeois liberal-capitalism, to form 
the new intellectual and moral hegemony which was so profoundly 
to transform pristine capitalism in the twentieth century and 
in fact to culminate in the establishment of societies where 
the early nineteenth century bourgeois concept of liberal
24. Togliatti, "L’Anti-fascisrao di Antonio Gramsci", op. cit. 
pp. 170-171
Disputing Croce’s Liberalism, Togliatti proceeded to add:
It was not admissible, for Croce, that justice should be 
placed beside liberty. It was not conceivable for him, that 
from freedom as method one should attempt to proceed towards 
freedom as substance, that is to claim the right to change 
the social order which currently existed. This polemic can 
furnish whoever wishes to study the issue in depth the ele­
ments for judgments concerning the ideological foundations 
of anti-Fascism.
Ibid.
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democracy was reversed. The freedoms which the capitalist 
bourgeoisie claimed for itself in the name of all were seized 
from and denied to that same bourgeoisie. The "dictatorship 
of the capitalists," liberal-democracy, was replaced with the 
"dictatorship of the proletariat," popular or "people's demo­
cracy," which was to last until the elimination of economic 
classes under Communism made the state itself a worthless ana­
chronism:
This period of proletarian rule Marx called democracy. We 
are so used to thinking of dictatorship and democracy as 
opposites that to call this democracy strikes us as out­
rageous. To call it liberal-democracy would be outrageous, 
for there was intended to be nothing liberal about it.
But to call it democracy was not outrageous at all: it
was simply to use the word in its original and then normal 
sense. This was Marx's meaning when he wrote in the 
Communist Manifesto in 184# that the first step in the 
revolution of the working class is to raise the proletariat 
to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of demo­
cracy. Democracy was to be a class state, it was to use 
its power to abolish the legal basis of capitalism and put 
its productive powers of the whole society, including its 
accumulated capital at the service of the whole society.*?
But, to return to the original consideration: how
was the transformation to be brought about? Was the revolution 
necessarily to be a violent upheaval? Originally Marx and 
Engels thought so. In 1848 it seemed to Communists that "their 
ends can be attained only (my italics) by the forceable over­
throw of all existing social conditions." Forty-seven years 
later Engels was to write, however, that "Rebellion in the old
25. Macpherson, op. cit. pp. 14, 15
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style...which decided the issue everywhere up to 1848, was to a 
considerable extent obsolete.”
Engels took enough care not to rule out violent 
struggle for all cases and thus Lenin could write in 1917 that 
the oppressed classes could not be free "without a violent revo­
lution." But Lenin too found it necessary by 1920 to rebuke 
certain "childish” revolutionaries who would not on principle 
utilize bourgeois political institutions to further communist 
aims. As for Gramsci, revolution began when the hegemony of 
the ruling class suffered a crisis which deterioriated the 
fusion of dominlo and direzione. The crisis in hegemony could 
be aggravated if "vast masses" began to exercise their political 
power and, passing "suddenly from poltical passivity" to a 
certain activity, succeeded in advancing their political 
interests. Such a transformation in its "disorganic complex" 
constituted in fact "a revolution." But, even Gramsci admitted 
that when such crises occur the situation could be "open to 
solutions of force."
What happened in the latter part of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, when universal suffrage was finally 
granted and the working-class parties, rather than being classed 
as subversive, were recognized as legitimate and were allowed 
to carry on legal political action resulting in the victories 
which had so impressed Engels by their potential, was to use 
Gramsci*s terms, the beginning of a crisis in the hegemony of
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the capitalist bourgeoisie. The dominio which it had exercised 
exclusively began to slip away.
V/hen the liberal state became subject to the open 
competition for political power among parties which, in the 
economic sphere of the market economy, was related to the 
competition for economic profits among individuals, not only 
the power and predominance of the bourgeoisie was threatened: 
the liberal state itself was exposed to the legal, and con­
stitutionally deferential, as opposed to extra-legal revolu­
tionary, attack of political movements which had as their 
fundamental programme the utter abolition of both the capi­
talist system, and its political framework, the liberal demo­
cratic state. The irony lay in the fact that such movements 
could not be denied their right to do so because of the very 
principles with which the liberal state had been justified.
If the right were denied, the existing order could properly be 
considered subject to violent revolutionary assault: if the
right was granted, revolutionary violence became unnecessary 
to achieve the same ains. With their own creation, the liberal, 
then liberal-democratic state, the bourgeoisie placed itself 
in the fork of a dilemma. 11 La legalite nous tue,” wailed 
Barrot.
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Groomlng-Up
Although PCI policy in the post W.W, II period has
been described as amounting to a stifling of "any reiteration
- *
of long term revolutionary objectives," such a judgment 
cannot be swallowed without a pinch of salt. There was no need 
for the PCI to apologize for Its political decisions on a 
theoretical basis if by a stifling of "revolutionary objec­
tives" was meant the party*s decision not to stage an insur­
rection. As it has been pointed out above the equation, revo­
lution *= violence, was both a simplification of the meaning 
of the word revolution and an overrating of the potentially 
positive consequences of violence. The course the party chose 
to follow was not guaranteed to bring success but it seemed 
at the time to be the most likely to. Had violence been 
attempted "total disaster would have faced not just whoever had 
risked it but the country itself."2?
As Togliatti wrote later:
The road to follow was that of maintaining and defending 
for as long as possible the unity which was created during 
the Resistance and of setting up for this unity a combina­
tion of objectives which would be attainable by a mass 
movement, starting with the achievement of a republic up 
to tho realization of the pressing economic, political and
20. G. Galli "The Italian C.P.: The Road Toward a Dilemma,
1945-56" Problems of Communism, Vol. V, No. 3 (May-June 1956)
27. Togliatti, II partito comunista italiano. p. 94
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social reforms which were necessary for the^country and 
which were claimed by the working classes*
In January, 1946 the PCI held its Fifth Congress, the 
first in fifteen years. Within a few months of its meeting 
Italians were to go to the polls to make important decisions 
for the future of the country. Thus the policy statement by 
the Congress was one which sought to clarify to the voting 
public communist intentions for Italy and articulate in general 
terms the programme the party would try to implement* The pro­
gramme declared that a mere restoration of a democratic parlia­
mentary type regime "in the old style” would not be enough to 
solve Italy’s problems, Italy’s problems were equally or rather 
more of an economic nature than of a political nature and what­
ever reforms were made in the structure of the state they would 
have to oe ones vrhich would promote social justice and economic 
improvement for the masses of people which had never experienced 
either:
This,cannot yet be a socialist State, but it must no 
longer be a bourgeois State dominated by big property and 
by the capitalist monopolies. We must be dealing with 
a new power which is based on the working classes, on the 
peasantry and on the working middle class, which will des­
troy themmonopoly of the great landomers. which will aim 
its blows at the monopolies of industry, will transform 
the structures of the economy,,.destroy the incrustations 
of the bureaucracy,,.and give to the democratic order a 
new content, vrhich is that of the advancement towards a 
profound transformation of the economic and social order. ^
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
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This procedure was represented as being the Italian road to 
Socialism, one which nhas objectives which are basically attain­
able through the application of the democratic method.”
Despite the party*s earlier willingness to enter the 
king's government It officially demanded the abolition of mon­
archy and its replacement by a republic having a representative 
parliamentary system and which constitutionally v;ould guarantee 
and defend:
the fundamental liberties of the citizen, freedom of speech 
of conscience, of the press, or religion, of political, 
syndical and religious association and propaganda {the 
equal status of women),-the right to work, rest, education 
and to social security.
The new State must extent special autonomy to certain
specific Regions, notably Sicily and Sardinia, and allow all the
Regions substantial administrative, economic and agricultural
self-regulation. Cities, towns and other local administrative
organs must also be extended greater freedom. All of this
depended upon achieving one basic goal: the abolition of the
prefectures. Prefects were the all-powerful agents of the
Ministry of the Interior and held the ultimate power in each
particular territory in which they resided. In this situation
they represented the single greatest impediment to lively local
democracy. The selection of individuals to comprise the judiciary
liras also to be made more democratic, less arbitrary and to be
based upon demonstrable merit.
30. Ibid.
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Beneath all of the Communists* demands for democra­
tization of the political apparatus of the state rested unmo­
dified the almost metaphysical conviction that it would be 
meaningless without a "democratization” of the economic sector 
as wellj that is, without sub.jecting the economy to public 
control and preventing it from being manipulated by the pluto­
crats:
In the industrial sector the Italian Communist Party pro­
poses the nationalization of the large industrial combines, 
of the large banks and insurance companies, a beginning 
of national planning and the installation of a system of 
national control of production whose first task will be 
the general implementation and recognition of the manage­
ment Councils, (Factory Councils)
In the agricultural cector the Italian Communist Party 
proposes the liquidation of the large absentee-owned landed 
estates (latifcndi) the limitation of large capitalistic 
ownership, with the starting and stimulation of forms 
cooperative tenure, a profound reform of agricultural con­
tracts (and) the consequent protection of small and 
medium property holdings.31
The policy declaration also contained other proposals
regarding education and the southern problem all of which were
intended to document tho official position of the PCI,
With this done tho party prepared itself for the
upcoming matches.
31, Togliatti, op. cit. p. 97-96
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Reconstruction
As political life in Italy was normalized in the 
aftermath of war, PCI attitudes and formal policies with regard 
to a number of particular issues, such as those already men­
tioned, appeared at first to have been rightly chosen for they 
resulted in encouraging political advances for the party. In 
March, 1946, the first open and unobstructed campaign for public 
support at the urns was carried out among rival parties during 
partial local elections held throughout the peninsula. This 
was the first such experience in twenty years and some eighty- 
five per cent of the electorate chose to participate in it.
The results were heartening for the PCI, verifying the party*s 
untested contention that the three major forces to be reckoned 
with in Italian politics would be the Communist, Socialist, and 
Christian Democrat. Out of 5)596 communes where elections took 
place in March, Communist and Socialist candidates running on 
joint lists won 1,976. Singly, each party won another 140, thus 
giving the extreme Left control of 2,256 communes altogether.
The DC alone won 1,907 while the various smaller parties won, 
either alone or in combinations, the other 1,433.
But, as important as were the local elections, the 
March polling was really a dress rehearsal for the far more 
important national elections which were to follow in June.
On June 2, 1946 the first of a series of very important post 
war national elections took place: voters, Including women
for the first time, were to decide not only the composition of
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the Constituent Assembly which would draw up a new constitution 
for Italy, they were to decide also on the settlement of "the 
institutional questionthat is, the choice between continu­
ing with the monarchy or abolishing it in favour of a republic. 
The Left-wing parties opposed a referendum on this question and 
insisted that it should be settled by the Constituent Assembly 
once convened: monarchist groups on the other hand counted on
public sentiment for the glamour of royalty to swing the vote 
in favour of retaining the Savoys on the throne. It was to be 
a vain hope. Although on the eve of the election powerful 
voices were raised on behalf of the monarchy as a Christian 
bulwark against the subversive forces of Atheism,^ the Italian 
electorate chose all the same to do away with it.
The voting was significant for the manner in which 
political sentiment broke down to fit distinct geographical 
patterns. The North, where the Resistance had taken place,
1, "What is the problem?" asked Pius XII, "The problem is 
whether one or another of those nations, of those two 
Latin sisters (the Pope*s speech referred also to poli­
tical elections taking place in France the same day) 
with several thousand years of civilisation will continue 
to lean against the sc.ld rock of Christianity,. .or on the 
contrary do they want to hand over the fate of their future 
to the impossible omnipotence of a material state wihout 
extra-terrestrial ideals without religion and without God. 
One of these two alternatives shall occur according to 
whether the names of the champions or the destroyers of 
Christian civilisation emerge victorious from the urns." 
Quoted by Mammarella, op. cit., p. 114
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went solidly for the Republic while the South where the king 
had settled after fleeing Rome and xvhich had fallen early to
Allied control voted heavily in favour of the monarchy. Still,
2
the majority vote was against the monarchy.
The June 2 election results for the Constituent 
Assembly, were also advantageous to the Left. The popular 
vote for Communist and Socialist candidates together exceeded 
that for Christian Democrats by over one million. This com­
bined strength helped further to clear the way for the formal 
renewal of the "Unity of Action" pact which had united the 
two Marxist parties in the late Thirties, although, for the 
only time in the history of postwar elections, the Socialist 
Party won a larger vote than the Communists. Of their combined 
219 seats, the Socialists controlled 115. Other parties, 
excluding the DC with its 207 seats, averaged some twenty each 
while the Action Party barely survived with only 7 seats.
The pattern of voting for the Constituent Assembly 
paralleled that of the referendum. The northern industrial 
areas voted Social-Communist as did the traditionally radical 
agricultural regions of Worth-Central Italy, The DC gained 
support from middle-classes and from the very Catholic Worth- 
East. Conservative parties prevailed in the South.
2, 12 717i923 votes in favour of a Republic and 10;719)2S4
for the monarchy.
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With the two Left-wing parties commanding just under 
40$ of the votes and pledged to joint political action, the DC 
with its 35/"' of the vote had either to come to terras with them 
or look to the various parties of the Eight for allies. To 
promote the former course was already part of PCI policy but 
its success in achieving it was not resounding. Nevertheless, 
the capacity of the extreme Left to influence the content of 
the constitution was real and this was evident in the final 
document produced by the Costituente. One of the three official 
signatories to the constitution, including the provisional 
president of the Republic, Enrico de Nicola, and the President 
of the Council of Ministers, Alcide De Gasperi was the Presi­
dent of the Constituent Assembly, the veteran Communist and 
Ordinovista, Umberto Terracini.
The document, despite Terracini1s signature, was not 
a blueprint for a socialist society. It did, however, contain 
a number of carefully -worded articles especially concerning 
economic relationships which made tho constitution quite 
acceptable to the PCI.^ These articles could be implemented 
by a reform-minded government to carry out profound structural 
changes throughout the economy. The constitution of republican 
Italy was in potentia the constitution of socialist Italy as 
well. The constitution as finally approved was not on the 
Soviet model but all the same it did recognize:
3. i-ee Appendix I
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.. .in a concrete way the right of vrorkers to accede to 
the management of the State and poses certain conditions 
which can, wherever they be realized, favour this accession 
and allow for a noteworthy transformation of national 
society in a socialist sensed
With the constitution written, the Italian Communist 
Party found itself part of a political framework which was not 
disagreeable since it was partly responsible for producing it. 
But this was only one goal which the party had set for itself.
It was elementary to expect the PCI to pursue policies which 
would lead to its participation in the direction of the economy 
of the country. This could occur first by winning real poli­
tical power by legitimate means in elections and then by 
exercising this political power constitutionally to undertake 
reforms in the economy. The tone of restrained confidence in 
the above quotation was rooted in an appreciation of certain 
realities which made the statement an expression of fact.
Because of historical circumstances the economic 
structure which the Italian republic received from Fascism 
allowed the State, if it so chose, to exercise a potentially 
dominant managerial role in the national economy, although so 
far the economy had remained basically capitalist. During the 
depression of the Thirties, the Fascist regime had intervened 
to prevent the collapse of numerous enterprises which were on 
the verge of bankruptcy. The State simply bought up shares
4 . Togliatti, op. cit. p. 103
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v/hich had greatly diminished in value and thus became the 
majority stockholder in many companies: banks, industries and
financial institutions. In order to administer the shares a 
special state agency, The Institute for Industrial Reconstruction 
(ITII) was created. The IRI’s intervention was by no means 
limited or insignificant.
Today, the Italian State owns or controls through 
IRI the iron and steel industry, ship building naval and air 
transportation concerns, telephone and utility companies, auto 
tool and machinery manufacturing companies, textile, glass and 
chemical firms, road-building firms and broadcast media among 
many others,5 Under Fascism, the State, rather than actively 
manage "its" enterprises, remained instead a passive partner 
with private capitalists who continued to run their affairs 
along the old lines.
The arrangement was a very happy one for the latter; 
in prosperous times, private stockholders continued to receive 
their dividends; if times were unfavourable, the State acted 
as guarantor against the collapse of its own enterprise. Thus 
the industrialists of the country, united in Confindustria, 
exercised an enormous poitfer in both private and semi-public 
sectors of the economy. Under a regime such as Fascism, which
5, After the war, another entity, the Italian Hydrocarbons 
Agency (EWI) drew the Italian State broadly and massively 
into the petrochemical industry also and has indirectly 
made the former a protagonist In the international rivalry 
of giant oil corporations competing for oil exploration 
rights in many emerging countries.
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was not inimical to its interests, Confindustrla became a 
pressure group with immense influence over government policy.
To restrict severely or break entirely the economic 
and political power of Italian monopoly capitalism thus became 
part of the programme of all of the Left. The moderate Left 
projected a programme of anti-combine legislation leading to 
a type of mixed economy; the radical Left intended outright 
nationalization of the basic means of production to achieve a 
fundamental reorientation of the economy along socialist lines. 
If, furthermore, the lobbying influence of the powerful indus­
trialists could be weakened, by a curtailing of their economic 
power, an important obstacle barring introduction and implemen­
tation of further Left-wing policies could be removed. The 
extreme Left was convinced that it had been the enthusiastic 
support and prompting of the Italian Capitalists which had 
allowed Mussolini to wield his unlimited power with the special 
ferocity he reserved for Socialists and Communists especially 
in the early years of the fascist regime when he consolidated 
his power.
Another way by which the power of the industrialists 
could be curtailed, a method favoured by the PCI especially, 
was the system of "Management Councils" (consign di gestione) 
which had been already implemented by the CLNAI in early 1945* 
In the eyes of the Resistance leaders this system was eminently 
just. The factories had been protected and saved from destruc-
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tion by the retreating German armies by workers who had them­
selves taken up arms, and it was right that these workers 
should participate in running the factories they had risked 
their lives to save. As conceived, the management councils 
were bodies composed of representatives of management as well 
as of workers who were in the latter case elected by and from 
the workers of the particular factory. In this system of dual 
control the councils could settle problems of production, use 
of manpower and any other technical difficulties impeding 
efficient productivity.
It v/as in fact a moderate proposal. The private 
entrepreneui-s did not necessarily have to face expropriation; 
on the other hand, employees could play a significant role in 
the management of their ovm places of work. The importance 
attached to facilitating increased productivity was a partial 
explanation for PCI moderation. Italy was economically pros­
trate and in no condition to sustain any postponement of 
economic reconstruction. The creation of jobs to absorb the 
huge number of unemployed and underemployed was imperative. If 
the PCI adopted positions which would appear to aggravate 
unemployment the blame for the plight of the workers could be 
placed on it.
Needless to add the factory owners did not receive the 
idea of management councils with boundless enthusiasm; it v/as 
seen to be merely another indirect attempt by the Social-
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Communists to confiscate private property. In fact, this 
opposition to the installation of the councils hardened and 
legal recognition was never granted them. The decline of the 
councils paralleled the rebuilding of the Italian economy along 
old lines. The outcome of the struggle over what direction 
economic reconstruction would take v/as of crucial importance 
to both the Left and Right.
The electoral successes of the Social-Cornmunists were 
real enough and their influence in the Constituent Assembly was 
revealed in the constitution which came out of Its deliberations. 
But there were increasing points of contrast and conflict between 
the Left and Right which hindered the tripartite government 
collaboration sought by the PCI. Soon after his assuming the 
reins of government, Alcide Do Gasperi set about to undo some 
of the actions undertaken by the CLR particularly in Northern 
Italy where CLNAI control had been more or less exclusive 
during the Resistance. Specifically, De Gasperi removed CLN 
appointees in local administration and replaced them with 
functionaries from the old prefectures which had been the 
authoritarian administrative apparatus of Fascism in the pro­
vinces.
The individuals chosen frequently were of distinctly 
conservative and anti-communist outlook. For the Left-wing 
parties of the CLN*s (who formed a majority in them) this was 
as if the Resistance had been fought to no avail since one of
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the first acts of the CLM leadership had been precisely the 
replacement of local officials, De Gasperi»s actions with 
regard to local government were tied to another decision; that 
of ending the general purge of important Fascist officials within 
government and industry. This too vras to contradict much for 
which the CLW*s had worked. Wherever the latter had been in 
control, purges against collaborators and willing accomplices 
of the Fascist regime in both public and private institutions 
were carried out. The purges were intended to weed out those 
elements in administrative capacities which had compromised with 
Fascism and particularly those who personally profited at 
public expense from this collaboration.
The Italian bureaucracy, which at its worst can be 
shamelessly venal and arrogant, sheltered many such accomplices. 
The parties of the Left wished to carry out a broad shake-up of 
the administrative apparatus of the State and the economy.
That many minor functionaries who had passively joined the 
Fascist party out of practical necessity to secure their jobs 
could be hurt was seen as an unpleasant necessity. If funda­
mental reforms in the structure of the Italian State were to 
be carried out, the old governing class retaining the mental 
habits of Fascism had to be eliminated for it would only hinder 
the changes envisaged by the Loft. Hence, the parties of this 
orientation insisted on extensive purges. The moderate and 
conservative parties in the CLN's (DC and Liberal) were far less
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enthusiastic or radical in this natter. The classes from which 
they expected to receive considerable support would be the 
principal targets of the purges and, in the eventuality of 
assuming power in the Italian government after the vrar, their 
political power would be severely ’weakened if they could not 
rely on the cooperation of the existing bureaucracy {minus, of 
course, its Fascist hierarchs and flagrant profiteers). This 
struggle over the question of the purges rumbled on until the 
purge trials were brought to a definite halt in January 1946.
Connected with this struggle over the reform of 
bureaucracy there v/as a debate of far greater importance. Deter­
mination of financial and economic policies were of immediate 
and essential necessity. In order to finance economic recon­
struction vast amounts of investment capital were needed. Italy 
benefitted substantially from UNRRA aid but the major source of 
financing had to be from taxes levied on the savings and assets 
of Italians themselves. Two methods were proposed: a public
loan and a special compulsory and progressive tax on property.
The question of the loan raised little opposition and was 
floated successfully. The monies it raised were insufficient 
to the needs, however, and the property tax was expected to help 
raise the remainder needed.
The taxation project became bound up with a third 
question on financial policy, that of changing the currency.
Both plans met stiff resistance from the conservatives. By
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changing the currency, sizeable amounts of money being sent 
outside of Italy by those rich enough to do so could have been 
blocked and at the same time, by curtailing the circulation of 
money within Italy, the serious and increasing inflation could 
have been checked. Moreover, in both the levying of the tax 
and the reform of the currency, the Italian government could, 
as the French government had done, project a long range 
economic plan to utilize the funds which would be raised.
Economic conservatives, however, wanted reconstruction 
to be financed privately xirithout public controls on credit or 
particularly without any hindering by a progressive property tax. 
To follox* a laisser faire policy of this type would have reduced 
the role of the State in determining economic priorities to a 
minimum and restricted its managerial poxiers as well. Further­
more, the economic plans of the government met not only xvith 
opposition from private groups but were hindered internally by 
the resistance of a conservative Minister of Finance. The 
natural consequence was to delay measures which should have been 
effected immediately to achieve the originally intended results. 
The procrastination also allowed time for strengthening the con­
servative influence on the government. The property tax as 
finally approved was proportional rather than progressive so 
that large proprietors benefitted by smaller levies. The 
currency change v/as never put into effect. By shelving this 
fundamental project a basic decision was made concerning the
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economic future of the newly-formed republic. Italy would 
revert to traditional private capitalism with the State colla­
borating \*ith private enterprise rather than controlling it. 
Although industrial productivity was raised as the 
year progressed, the increased private investment which 
accompanied the industrial recovery, greatly aggravated the 
existing inflationary situation. This was particularly burden­
some to the mass of the working population which v/as either 
underemployed or, in many cases, quite simply out of work.
The restoration of industry along traditionally capitalist 
lines, however, reinforced itself since the rising value of 
shares attracted even more investment to private industry while 
less remunerative bonds, floated by the government in order to 
attract capital for public financing, consequently suffered from 
lack of public response. To pay its debts the government res­
orted to printing paper money. The result was an alarming 
acceleration of the inflationary trend. In one year, June,
1946 to June, 1947) money in circulation increased from some 
394.7 billion lire to 577*6 billion lire.
The Jreak-bp of Tripartism
As months passed it became more and more evident that 
the chief beneficiary of the De Gasperi governments laisser
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faire attitudes was to be the economic Right and that conversely, 
nothing would be done to carry out the basic structural reforms 
sought by Left-wing parties. This inclination placed the func­
tioning of the tripartite Council of Ministers under increasing 
strain. It was clear to all participants that without any 
basic unanimity about what programmes the government should 
properly promote, decisive action of any kind by the government 
was impossible. Since the "Management Councils" failed to achieve 
legal status, vrith the result that workers were barred from 
any sharing of responsibility in managing their places of work, 
the Social-Communists placed greater emphasis upon trying to 
influence the general economic and financial policies of the 
government.
It was not unreasonable that the two parties, united 
in a common front, were led to expect that their views should 
carry some considerable weight in influencing government policies. 
Extensive successes at the polls, both locally and nationally,
r
had politically reinforced the positions of active leadership 
they had assumed in the armed Resistance. Their control of the 
preponderant working-class vote was unquestionable and their 
important contributions to the deliberations of the Constituent 
Assembly were generally recognized. It was indeed precisely 
because of all of these things that the two parties were present 
in the Council of Ministers.
When, despite the socialist presence in his cabinet,
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De Gasperi chose to promote economic conservatism at the expense 
of socialist reformism, it was with the full appreciation that 
such a course would meet with determined resistance by the two 
Left-wing parties. >/ith the choice once made, hoiyever, the 
inevitable consequence facing the Social-Communist Ministers, 
who objected to the government’s general programme, was their 
eventual elimination from the government altogether. To this, 
needless to add, they were utterly opposed.
Nevertheless, the writing was already appearing on 
the wall; the expulsion of CLN officials in local administra­
tions and in the local police forces was the first step. This 
action was being justified on the grounds that in order to 
return to "normalcy” and to restore "law and order" it was 
necessary to reimposa the central administrative authority of 
Rome. The move also assured that any Red sympathizers in the 
administration were deprived of whatever decision-making 
functions they might have exercised. The centrally-approved 
replacements, frequently amnestied ex-Fascist bureaucrats, 
were trusted by the Ministry of the Interior and could be 
counted upon to crush any foreseeable anti-government demon­
strations incited by extremist Left parties.
In other words, the radical parties were being dis­
armed of an important political weapon, that of putting pressure 
on the government by way of the piazza; protesters would be 
less willing to risk injury in violent demonstrations if they
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were faced with squads of riot police equipped and determined 
to quell any such disorders. Mot without reason did De Gasperi 
retain the Interior portfolio for himself or for trusted col­
leagues.
Such moves against CLM-appointed officials incited 
numerous protest demonstrations which in turn aggravated the 
difficult and strained relations within the Council of Mnisters. 
Conservatives, insisted even more strongly that "public order” 
had to be restored and the results of the November, 1946 elec­
tions sustained their conviction that the advancing Left must 
be checked. In such major centres such as Fdlan, Genoa, Florenc 
Bologna and Turin the Social-Communists had won absolute major­
ities on the communal councils and in numerous other centres 
just failed to achieve the same results.
In the same areas,moreover, the DC lost substantially 
not only to the Left but to the Right as well. The event requires 
an explanation for it signified the revival of Right-wing 
influence and self assurance in the shadow of a government which 
was showing tolerance toward the "small fry” of Fascism. The 
tense and still unsettled internal situation characterized by 
the aggressive militancy of the lower classes and the demands 
of the Left-wing parties, coupled with the inability of the 
disunited central government to prevent the disruption of 
"public order," posed for the propertied upper-classes and for 
the lower middle-classes (who had formed the bulk of the "small
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fry") the most menacing danger to their interests and privileges. 
Both nourished a deep hostility, amounting to reaction, to 
the new political order which jeopardized their economic and 
social security.
The hostility became vented in a political phenomenon 
of transient influence the Uomo Qualunque (Average Man) party 
which achieved a considerable following particularly in Rome,
Naples and the South. The simplistic slogan of the party was 
"things were better when they were worse” and with such a 
battle cry the Uomo Qualunque touched a sensitive chord in the 
Italian character which aroused a response in significant 
sectors of the lower classes. These politically unsophisticated 
Italians, congenitally cynical and suspicious about the State* 
politicians and human virtues in general, confused and unable 
to grasp the fundamental struggle between the large parties, 
and above all caught in a desperate economic bind (no work and 
rising prices), succumbed to the Uomo Qualunque appeal. The 
party bitterly attacked the existing situation (which was easy 
enough to do), criticized political leaders for their "immo bill sir.,” 
denounced the Resistance as the root cause of the current mess, 
jeered at its ideals, ridiculed its values, its parties 
(especially the PCI), and defended nostalgically the achieve­
ments of the past. The Uomo Qualunque was soon enough to be 
absorbed by the blatantly Fascist kovimento sociale italiano 
(kPI) leaving exposed in its wake only a disturbing element in
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public opinion and bequeathing a new word to the Italian voca­
bulary which is still frequently invoked to describe its parti 
cular mentality: qualunquismo. ^
Besieged, as it was, on all sides, the DC could not 
survive very long. Both Left and Right were making gains at 
its expense. In January, 1947, Prime Minister De Gasperi
6. Alberto Moravia, for example, in the context of a recent
film criticism tried to give qualunquismo a cultural defini­
tion: The putrefaction of the old Italian Humanism of
Guicciardini and the Renaissance.*
Humanism was probably the last free, original ideology of 
Italy and hence deep down qualunquismo is the kind of men­
tality which distinguishes Italians from other people. An 
Italian is Qualunquist as an American is Puritan, as a 
Frenchman, a Cartesian.
...qualunquismo has nothing at all in common with wiseness 
but is rather a peculiar kind of regressive common sense...
Naturally, these definitions are worth what they are worth, 
that is little or nothing.
"In giacca rossa e parucca beatnik" LtEspresso (Rome) XII,
No. 11, (March 13, 1966) p. 23
* Francesco Guicciardini (14^3-1540) Renaissance diplomat and 
historian, was: a man whose moral nature inspires a sentiment
of liveliest repugnance. It is not merely that he was ambi­
tious, cruel, revengeful and avaricious, for these vices 
have existed in men far less antipathetic than Guicciardini.
Over and above these faults, which made him odious to his 
fellow citizens, we trace in him a meanness that our century 
is less willing to condone. His phlegmatic and persistent 
egotism, his sacrifice of truth and honour to self interest, 
his acquiescence to them for his own advantage, combined with 
the glaring discord between his opinions and his practice 
form a character which would be contemptible in our eyes were 
it not so sinister. John Addington Symonds, quoted in 
"Guicciardini," Edited by John R, Hale, (New York: 1964) PP* 6, 9 
Evidently, Guicciardini is the arch Qualunquist of Italian 
history. His twentieth century imitators unfortunately have
only his faults without any of his redeeming intellectual 
talents.
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visited the United States. The trip was an ostensible good 
will mission and symbolised Italy1s restoration to full status 
in international affairs on the eve of the signing of the 
Peace Treaty with the Allies. The United States had been, of 
all the Allies, the most sympathetic toward Italy during the 
treaty negotiations. This treatment contrasted sharply with 
the stem attitudes of the Soviet Union which insisted on 
receiving war reparations in full. Against the background of 
the tense international situation, characterized chiefly by 
the increasingly gelid relationship between the two great rival 
power blocs, the cordiality shown toward De Gasperi by the 
Americans acquired greater significance than otherwise might 
have been the case.
Moreover, without denying the Italian Prime Minister*s 
sincere desire to cultivate good will and reconciliation between 
two ex-belligerents, his visit to Washington had certain other, 
more specific goals; namely, to ask for economic aid. De Gas- 
peri*s petitions were received with sympathetic attention. The 
Americans extended a $100 million loan from the Export-Import 
Bank, released Italian property in the United States, which had 
been frozen during the war, and promised further efforts to 
help finance Italian industry.^
7. Under the UNItRA programme, which was largely American financed, 
Italy was to receive over $5&9 million worth of aid before its 
termination in June, 1947*
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The alacrity with which economic assistance was 
extended to the Italians did not conceal the string which 
attached the aid to the expressed American desire that its 
financial help should aid "the stability and consolidation of 
the Italian democratic regime."** In the context of the period 
the meaning of this statement was quite clear. About a month 
after De Gasperi*s visit, the Truman Doctrine was enunciated in 
the American Congress by which the United States pledged itself 
to "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation 
by armed minorities or by outside pressure" and to assist "those 
free peoples,,.against the aggressive movements which seek to 
impose their own totalitarian regimes." This was no more than 
a "frank recognition" that failure to extend assistance would 
"undermine.*.the security of the United States,"9
Truman*s declaration 'was specifically designed to 
justify American military intervention in the Greek civil war 
but its implications were applicable to the situation in Italy 
as well. During the expulsion of CLN-appointed officials from 
the local administration, the new appointees carried out wides­
pread searches for arms-caches known or suspected to have been 
hidden by Red-sympathizing ex-partisans especially in the "Red
ci. Quoted in Qammarella, op. cit. p. 141
9. President Truman, quoted by John V/. Spanier, American Foreign 
Policy Since World War II. (New York: i960), pp. 31 and 32,
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Belt" in North-Central Italy. The actual discoveries of such 
caches were seized by the Right-Wing and Qualunquist parties 
and press as irrefutable proof of a subversive, communist- 
inspired conspiracy to stage an insurrection against the demo­
cratic order (the same order which they never hesitated to 
denounce violently).
The clean-up hunt, which v/as carried on for months, 
further aggravated the already inflamed political climate in the 
country and intensified the basic division of public opinion into 
two hostile camps. It also strengthened De Gasperifs public 
position vis-a-vis the Left arming him with further pretexts 
for his next major move which concerned ridding his government 
of its Social-Communist participants.
A turn of events in Italy seemed almost to fulfill 
De Gasperi’s tactical designs. While he had been in Washington, 
the Socialist Party was holding its National Congress in Rome.
The two old wings of the party, Maximalist and Gradualist, which 
had been reunited in exile, were again at odds over what direc­
tion the party was and should be taking and precisely over the 
political collaboration with the PCI which had been formalized 
the previous October. The November local elections had revealed
10. "On a visit to the United States /be Gasperi7 had received 
assurances that his government would enjoy still greater 
favour in Washington if the Communists were no longer in it.” 
H. Stuart Hughes. The United States and Italy (revised ed.),
(Cambridge: 1965), p V 145
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that Focialist candidates were losing votes to Communists.
This factor alarmed the Right-i.ri.ng of the PSI which was hostile 
to the PCI for its long identification with Soviet ideology 
and particularly with the more objectionable aspects of Stalinist 
politics both domestic and international.
The Unity of Action Pact, in turn, bound together the 
Socialist and the Communist parties and blurred their differences 
to the public. Officially, the Socialist party maintained 
neutrality with regard to the rivalry between the power blocs, 
but in practise this amounted to antipathy for Western capi­
talists and sympathy for the Soviet Union, In tho tense atmos­
phere of the Cold War, which was becoming daily more frigid, 
this ambiguous attitude toward East and West v/as intolerable 
for the "autonomist" Right-wing Socialists whose fundamental 
political, ideological and cultural preferences were decidedly 
pro-Western. As a result of this irreconciliable division 
between the two wings, the "autonomist" wing led by Giuseppe 
Saragat walked out of the Congress to form v/hat v/as later to 
become the Italian focial Democratic Party (PSDI). With Saragat 
went 50 of the 115 Socialist members of the Constituent Assembly, 
Pietro .Uenni, leader of the "fusionist" (Maximalist) 
wing of the party, and De Gasperi*s Foreign Minister, subsequently 
submitted his resignation to the Prime Minister. Since other 
Socialist ministers followed suit, De Gasperi was given the 
opportunity to form a new government. Although Communists and
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Socialists were not yet eliminated, the opportunity was taken 
to assure greater Christian Democrat control of the most impor­
tant portfolios. De Gasperi*s tactics were well thought out 
for the Socialist and Communists were placed in the uncomfortable 
position of sharing government responsibility for the signing 
of the Peace Treaty (on February 10) which retained all the 
rigorous (and unpopular) exactions demanded by the USSR but 
renounced by the UFA and Great Britain. About one month later 
the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed. Although the doctrine was 
denounced as "imperialist” in the Social-Communist press it 
v/as applauded by those sectors of the Italian public which felt 
threatened by the Red bloc.
Despite the implications of the Truman Doctrine,
De Gasperifs skillful political strategy may not have been 
veil perceived by Togliatti and the Social-Communist group.
The PCI still pushed its determination to participate in the 
government and to cultivate a lasting collaboration with the 
Catholics to surprising ends. Shortly after the signing of the 
Peace Treaty the controversial Article VII^ came before the 
Constituent Assembly for a vote. In an astonishing break with 
the Socialists and the anti-clerical "lay” parties, the PCI 
voted to include Article VII in the constitution.
The party justified its vote by what it maintained
11. See Appendix II
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was a correct appraisal of the cultural imperatives of the 
Italian situation. Neither of the two "mass” Left-wing parties 
(PCI and Pf>I) could claim, either alone or jointly, to have a 
monopoly of political support of the lower or "popular" classes. 
The DC received most of its support from these same classes 
as well.
In Marxist terms political parties were the organized 
reflection of the conflicting political interests of differing 
socio-economic classes. But, a plurality of parties could still 
draw their majority support from the same common class. In 
Italy two such parties, the PCI and PPI, were collaborating on 
the general basis of a shared ideology. Because it was desirable 
that this collaboration be extended to embrace the rest of the 
“popular” classes, it was essential not to rupture the funda­
mental unity of "the working classes" by offending the religious 
sensibilities of the third, or Catholic, element.
Undeniably, substantial segments of the industrial 
workers, of the peasantry and, above all, of the mass of newly- 
enfranchised women ware moved by a profound attachment to 
what was an intimate part cf their personal and social culture, 
that is, to their religion, with all its demotic traditions 
and popular manifestations, to its endless hagiolatry and, 
above all, to la Madonna. Simultaneously, these same people 
could be hostile or resentful towards the Church as an institution 
and to its paladins, i preti. To many of these individuals
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there -was no contradiction in going to mass and voting for 
Communists. Others could not ignore the nonit ions of 11 pane 
and honco voted for the party which was both Christian and 
Democratic.
If the Communist Party wore to cultivate the support 
of these masses who voted DC, or even seek not to offend those 
militants in its ovm ranks who, though anti-Vatican, were 
religiously inclined, it could not be aggressively anti-clerical 
or anti-Catholic. As for the DC itself, though its leaders 
often voiced the interests of higher socio-economic classes, 
its mass political support ‘.rue still heavily based in the popu­
lar classes. The needs of these Catholic voters remained the 
same as those of voters who supported the Social-Communists.
In the long run populist Left-wing Catholic leaders, currently 
overshadovted in their own party, v/ould be forced to articulate 
the unsatisfied claims of this social-economic base both within 
the DC and in the larger forum of national politics.12
12. Some of the most prominent of those Loft-ving Catholic 
figures are:
Giovanni Gronchi ex-President of Italy; Amintore Fanfani, 
sometime Prime Minister and currently minister of foreign 
Affairs, Giorgio La Fira, ex-mayor of Florence and Giuseppe 
Dosetti, now a Catholic priest, one time leader of the 
Left-wing Social-Catholic current within the DC.
De Gasperi himself was a "centrist" in his ovm party and 
was constantly absorbed in the wearying task of balancing 
all the various party factions jostling for power in the 
party.
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Ineluctably, this would necessitate a dialogue with 
the Communists and with the entire non-Catholic Left. In 
supporting the inclusion of Article VII, the PCI hoped to avoid 
jeopardizing this eventuality by demonstrating to its future 
interlocutors its lack of prejudice and its good intentions.
Regardless of the reasoning behind the PCI action, it 
was not convenient at the time for the clerical DC to risk a 
negative communist vote in retaliation for the latter*s elimina­
tion in a cabinet reshuffling. Thus De Gasperi waited until 
Iiay, just three months after forming his last tripartite govern­
ment , two months after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine 
and one month after the vote on Article VII to submit his resig­
nation on the grounds that his government could not continue 
in the absence of any ’'solidarity" on the part of Communists 
and Socialists on questions of administration or public legisla­
tion and intthe face of persistent attacks on him in the Social- 
Communist press.
De Gasperi’s resignation touched off a long political 
crisis in which two prestigious pre-Kascist Prime ministers 
tried to form a government without a major party base. This 
was impossible and the charge naturally fell back to De 
Gasperi who began exhaustive negotiations with other parties 
to form a coalition. He failed on the Right and on the Left. 
focial-Democrats, Actionists and Republicans refused to enter 
a government which would leave out important working class
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representation as manifested by the Social-Communists. Liberals 
refused to enter a government with even token Communist represen­
tation. Thus De Gasperi decided to form a minority government 
composed of Christian Democrats with a few "experts" thrown in. 
The government was still dependent upon other non-DC votes in 
the Assembly to obtain majority support.
On June 21 this solution v/as presented to the Assembly 
for a vote of confidence and with the support of Liberal. Qualun­
quist and Monarchist votes, De Gasperi successfully evicted the 
extreme Left from their occupancy of any position in the govern­
ment. The government which emerged from these manoeuvres was 
then described to the public as "the government of rebirth and 
salvation of the country." During the same weeks in France, 
political developments, which since the days of the 'iV- II 
Resistance, followed a pattern similar to that in Italy, were 
climaxed by the identical result: Communist ministers in the
French cabinet were forced out of office ending the French 
experience of tripartite government.
Towards A Day of Reckoning
Im simpler terms, "salvation of the country" meant 
that Communists were now barred from exercising any control over 
the levers of government power. This much was a fait accompli.
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There remained for the proximate future an even more decisive 
political showdovm and the struggle leading up to it was to 
unfold over the next several months culminating in the momen­
tous elections of April 18, 194&.
During these eventful months Italians were to be 
absorbed not only in the drama of their own domestic politics, 
but, ineluctably, were to be participants in the succession of 
international episodes which initiated what cumulatively would 
become known as the "Cold War." As early as March, 1946, the 
realist Churchill, in his celebrated speech at Fulton, Missouri 
had declared that the alliances which had served during the war 
to defeat the Axis were already terminated and now had been 
formed into two new power blocs separated by an "Iron Curtain.” 
Among the first installments in the catalogue recording the 
actual progress of the "Cold War" must be included the 1947 
ministerial purges in Italy and France. Indeed, Italian politics 
in this period were, to a remarkable degree, international 
politics and Italy one of the "fronts" of the Cold War. On this 
"front" the PCI would sustain considerable casualties.
World War II had been a catastrophe for Europe, a 
disaster for its economy and a shock to its political institutions. 
This was even more true for those countries where the fighting 
had been greatest and Italy was among the latter. Even for a 
victorious country such as Britain, not to speak of France, the 
near economic collapse caused by the war so severely reduced its
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international political and economic power that at war’s end 
only two states could really be called "Great Powers," In 
Europe both of these great powers had an immense stake in the 
direction European nations would cast their political lot and 
neither hesitated in actively trying to influence a choice 
favourable to its own interests.
Europe, even devastated and prostrate, held the 
balance of world power. Thus, as a prize, it became divided 
by the proverbial Iron Curtain and nations falling on either 
side of it had their destinies bound to one or the other of the 
two super states. In a few cases the choice was not immediately 
clear and the final decision hung in the balance until a decisive 
move was made. This is what happened in Italy on April 18,
1948, Po significant is this date in contemporary Italian his­
tory that any reference to "il diciotto aprile" is immediately 
understood by all politically conscious Italians, (ip to this 
date "which way Italy would go" was uncertain. After this date 
no question remained.
The Truman Doctrine and its implications have already
been referred to. This policy, however, formed but one aspect
of the American commitment to assure for itself a Europe whose
political-economic orientation would be complementary to that
of the United States:
Europe's collapse...posed a fundamental question to the 
United States: Is Europe vital to American security?
The answer was never in d o u b t .Western Europe controlled 
the sea gateways vital to American security.,.possessed
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the largest aggregation of skilled workers, technicians 
and managers outside the United States...maintained the 
second greatest concentration of industrial power in the 
world...exercised control over many of the strategic raw 
materials which the United States needed to maintain its 
military strength and its capacity to wage war. American 
security demanded a healthy and strong Europe which could 
help tip the balance of power.^
If all of this was true for the United States it was
no less true for the USSR. Indeed, the latter could only trust
that in at least two important countries in Western Europe
national communist parties would win the power necessary to
prevent their respective governments from responding to the
attractive American offers which were being blandished. These
offers were contained in the European Recovery Programme, more
commonly known as the Marshall Plan, which was announced on the
heels of the Truman Doctrine in June 1947. The De Gasperi
government accepted the American offer immediately and of the
$12 billion dollars put into ERP by the Americans between 194b
and 1952, Italy received $1,515 million of them.
It was in part-fear that the Communist alternative might 
gain strength which prompted the United States to extend 
lavish aid to Italy throughout the years of the Marshall 
Plan*s operation— and without that aid the story of the past 
few years might have been a very different one.^
13. John 17, Cpanier, American Foreign Policy Since 7/orld War IX, 
{New York: I960), p. 40
14. Muriel Grindrod, The Rebuilding of Italy: Politics and
Economics 1945-1955, (London: 1955), p. 45
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The Marshall Plan was denounced hy the PCI, now 
growing more militant in the wake of its expulsion from the 
government. In this, its attitude was identical to that of the 
USSR. The Marshall Plan was originally offered to all of Europe, 
including the USSR, since the basic condition of the plan was 
that European States coordinate their recovery programmes lead­
ing to eventual economic integration. This was the instigation 
for the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).
For the Soviet Union {or the states in its sphere of control) 
to have accepted this condition would have meant first, that it 
permit some United States (i.e. capitalist) participation in 
planning its economy, and secondly, that in contributing food 
and raw materials as its share in the effort it would be contri­
buting in the reestablishment of capitalism in Western Europe.
As for the Americans, extending the ERP to include the 
Ur;SR was a "risk" which had to be accepted: it had to be the
Russians who by their rejection of Marshall Plan aid, would be 
responsible for the division of Europe. The masterly stroke of 
tactical genius would have been for the Soviets to have accepted 
the plan with eagerness, assuring, by the consequent soar in 
estimated cost to the United States, almost certain rejection 
of the Plan by the American Congress. "Actually...Molotov did 
arrive in Paris with a large delegation of experts and he gave 
American policy makers a momentary s c a r e . ,rl5
15* Spanier, op. cit. p. A3
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However, suspicion of western schemes led the USSR to
reject the plan (for itself as well as for East Europe) thus
taking the blame for aggravating the Cold War and assuring
passage of the programme in Congress:
...the Marshall Plan became transformed into an instrument 
of the Cold VJar...The American President and his advisers 
were now free to continue the distortion of the original 
proposal by presenting it to Congress as the economic com­
plement to the military programme of the Truman Doctrine. 16
Consequently the entire programme became not just a 
Western European affair but rather a liberal democratic, neo- 
Capitalist affair. In joining it the De Gasperi government 
was only extending to the international plane the choices it 
had already made in its domestic policies* In neither case 
tvas the PCI able to prevent the choice. The critical importance 
of the impending general elections, the first to be held under 
the new constitution, lay therefore in the still very real 
possibility that the PCI-PSI alliance would achieve a victory 
at the polls or at least capture a large enough share of the 
vote to prevent the centre-right Christian Democratic government 
from continuing to function without the approval of the Left.
A Social-Communist majority would at the very least 
"neutralize" Italy in favour of the Soviet bloc and a substantial 
victory in this direction, especially in the context of the 
period, possibly could move Italy right into the ,r>oviet bloc.
16, Hughes, op. cit. p. 430
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A legitimate electoral conquest of power, moreover, would have 
incalculable repercussions since it would be the first such 
achievement in history. A Christian Democratic victory, on 
the other hand, would accelerate the reconstruction of Italy 
along the lines already laid down by the government (with the 
promise of Marshall Plan money) and, on the international 
level, place it squarely in the Western camp.
Thus, the choice placed before the Italian voter on 
April 18 was not one of a routine selection from among a group 
of candidates or party programmes. The most strenuous efforts 
were made, especially by the pro-government forces, to cause 
the voter to realize that he was choosing between "East” and 
"West", between tiiro concepts of society, economics and politics, 
between two civilizations, two worlds and, not least, between 
the Church and her "enemies," It is doubtful that many of the 
voters could grasp the enormity of the decision facing them and, 
realizing this, the various parties subjected Italians to the 
most frenzied and acrimonious election campaigns ever staged, 
one which was to become a classic study in the art of propaganda.
Despite Saragat*s defection from the PSI, the Nenni 
Socialists unhesitatingly renewed their pact with the PCI and 
in January, 1948 the creation of the "Democratic Peoples* Front" 
was announced. The DC, Social-Democrats and Republicans on 
their side made an informal electoral alliance with each other, 
while the Liberals and Uomo Qualunque parties formed a "National
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Bloc." Other parties ran alone. From the beginning, however, 
the basic contest was clearly between the two great antagonis­
tic parties and the systems they championed. The DC, in fact, 
used as one of its appeals the claim that, since it was the 
major bulwark against Communism, any anti-Communist vote not 
cast for it was a wasted voto.
From the time the PCI was expelled from the govern­
ment, mass demonstrations, strikes and seizures of land were 
carried out by Leftist militants throughout the summer and 
fall of 1947. In November ex-partisans and workers went as 
far as seizing and occupying the Prefecture of Milan to protest 
the substitution of the CLN-appointed prefect by a career 
bureaucrat appointed by Rome. The outburst of extreme rank and 
file militancy, in contrast to the official moderation of the 
party directorate, coincided with the creation in September,
1947 of the Cominform.
The latter was also an episode in the progress of the
Cold V/ar. The Communist Information Bureau, as an agency for
consultation among nine communist parties (those of East Europe 
plus those of France and Italy), was a limited and much looser
resuscitation of the old Comintern. The hardening of attitudes,
the increase in mutual hostility and the sharpening of divisions 
between the Soviet and American camps was thus marked by the 
partial imitation of a previous institution which had been 
created at an earlier, more adverse period when Communists had
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had deemed it necessary to decide international communist policy 
from a central authority, one ttfhich, at the time of its dissolu­
tion, had seemed superfluous against the prospects of communist 
party successes in the future. The creation of the Cominform 
was in a sense a return to earlier patterns.
At the founding conference, Italian and French Communists 
found themselves being severely critiaed for their moderation, 
for not being more assertive in resisting the restoration of 
reactionary groups to the control of the levers of power in 
their respective countries and in preventing their countries 
from slipping into the American camp. The PCI and PCF would 
need exert greater energy to prevent the existing trend from 
worsening. In Italy this meant that the party leaders need 
simply to ease their restraint on the impatient rank and file.
3ut, with the elections impending the PCI chose to follow its 
moderate course to its logical end. In January, 1948, the PCI 
held its Sixth Congress and in its final declaration reaffirmed 
its intention to operate within the .framework of the Constitution 
of the Republic despite the best efforts of reactionary classes 
to put obstacles in the path of working class accession to 
power and despite the threat of armed foreign intervention in 
Italian affairs.1? The declaration added that party sympathizers 
should be prepared, if necessary, to fight for their rights in 
the face of intimidating obstacles.
17. Although the Peace Treaty was signed Allied troops were 
still in Italy at this time.
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As the campaign moved into high gear the propaganda 
mills of all the parties ground out reams of material to sway 
the voter:
As the campaign began it appeared that the Front would win 
more votes (about 40 per cent) than any other party or 
electoral bloc...The Christian Democratic party was expec­
ted to get only 30 to 35 pe*1 cent of the vote. 18
To reverse these prospects required a massive exertion 
on the part of Christian Democrats and their allies. The pro- 
government campaign concentrated on a number of issues, all 
basically variations on the same theme that Italy must stay 
with the west, foster its advantageous alliance with the United 
States and defeat communism at home. The DC presented itself 
to the electorate as the champion of freedom and bulwark 
against communism whose possible victory was depicted as dis­
aster for Italy. It defended its record in the government and 
its acceptance of the Marshall Plan for Italy. Above all the 
pro-government forces repeatedly emphasised that recent events 
in Czechoslovakia would be the model for Italy If the Front 
were to win the elections.^
18. Wm. Caldwell "The Press and Propaganda in the 194# Italian 
Election Campaign," Journalism Quarterly. Spring, 1953
19. In February the coalition Czech government headed by Communists 
(who formed the largest single party in Czechoslovakia and who 
were jointed with the Socialist party in a common Popular Front) 
had undergone a severe crisis. Non-communist cabinet ministers 
accused their Communist colleagues in the principal ministries 
of turning the country into a police state and refused to con­
tinue sitting in the communist regime. In the week-long con­
frontation which ensued the non-Communist ministers were kept 
out of office on communist insistence and consequently Czecho­
slovakia became a purely communist People’s Democracy. In 
short what was happening in Czechoslovakia was an inversion of 
the struggle for power in Italy.
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The events in Czechoslovakia formed an ideal issue 
for the non-communist parties in Italy to use against the 
Peoples1 Democratic Front. The touchy questions of the Istrian 
peninsula and of the City of Trieste, both of which were being 
claimed by communist Yugoslavia were also played upon in stri­
dently nationalistic tones. Even the fate of some 10,000 
Italian troops missing in Russia since the war was exploited 
as an election issue.
At the grass roots level the most thorough anti-Front 
campaigning, to benefit the Christian Democrats was carried out 
by the Catholic church which spared no efforts on the latter*s 
behalf. The three million member Catholic Action was mobilized 
to form "civic committees" in sorae 13,000 parishes in order to 
educate the faithful in coordination with the local DC propa­
ganda offices. Churchgoing masses, overwhelmingly female, 
heard about the evils of Communism from the lips of their parish 
priests and were exhorted, under pain of mortal sin, to get out 
and vote. The government radio network, although officially 
non-political, carried its news slanted to favour the government 
and to put Communists in a bad light. Finally, the anti-communist 
crusade in Italy spilled over its borders into the United States 
where millions of Italo-Americans were urged to write to their 
relatives in Italy to vote against the Popular Front.
Facing this tide of anti-communist propaganda, the 
Peoples* Democratic Front aimed its own attacks against the
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sources from which the anti-communist offensives were launched, 
particularly against the /atican and the United States’ State 
Department. De Gasperi and the DC were attacked as being 
Fascist, a vassal of American imperialism and a tool of the 
Catholic hierarchy. The voters were urged to retaliate against 
the "letters to Italy" campaign by voting for the Left.
One last card remained for the West to play. In 
March, 194S, the three Western powers declared that since no 
agreement could be reached on choosing a governor for the Free 
Territory of Trieste they favoured the city’s restoration to 
Italy. Since the USSR had advocated Yugoslav claims on the 
city, the PCI would be put in a position of appearing to be 
contrary to Italian interests if it questioned the justice of 
the move. Consequently, the Front was reduced to describing 
the western proposal as an "electoral trick."
Finally, after being subject to weeks of the most 
intense barrage of campaign propaganda in an extremely charged 
atmosphere and against a dramatic background of international 
confrontation on Italian soil, 92.1 per cent of the electorate 
went to the polls to make their choice.
The choice trades on 11 diciotto aprile is wall known.
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II Secondo Dopoguerra: 1945 - 1953
When the ballots were counted in the days following 
April IB a number of conclusions were to be drawn. First and 
most important of these was the fact that the actual results 
of the elections turned out to be the inverse of what had been 
predicted: it was the DC which walked away with 43‘a< of the
vote \<rhile the Social-Communist Front was kept to 31>j of the 
total. The Front did lose some two million votes to the break­
away Social-Democrats but, even combined, this "socialist" vote 
would have amounted to only 3b. 1  ^ of the total, still 10;. i less 
than the DC. Italian politics nevertheless remained, fundamen­
tally, a three party affair.
Post-election voting analyses revealed that the DC 
had made its gains basically in two ways: it had picked up
three million votes from the smaller Right-wing parties, which 
fared poorly in the voting, and had gained another two million 
"new" votes from women balloters. The frantic crusade to have 
all anti-communist votes concentrate on the "bulwark" of 
Christian Democracy was, therefore, a very real success and, 
considering that the DC, with a relative majority of parlia­
mentary seats, if it chose, could almost have governed alone 
(it lacked but 3# more to have an absolute majority), the 
results of April IB indicated a clear defeat for the extreme- 
Leit led by the PCI. It meant, above all, that there was no 
chance for Communists to re-enter the government; the DC now
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had little fear Tor its parliamentary life; it need not "come to 
terms" with the Communists. The government if it pleased could 
proceed full speed ahead to resuscitate Italian capitalism; bind 
Italy’s destiny economically, politically and soon militarily 
to that of the United States, champion the ambitions of the 
Catholic Church, ignore the claims of the radical and proletarian 
parties and release the controls against resurgent neo-Fascism.
To greater or lesser degree this is what would in 
fact happen and, to the extent that all of these things were 
utterly against what the extreme Left wanted, the focial-Couummist 
defeat could be considered all the more decisive. The PCI had 
pinned all its hopes on legitimately winning enough political 
power to claim a commanding voice in a coalition government. 
Instead, after the 18th of April, the party found itself neither 
in possession of that power nor in any position to force an 
uninterested DC to ask for its collaboration. True, about one 
out of every three Italians supported the Front but almost one 
out of two Italians had cast a vote against the Front by supporting 
its principal rival, the DC. The criticisms of PCI tactics 
which had been levelled at the first Cominform meeting were 
correct insofar as these tactics had failed to promote the PCI 
into positions of real influence within government.
There did remain of course the "Greek road" to 
Socialism which might have been taken instead of the "Italian 
road" but, in the judgment of Luigi Longo: "it is certain that
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had we gone the direction of Greece we should have faced a 
similar kind of counter-revolution."^- In the concurring opinion 
of another PCI leader: "The presence of the Allies can in fact
be considered to have been preclusive counter-revolution imported 
into cur count 17-."2
For the PCI, April 16 represented a real setback: 
it had been a crucial confrontation and the DC had emerged vic­
torious as a frankly declared champion of conservatism. If 
April 16 represented a setback it was not, however, a total 
defeat by any means. The next general elections in 1953 would 
prove to be much less of a triumph for the DC and more much 
favourable to the Left. In the five year interval the PCI would 
bide its time in exercising its power as the major opposition 
party. Fince these same five years would mark the height of 
the Cold VJar— with episodes of Hot Nar (Korea)— the role of the 
PCI as a formidable pro-Soviet threat to a staunchly pro-American 
government would have international as well as national overtones.
1, Luigi Longo, "A che punto siamo?" Rinascita, (Rome), (26 i-iay,
1966), pp. 3-7
Longo adds that: ...the choice was not a simple question
of will, it could not overlook actual power relationships... 
Togliatti laid great stress on the presence of the Allies as 
a conditioning force on our policies. And this meant not 
just military presence but also (the) economic...administra­
tive presence for as long as the terms of the armistice and 
the peace treaty endured.
2. Giorgio Anendola, ibid. Hughes tends to share this view:
A decade ago it was still possible to imagine our country’s 
(UPA’s) armed forces intervening in Italy to cancel the results 
of a leftist electoral victory. "The New Italy and its 
Politics" Commentary. No. ; October, 1964, p.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
In biding its time the party 'would not stand around 
idly but neither would it embark on any rash adventures. The 
party leadership stood by its commitment to follow the consti­
tutional road to power. Had this attitude reflected expediency 
alone, had the leadership simply lacked the chance to follow 
another tack, the several ideal pretexts for instigating 
revolutionary insurrections which did present themselves during 
the course of things would not have been passed up as they were. 
This restraint in exploiting explosive situations in the face 
of harsh criticism from the Cominform, which increasingly 
reflected Stalinist points of view, has even led some non- 
Communist commentators to accuse the PCI of actually being a 
party of conservatism.^
Such an opinion, however, is not without its polemical 
content. April IS had, it is true, been a verdict. But no one 
could claim that it was a verdict emanating from an atmosphere 
of contemplative serenity, free from any trace of engineered 
hysteria. At least no one espousing a Gramscian point of view- 
would claim this. To refer again to one of Gramsci’s writings:
The crisis (of hegemony) creates Immediately dangerous 
situations, because the different strata of the population 
do not possess the same capacity for rapid reorientation 
or for reorganizing theraaolvos with the same rhythm. Tho 
traditional ruling class which had a numerous trained per­
sonnel, changes men and programmes and reabsorbs the control 
which was escaping it with a greater speed than occurs in
3. Giorgio Galli takes this vievr in some of his writings, e.g. 
"The Italian CP: Conservatism in Disguise" Problems of
Communism VIII, Wo. 3 {May-June 1959) pp. 27-34
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the subordinate classes: it makes sacrifices exposes 
itself to an uncertain power, strengthens it for the 
moment and makes use of it in order to crush its opponent 
and dispose its leading personnel which cannot be very 
numerous or well trained.4
II diciotto aorile had inflicted its wounds, but it did 
not entirely crush the opposition. However, in the wake of 
such a dispiriting electoral defeat, one which had effectively 
prevented the PCI from claiming a legitimate share of govern­
ment power, and in the grim international atmosphere of the 
period— one of an impending clash between mast and V/est— the 
PCI felt more acutely the need for the sustaining moral support 
and political solidarity of its one time patron the USSR and, if 
things came to the worst, to demonstrate that its ultimate loy­
alties still lay with the ideals which the USSR represented.
In the aftermath of W'V II, however, Soviet society 
and government were themselves experiencing internal strains 
which in later years would have far-reaching effects. After 
sustaining immense sacrifices to repel the Axis invasion of its 
territories, the Soviet Union emerged from the war no longer 
the solitary ’’cradle of the revolution” but as the head of an 
entire bloc of states in East Europe. The governments of these 
states had in the inter-war period frequently been very anti- 
Russian, philo-Fascist, and in some cases during the war itself, 
aligned with the Axis. The communist parties in these states
4. Gramsci, loc. cit.
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were— if legal--usually weak, or outlawed altogether. Hence 
it was basically the gubernatorial presence of the Red Army 
which had assured the postwar establishment in East Europe of 
communist governments. Quite understandably they remained 
friendly and grateful to the Soviet Union.
But, rather than feel more protected, the USSR felt 
even more insecure and, as the Western Alliance, in application 
of the doctrine of "containment,n encircled the country with 
military bases, a sense of being besieged. The external threat 
served as the pretext for the Soviet leadership, that is,
Stalin (who in his later years especially is reported to have 
suffered from paranoia) to repeat the kind of behaviour prac­
tised during the purges of the Thirties when Stalin ordered 
the most ruthless crimes— torture, imprisonment, execution—  
to be committed against numberless victims. Again after V/V/ II 
supposed enemy spies, counter-revolutionaries, plotters and 
imagined traitors vrere liquidated -with the barest pretenses of 
legality and with utter lack of justice. This reversion to 
police-state terrorism placed the populations of not only the 
USSR but all of the East European countries under the severest 
kind of psychological as well as political strain.
In the USSR the reapplication of the tight centralized 
authority, necessarily weakened under wartime conditions, was 
characterized by the coercive demand for the most stringent 
orthodoxy on all matters; political, economic, cultural and
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idelogical. Such orthodoxy extended to the whole Soviet bloc 
and was justified and rationalized on the basis of a long culti­
vated myth that of the infallible good judgment and almost 
providential sagacity of Stalinfs leadership.
In the light of this demand for uncompromising single- 
mindedness and militant discipline within the Soviet bloc itself, 
vrlth the unpleasant and oppressive atmosphere it created within 
this bloc, the PCI could not expect Soviet indulgence for its 
undogmatic flexibility and moderate line of action especially 
when it had just emerged from a stinging electoral defeat. Like 
it or not, if the choice facing the PCI were to be reduced 
ultimately to one of being either "for" the USSR or "against" 
the USSR the answer, especially in 194ci, could not be equivo­
cated. 5
To have chosen the latter would have negated the 
political rationale of the PCI since its creation in 1921. After 
everything elso was said, the October Revolution and its issue, 
the Soviet state, had been the first effort in history to begin 
building Socialism, despite tlv* best efforts to "strangle it in 
its cradle," against the greatest physical odds and at the cost 
of immense privation and suffering on the part of the Soviet 
people. This momentous achievement, in turn, animated the 
struggle of communist movements throughout the world which
5. Vide, Rossana Rossanda "Unita politics e scelte culturall"
II Contemporaneo/Rlnascita. (Rome), (Aug. 28, 1966, pp. 19-24
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continued to be inspired by the achievements of the USSR and 
to look to its prestigious leaders for support and encouragement. 
If these leaders determined that the time called for militancy 
and discipline, then such t,us their influence that other 
Coramunists could not but become more militant despite their 
own judgment concerning the proper course of action.
Thus, for a short time, prior to and after the April 
elections in Italy, public demonstrations by party militants were 
not discouraged by the PCI. Neither were they encouraged, how­
ever, not even when it seemed that a revolution was about to 
erupt spontaneously. On duly 14, 1943, as Togliatti was leaving 
the Chamber of Deputies, a fanatic and ’unstable neo-Fascist 
student, evidently goaded by the violent anti“Communist campaign 
in the press shot and severely wounded the Communist leader.
While Togliatti lingered near death, Italy almost erupted into 
civil war. Over the entire peninsula riots occurred, and 
barricades were throvm up in the streets. Industry was brought 
to a halt when the CGIL called for a general strike. In clashes 
between -workers and police, several persons were killed. To 
have touched off a full blown insurrection iirould have required 
only a word from the PCI leadership. Although there were those 
in the party who urged this very course, Togliatti himself
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restrained such action.^ The forces aliened against the party—  
the army (Italian and foreign) and the national police brigades—  
were too clearly overwhelming to risk the useless bloodshed and 
inevitable defeat which would have ensued from such an armed 
clash:
After the events of July 1943, the Italian Cor.imunist Party 
became an opposition party as indeed it had to be within 
the conditions of the Gold t/ar. 3ut: even so, it avoided 
any frontal clashes with the government which might have 
caused it to be outlawed and Togliatti pursued his goal 
of making the Party the foremost democratic force in 
Italy.7
To some; for whom "Communism" and "Democracy11 remain 
quite incompatible ideals, the goal of making the PCI "the 
foremost democratic force in Italy" would seen; to be a contra­
diction and an impossibility. Gut, the quadripartite government 
which would rule Italy for the next five years was to og formed 
by parties either dedicated to perpetuating the economic status 
quo (Liberals) or by parties which, if reform-minded at all, 
sought reforms without tears {focial-Democrats and Republicans.)
6 . Togliatti*s personal sentiments on this fundamental problem 
facing the PCI (referred to by Longo in a previous quotation 
(vide p.I67) are revealed in this quotation: Had we ux'oused 
the masses to an insurrection...we should have detached from 
these masses but a small vanguard. The latter would have 
bean met with a fusillade and the rest would have fallen 
under the influence of conservative and reactionary groups.
The entire evolution of our country would have been different. 
Instead of bringing ourselves closer to a socialist perspec­
tive we should have made it more remote. Quoted by Georges 
Jarlot "Le Neo-Marxism© Italian", Etudes. No, 324, (Janvier- 
Juin 1964) pp. 32-46. This is the kind of "conservatism"
to which Galli seems to allude.
7. Robert v/ohl, "Togliatti: Master of I'ianoeuvre" Communist
Affairs,I. Wo. 9, (Nov. -Dec. 1963), pp. 21-26
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The DC itself contained currents which went both further Right 
and further Left than any of its coalition partners but, as 
long as De Gasperi held the reins, the DC kept a steady course 
just to the Right of Centre. Thus, under these circumstances, 
it was the opposition parties of the Left, and, of these, 
principally the PCI, which articulated most forcefully the 
popular demands for reforms and represented the most powerful 
challenge to the power of the propertied and privileged.
Faithful to its commitments, the De Gasperi government 
utilized its electoral power to proceed with its policies of 
financial orthodoxy. The arrival of economic aid under the 
ERP assisted the Italian government in its goals of stabilizing 
prices and restoring industrial production to its prewar levels 
but it did not seek to alter the basic structure of the Italian 
economy. Unlike France, Italy was never equipped with a long 
range economic plan and economic activity was revived privately 
without priorities or plans. The propertied classes, whose 
wealth was based on ownership of land or industries in fact 
grew richer during the post-war inflation; on the other hand, 
salaried classes grew poorer. The savings of the middle classes 
were wiped out by the inflation: the lira in 1950 had been
reduced to about one-fiftieth of its value of 193S. Consequently, 
it was this latter class which most frequently responded to 
the appeals of neo-Fascism ("things were better..."). V/age- 
earning classes were in a somewhat better position than the
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salaried middle-classes since their wages could be adjusted 
upward as the rhythm of industrial production increased and 
particularly since the vote of these working-classes remained 
a powerful threat to the industrialists.
A major irony in the political arrangement which 
resulted from the vote of April ltf was that the PCI— a party 
denounced by its opponents as being utterly contemptuous of 
law and order— was cast in the role of being the defender of 
constitutional legality while the DC— a party whose very name 
included the word Democracy— felt constricted by a constitution 
which had been adopted through legal and democratic procedure 
and resisted its full application. Even today, nineteen years 
after the constitution has been in existence one of its major 
provisions, the institution of the Regions has not been effected 
except in the case of five Regions whose demands for autonomy 
could not be resisted. Although every kind of rationalization 
for this state of affairs is put forward, the real reason for 
it is the fact that there exists across North-Central Italy the 
famous T,Red Belt" of Tuscany, Umbria, Le Marche, and Emilia 
Romagna. Regional autonomy would place these communist strong­
holds out of the grips of the Ministry of the Interior.
£. The five are: Sicily, Sardinia, Val d fAosta, Trentino-
Alto Adige, and most recently, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, all 
of them either islands or Northern frontier regions with 
large linguistic minorities.
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Other important democratic institutions provided for 
in the constitution were also delayed as long as possible. The 
Constitutional Court and Supreme Council of the Magistrature 
for example were created only eight years after the constitution 
went into effect.9
These delays by the Christian Democratic regime in 
making the constitution fully operative, delays which were 
based upon political convenience rather than technical inoppor­
tunity, consequently prevented the extension of popular partici­
pation in self-government. The field of local, provincial and 
regional government remained {and remains) ultimately subject 
to the centralized authority based in Rome and "Rome" increasingly 
reflected the will of the DC which was consolidating its own 
party hegemony over the apparatus of State. Indeed, if there 
was one issue which kept the various correnti of the DC from 
pulling apart it was their common accord to use their power to 
fight off the "communist menace."
The offensive against the Communists extended as well 
to one of the most important of their strongholds, to the unions.
9. It is Mammarella’s opinion that: "In the case of the Consti­
tutional Court and the Supreme Council of the Magistrature, 
the government and the parties of the majority have delayed 
their establishment as long as possible in order not to be 
deprived of important instruments of power, such as for 
instance the Fascist police laws, which the court should have 
abolished— although this did occur later. The failure to 
set up the other institutions— legislation by popular initia­
tive, the popular referendum and regional administration by 
regular statute— can be explained by the majority’s preoccu­
pation with denying an advantage to the Social-Communists." 
op. cit., pp. 1C6-1S7
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Ever since the industrial strike of 1942 and 1943 which began 
the process which led to Mussolini*s overthrow, the communist 
influence in the unions was overwhelming. The actual manage­
ment of the postwar General Confederation of Italian Labour, 
like the government, was at first tripartite, joining together 
leaders affiliated with the Communist, Socialist and Christian 
Democratic parties respectively. In practice, the highly capable 
Communist, Giuseppe DiVittorio, exercised his skill in organiz­
ing and his forceful ability to communicate his ideas to the 
rank and file as well as to the leadership to win the two other 
union secretaries over to his point of view and to have the 
latter, willingly or with hesitations, follow the policies he 
advocated.
Since the Communists were not only more aggressive in 
their promotion of worker interests and demands but better organized, 
they were better able to staff lesser positions in the union 
hierarchy with dedicated union workers. Here the Christian 
Democrats could not compete with the Communist*s party man for 
man, as they could in the rural parishes, for unlike the latter 
case the DC did not have in the factories the local clergy at its
disposal.-*-0
10. The same situation in France led to the unsuccessful "worker- 
priest* experiment where priests took up jobs in factories 
alongside the workers. To the chagrin of the hierarchy it 
was found that, rather than workers becoming better Catholics, 
priests were becoming Communists.
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Thus the only way for non-communist union leaders to 
tveaken the PCX hold on the unions was to secede from the CGIL.
The pretext arose after the CGIL used the union organization 
to foment worker demonstrations which were of political rather 
than economic nature: the demonstrations following the attempt
on Togliatti*s life, against the Marshall Plan, and against the 
unloading of military supplies from the United States were 
examples of such "political” strikes which reflected the 
communist point of view.
Shortly after the events following the July 14 assassi­
nation attempt, the Catholics left the CGIL to form the CISL 
(Confederazione Italiana dei Sindacati Liberi— Italian Confed­
eration of Free Unions) and, somewhat later, the Social-Democrats 
left to form the UIL (Unione Italiana dal Lavoro).^ The 
Socialists, however, remained and are still joined with the 
Communists in the CGIL.
In July, 1949 a blow was aimed a he Communists frora 
another direction. From the throne of St. Peter was hurled an 
excommunication against all those who professed, defended, pro­
pagated, published, read, diffused or collaborated by writings, 
books or periodicals "the theory and practice of Communism."
11. "These secessions, which vrere backed by moral and financial 
support from American union representatives, deprived the 
CGIL of perhaps a third of its membership." Hughes, op. cit. 
p. 169
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Inexorably, the PCI continued its advance but, now, 
the advance was achieved not by the old conspiratorial methods 
but, rather, by becoming openly an enormous mass party, the 
largest in the non-communist world, which achieved despite every 
effort to halt its progress a membership of over two and one-half 
million at its greatest extent. Papal excommunications against 
"atheistic Communism," especially from a Pope who made princes 
and counts out of his nephews, convinced only those already 
opposed to Communism of the need to resist it. vfliile economic 
and social disparities in Italy remained so acute and unalleviated, 
pleas on behalf of the defenders of the status quo, regardless 
of from how prestigious a source they emanated, could not prevent 
those masses who remained victims of that same status quo from 
listening to the attacks against the injustices it perpetuated. 
This still does not explain the endurance of communist power in 
Italy, assuming that this power depends solely upon the economic 
deprivation of the population. The PCI today is electorally 
stronger than it ever was despite the effects of the much 
advertised "Kiracolo Sconomico" which Italy has experienced.
Any government which might have come to power in 
1943, regardless of its political colouring, would have faced 
the same socio-economic problems and would have had to have 
taken some steps to solve them, even if only by accomplishing 
the bare minimum. Agriculture remained the greatest headache.
One half or more of the population still remained on the land
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and of these the landless braccianti (literally "the ones with 
arms" their only source of income) who worked on a day to day 
basis for the owners of the latifondi. formed alone about one 
quarter of the agricultural population. These "wetbacks" lived 
in the most hopeless conditions with no security of employment 
and were for much of the year in fact jobless. Emigration had 
traditionally been their only escape. After II, however, the 
braccianti in angry desperation began to occupy some of the 
great estates, particularly of the South, which were semi­
cultivated or completely neglected by absentee owners. In the 
face of this menacing social unrest the De Gasperi government 
introduced a bill to redistribute the land (with indemnities 
to the owners) to the landless peasantry. In doing so, the 
conservatives in the government (particularly the Liberals and 
Right-wing Christian Democrats) fought the measure at every turn 
in alliance with the bitterly opposed Federation of Agricultural 
Employers, Confagricoltura. Although almost two million acres 
of land were redistributed by the land reforms, they have not 
brought the resounding success which had been hoped for.
The Christian Democratic land reformers had hoped to 
create a class of independent peasant farmers of the kind who 
usually could be counted on to vote DC. Therefore, going against 
the trend of modern agriculture everywhere, land was distributed 
to the peasants in .small uneconomic parcels instead of joining 
the peasants together in larger cooperative types of agricultural
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South where the land was often infertile and required modern 
mechanized techniques applied xvith industrial efficiency to 
achieve a suitable yield. The not infrequent result was that 
the resettled farmer, unable with his old and inefficient 
techniques to make a go of his new farm and lacking the invest­
ment capital to mechanize even his own small acreage, abandoned 
his new cottage to return to his squalid village where at least 
he could share his poverty with others.
Along with the land reform was created a new agency 
La Cassa per II Kezzogiorno (The Fund for the South) which was 
provided with very substantial funds to carry out sorely needed 
public works projects (roads, aqueducts, power installations etc.) 
which would provide an infrastructure for future economic advances 
nevertheless, the South was suffering from an immediate excess 
of population which neither a well-conceived land reform nor 
serious regional planning of the Tennessee Valley kind could 
entirely alleviate. An industrialized South might have been 
the answer, but no such condition existed. Consequently, Italy 
began to experience an entirely new social phenomenon which is 
still continuing; the mass migration of millions of Southerners 
seeking work in northern industrial cities. The Two Italies 
were finally to meet but not in the manner expected by economists.
12. This dramatic confrontation between Northerner and South­
erner has been cinematically depicted by the highly praised 
director Luchino Visc-onti (a Communist) in his film "Rocco 
and his Brothers.”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
t182
The less than satisfactory results of the government *s 
various programmes and policies both foreign and domestic soon 
began to reveal themselves politically. When NATO was officially 
formed in 1949> the De Gasperi government unhesitatingly com­
mitted Italy to the Alliance as a logical application of its 
general political line and in very short time American military 
bases were established over the Italian peninsula. By 1953 5 
Italy itself, having assumed onerous military obligations as 
part of NATO, was diverting 23% of the Italian national budget 
to military expenditures, an amount whose size disturbed even 
Right-wing Italians.^3
It was the outbreak of the Korean War which most 
deeply distressed wide sectors of the population who had had 
their fill of war and were basically of neutralist leanings.
13. In 1953, while these hundreds of billions of lire w^ere
being spent to defend Free Italy from the Communist Menace, 
a parliamentary commission published its findings on the 
living standards of the Italian people. In the *Vigorelli 
Report» the following facts were brought to light: 11.7#
of Italian families were declared utterly destitute; a 
similar number were "needy”; 65.7# lived in "modest condi­
tions" (for Italy); 232,000 families lived in cellars, 
attics or warehouses; 92,000 lived in caves or ’"icks and 
most Italian housing lacked even elementary hygienic 
plumbing facilities. In 1952 the national census showed 
that some five million Italians were still illiterate 
and millions were semi-literate. There were at the same 
time over two and a half million unemployed in the country.
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To these people, the military rather than the financial impli­
cations of the governmentfs foreign policy were the immediate 
cause for anxiety. Nationalistic-minded Italians disliked the 
governments lack of an ,findQpendent,, foreign policy and its 
obsequious eagerness to please Washington while the angry 
reactions of the Communists and other Left-wing sympathisers 
(strikes and demonstrations) unmistakably revealed their hostile 
attitudes. These and other factors helped to diminish the 
popularity of the government. Inevitably also the practise of 
the clientela and parentela, the peculiarly Italian forms of 
porkbarreling, became rife in what is known as the sotto-governo 
or "sub-government" of the ministries and numerous state cor­
porations, all of which were usually run by DC appointees. The 
indications that all of this was not popular with the electorate 
were first revealed in the local administrative elections held 
in 1951 and 1952.
The results of both elections showed a substantial 
decline of votes for the DC which dropped from its 1948 total 
of 48.5$ to 35.9$ of the votes cast. The four million votes 
it lost were picked up mostly by the revivified High. -ing 
parties such as the neo-Fascist MCI and the Monarchist party, 
the latter of which actually won the Naples elections. While 
the Communists held their positions, the PSI made some notable 
advances which began to stir up anew the autonomist elements in 
the PSI who wanted greater self-identification from the PCI. The
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Social-Democrats showed gains as well. Nevertheless the admin­
istrative elections were only the prelude for the battle which 
lay ahead in national elections of 1953.
The loss of votes suffered by the DC in the 1952 and 
1953 elections, as well as losses by the Liberals and Republi­
cans, indicated that the majority enjoyed by the quadripartite 
coalition had been pared to a bare minimum and, if national 
elections were to be held soon, even this margin might disappear 
if the trend continued. In fact, national elections were in 
the offing and the prospect of losing frightened the Christian 
Democratic leaders and their coalition partners into introducing 
a bill in Parliament which ignited an uproar of opposition and 
exposed the government to an unflattering comparison with the 
Fascist government of thirty years earlier. In 1923 the latter 
had rigged the election laiys to assure for itself a parliamen­
tary majority. IVhat the Christian Democratic government proposed 
was a similar electoral lav; (dubbed by the opponents as La 
legge truffa (the fraud or swindle law) by which a single party 
or an alliance of one or more parties (such as the four parties 
of the coalition) which was able to muster at least of the
total vote would be given a premium of eighty-five seats thus 
raising the "winner’s" majority to a safe of the seats in 
the Chamber. After chaotic scenes characterized by very 
unparliamentary behaviour in both of the Italian Chambers, the 
law was passed over the violent protests of the opposition parties
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and automatically* became the chief issue of the 1953 election 
campaign. The election took place on June 7 xi/ith 93# of the 
electorate voting.
If II diciotto aprile is memorable for the failure 
of the Popular Front to vault itself into power by electoral 
means, II sette giugno can be considered as the April 18th of the 
Right since the coalition parties together failed to win even 
50.01# of the vote. Thus the new electoral lav/ was made use­
less. The Social-Democrats and Republicans fared very badly 
although the DC improved its showing as compared with 1952-53 
local elections and won 40.1# of the vote. The PCI and PSI 
ran on separate lists to emphasize their opposition to the 
,rSwindle Lawlf and while the former made some gains the PSI 
gained twenty-three new seats. The other notable advances were 
made on the Right by the Monarchists who successfully exploited 
the political illiteracy of enough Southern peasants to jump 
from three seats in 1948 to forty in 1953.
The 1953 elections form another milestone in the 
political history of postwar Italy. In a real sense they meant 
that the struggle between Left and Right could be ca^^d a 
"draw11: if the Left had been barred from grasping tho power
which was just within its reach in 1948, neither could the 
Right hope to monopolize it after 1953*
Italian Communists were not unused to hearing certain 
accusations repeatedly levelled at them: they were “threats to
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democracy,” "totalitarians” and even no less than "enemies of 
the human race.” Yet, when the vilifiers still posed sancti­
moniously as defenders of democracy just after having failed 
barely in their attempt to sabotage the representative nature 
of the Italian parliament, when they continued to delay putting 
important provisions of the republican constitution into effect 
in order to profit politically and especially when they eagerly 
utilized Fascist police lavra against political enemies while 
posing as anti-Fascists the accusations tended, after the elec­
tions of 1953, to emit an odour of mendacity. To these 
hypocrites the Communists might well have repeated Higoletto,s 
contemptuous epithet with regard to the assassin Sparafucile: 
Pari siamo (We are both alike).
The Third Quinquennium: 1953-195b
In 1916 Gramsci wrote:
Every revolution has been preceeded by an intense labour 
of criticism, of cultural penetration, or permeation of 
ideas through groups of men initially refractory and en­
grossed with solving day by day their own political and 
economic problem.14
Attention has already been made concerning Gramsci*s
thoughts on the competition which exists between groups or
14. Quoted by Neil l-lclnnes "Antonio Gramsci" Survey. No. 53 > 
(Oct. 19o4)> PP. 3-15
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classes for the position of "hegemony” in any given society; 
and reference has also been made to the considerable political 
power and influence achieved by the PCX after it returned to 
public activity in Italy after I’Atf II, a power and influence 
which the party continues to retain and in fact has succeeded 
in increasing. Communist power in Italy, however, cannot be 
measured strictly in terms of percentages of the popular vote 
in elections, in numbers of parliamentary seats or in numbers 
of city or town councils controlled by the PCI.
This is not intended to mean that one must not forget, 
when calculating communist power in Italy, to include other 
institutions in which communist participation is significant, 
that is, in the unions, in the extensive system of cooperative 
businesses, in import-export businesses or in other enterprises 
such as publishing. These, of course, are very important but 
in gauging the true extent of the influence of the PCI in Italy 
such yardsticks do not suffice. They do not cover what is 
immeasurable, that is to say, the extent of the ideological 
attraction which the Italian variant of Communism has on 
Italians. They cannot appreciate, in a word, the extent of the 
"hegemony" of communist ideology in Italian society for the 
latter is not strictly identifiable with the political institu­
tion which is the PCI. The incalculable attraction of Gramsci 
lies at the centre of the issue, for his posthumous influence 
extends far beyond those circles which would be willing to be
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as a party.
The years after 1953 are profoundly important in 
Italian political history because they are years in which another 
svolta in the course of Italian politics began to take place.
To use Amintore Fanfani’s phrase, the period between 1953 and 
195S were "difficult but not sterile years," This could be 
said for European or international affairs as well but, for 
Italy, it signified particularly the period when the groundwork 
was first being laid for the "opening to the Left" on the part 
of the Right and indeed for the "opening to the Right" on the 
part of the Left, Much of this preparation was achieved not so 
much on the purely political level as on the cultural/ideological 
level where the Italian intelligentsia, regardless of political 
leanings, spoke the same intellectual language.
The pre-Fascist culture of Italy, so deeply influenced 
by Crooaan idealism, did not suffer the same fate as pre-Fascist 
politics which were thoroughly eliminated during the twenty year 
long regime. To a great extent the former emerged intact 
because even the "official" Fascist culture and ideology had 
been created with the same intellectual tools which lay at the 
disposition of all intellectuals trained in the classical tradi­
tion of Italian scholarship,
Giovanni Gentile, the most distinguished ideologist and 
apologist of Fascism, had once been an intimate collaborator of 
Croce’s until the two parted ways and the latter, as a Liberal,
UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR LIBRARY
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assumed his "quietist" opposition to the regime. Croce*s intel­
lectual opposition was tolerated by the regime not simply 
because it served as convenient proof that "opposition" was 
allowed in Fascist Italy, nor simply because this opposition, 
limited as it was to the tiny elite of scholars conversant with 
Crocean thought, was quite ineffectual, but also because Croce’s 
immense prestige as the doyen of an entire cultural tradition, 
shared by Gentile and Gramsci alike, mad© his suppression 
unthinkable. When the old man emerged from Fascism with his 
intellectual integrity uncompromised his prestige was oven more 
widespread among the cultured classes:
The immediate effect of Mussolini’s fall, then, was to 
strengthen the hold of Croceanisia on Italian literary 
and social thought; the position of pre-erainence that the 
Neopolitan philosopher had achieved in the past forty 
years seemed only to be confirmed by the destruction of 
the Fascist tyranny. Yet this leadership was more pre­
carious than it appeared: in most cases it rested on
vague respect rather than on true understanding and Croce 
was by now too old to adapt to the new Italy that was 
emerging from the ruins of war.15
Croce’s thought, while exercising an undeniably wide­
spread and profound influence on Italian culture, had, at the 
same time, a smothering effect. It was almost as effective as 
the Fascist intolerance for the non-Fascist ideas which were 
common currency in the rest of v / e stern Europe and North America 
not to speak of the USSR. Between Croce and Fascism nothing
15. Hughes, op. cit., p. 238
Hughes gives a very informative while concise account of 
the intellectual realignments in post v/W II Italy in his 
book The United States and Italy. Chapter 11, For a deeper 
exposition of Croce’s thought see the same author, Con 
sclousness and Society (Chapters 2, 3 and 6 particularly).
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could grow:
Thus Croccanism in the immediate post-Fascist era exerted 
an influence almost diametrically opposed to what it had 
stood for a generation earlier. In the first two decades 
of the twentieth century Croce’s historical and literary 
idealism had come as a breath of renewal; in the 1940’s 
it figured as a solidly established cult whose aesthetic 
formulations masked rather than illuminated the harsher 
features of contemporary Italian life. It was only a 
question of time before some new approach to reality would 
shake up Italy’s intellectual world and-.almost overnight 
release it from Croce’s hypnotic spell. 1
Enter Antonio Gramsci. While the PCI was conducting 
its struggles on the political plane, with the degree of success 
and failure already described, the body of Gramscian thought 
began to permeate Italian intellectual life. In it were syn­
thesized the traditions of Crocean philosophical culture,
Marxist criteria of socio-economic analysis, and an acute and 
profoundly humane personal consciousness of the squalor and 
backwardness which formed so large a part of the Italian reality, 
a reality which was all the more glaring when no longer veiled 
by the veneer of Fascist rhetoric.
Artistically, the first reactions were to be seen in 
the wave of postwar films now known under the generic name of 
"Neo-realist," films such as Rossellini’s "Rome, Open City," 
-"Paisa," and Do Sica’s "Sciuscia" and "Bicycle Thief" which are 
regarded as classics and which hid nothing of the truth of
16. Hughes, ibid.
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Italian life from the camera lenses. In literature, the 
writings of Cesare Pavese, Alberto Moravia, Elio Vittorini,
Carlo Levi, Vasco Pratolini, Pier Paolo Pasolini and others all 
reflected a preoccupation with the interaction between the 
characters in the novels and the social situation. Usually the 
protagonists were simple people of poor station or else well- 
to-do characters bored and corrupted by the hollowness of their 
easeful lives. But, while these engage*creations could and did 
express a deep sympathy for the poor and oppressed they could 
not be ’’political" as such.
Gramsci*s own work was more immediately connected with 
political and social theory, even if his aim was to relate this 
theory to the needs of the same masses from which the neo-ralists 
took their characters. Gramscifs desire was to create a pro­
letarian ethic which would overcome all other rival ideologies 
and raise the working classes to a ^ position where they could 
exercise the cultural as well as social, economic and political 
hegemony over society. To achieve this in the Italian context, 
Gramsci thought., required that he come to grips with Croce:
It is necessary to practise on the philosophy of Croce the 
same reduction that {Marx and Engels) practised on the 
Hegelian philosophy. This is the only historically fruit­
ful way of bringing about an adequate renovation of the 
philosophy of praxis (i.e. 24arxism), of elevating that 
philosophy, which has been "vulgarized" for the immediate 
needs of practical life, to the level it must attain... 
(namely) the creation of a new integral culture which will 
have the mass-character of the Protestant Reformation and 
the French Enlightenment as well as the character of Greek 
culture and the Italian Renaissance, a culture that will.., 
synthesize...politics and philosophy in a dialectical
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unity...For us Italians, to be the heirs of German philo­
sophy means being the heirs of the Crocean philosophy. . ,^ -f
The above statement, has been explained as arising 
from Gramsci’s conviction that marxism "had suffered a ’materia­
list’ degeneration in his time."^5 This degeneration had been 
caused in three ways: firstly, Stalinism had reduced its
(Marxism’s) metaphysics to a "mechanical materialism;” secondly, 
cultural, social and ethical factors in social change had been 
reduced to a "narrow political interpretation” in Leninism; and. 
thirdly, in order ”to van the support of the plebs whose intel­
lectual capacity or incapacity, reflected merely vulgar 
prejudice and naive realism" Marxism had been simplified for 
purposes of mass indoctrination. Political practice and 
speculative idealism had to be fused, not one time for all but 
"by each generation at higher levels." Gramsci’s immediate task 
then was to achieve such a fusion which for Italy would "take 
the form of an anti-Croce written by a Marxist."
Such a concept does not indicate a totalitarian, 
ideological or political order. As suggested by a French 
Jesuit, Italian Communism refuses to assume a strictly
17. Gramsci’s "11 matarialisiiao storico e la filosofia di
Benedetto Croce"quoted by Neil Mclnness in "Antonio Gramsci" 
p. lO. Mclnness gives a good short summary of Gramsci’s 
thought in his article relating it to other Marxist thought 
and to the PCI’s position today.
1C. Mclnness ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
193
proletarian colouring for it seeks to attract to itself not
only the masses but the elites as well. Hence, according to
the same writer "pluralism is necessary" to the PCI not simply
because of the numerical realities of Italian politics but
"doctrinally as well":
Marxism necessitates, in order that it purify itself both 
dialogue and dialectic. Hence, praxis. For the latter, 
thought is action and action is thought: the dialectical
progression does not consist of destroying the thesis by 
means of the antithesis, but of saving all that is posi­
tive furnished by one and the other, and to raise both one 
and the other to a synthesis which is entirely positive. 
(Aufhebung)19
Thus, with regard to the "narrow" or political Leninist 
version of Marxism, despite its historical indispensibility,
Gramsci felt about the same way "a theologian does about simple 
minded ^popular religion1."20 ^his did not diminish the impor­
tance of the Leninist type party because the latter remained the 
most important instrument of political action. Even a revolu­
tionary movement of mass participation whose goals are cultural 
and ethical must be subject to the discipline of organization 
and leadership which is provided by a party. This is not to say 
that the party will be authoritarian. There must be a reciprocity, 
almost a dialectic, between the leadership, which must remain 
sensitive and responsive to the aspirations oi' the mass base, 
and this same base whose self-consciousness is concentrated in
19. Georges Jarlot, "Le Neo-marxisme Italien" Etudes, No. 324, p.35
20. Mclnness, op. cit. p. 11
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its leadership. In such a praxis the party becomes the medium
through which thought, which ideally exists in individual minds
•'becomes actual, lives historically, that is s o c i a l l y . " 2 1
A philosophy such as Marxism must seek its •’proof’* by
conquering mass support as a way of living. And at a crucial
point in that effort "it will need a Machiavellian Prince to
incarnate the collective will that has opted for its morality."22
To use Gramsci’s own words:
The modern Prince, the myth-prince cannot be a real person, 
a concrete individual; it can only be an organism, a com­
plex element of society in which the cementing of a collec­
tive will, recognized and partially asserted in action has 
already begun. This organism is already provided by his­
torical development and it is the political party:...It is 
necessary to define collective will and political will in 
general, in the modern sense: will as working conscious­
ness of historical necessity, as protagonist of a real and 
effective historical drama. One of the first parts (of a 
study of modern revolution) ought in fact to be dedicated 
to the "collective will" posing the question in this way: 
"When can the conditions for the arousing and development 
of the national popular collective will be said to exist?’.'.. 
The Modern Prince must, and cannot but, be the preacher 
and organizer of intellectual and moral reform, which 
means creating the basis for a later development of the 
national-popular collective will towards the realisation 
of a higher and total form of modern civilization.2’
In this notion of the party, Marxism is anything but
a crude materialist economism. The latter becomes rather an
21. Ibid.
22. Mclnness, op. cit. p. 13
23. Gramsci, Mote sul Hachiavelli (The Modern Prince) quoted 
by Mclnness, op. cit. p. 13
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element of a more integrated critical consciousness which is 
diffused throughout the social collective. In seeking to 
bring about a fundamental moral and intellectual regeneration 
of society as well as in pursuing immediate economic social 
and political reforms the myth-prince becomes the instrument 
or medium through which critical awareness (thought) becomes 
programmatic (action).24 Through such a complete commitment 
the ’’higher and more total form of modern civilization” will 
be realized.
The party conceived by Gramsci remains voluntaristic 
enough to be considered Leninist and didactic enough to be con­
sidered Stalinist. On the other hand Gramsci’s party seems to 
go beyond purely political concerns occupying itself with the
24. In this connection see Togliatti's comments on the obliga­
tions of the party worker. Chapter I, p. 33j footnote 33
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much vaster questions of culture and civilization.25 Such a 
"gout ds la. culture”26 could not but attract the attention of 
the apolitical intellectual, especially in an environment such 
as that of postwar Italy, where the ideals of the Resistance 
were struggling bitterly with the conservatism which had been 
the mainstay of the earlier regime.
25. Gramsci has not infrequently been described as an "hereti­
cal" or "open" Marxist usually by non-Communist intellec­
tuals who would like to "claim" him as one of their own.
The implied sense is that had he not been isolated in 
prison Gramsci would surely have broken with his party 
during the Stalin years. However, the closest approxima­
tion of what a profound cultural and moral, as well as 
political-economic, regeneration of society seems to be 
being made by no one as much as by the "Stalinist" Chinese 
Communists. According to a competent and impartial obser­
ver of Chinese affairs, Han Suyin, the Chinese Revolution, 
with all its political, economic and social implications, 
is not simply the result of the leadership of the Communist 
Party willing change. The latter is convinced that social 
change predicates irreversible changes in attitudes, a 
self-conscious planning on a philosophical as well as 
material scale. This furthermore assumes the perfecta- 
bility of man through education; an education moreover to 
be carried out on a mass basis otherwise the vast masses
of the population will remain untouched and unmoved by 
whatever progress is achieved by the well-prepared elite. 
Such a dichotomy would separate the basses and the elite 
on a material as well as spiritual basis. To this may be 
traced the importance attached to intellectuals doing 
physical labour and perhaps some of the remoter roots of 
the "Great Cultural Revolution" which seems to be as much 
political as "cultural" in context.
Vide Han Suyin, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. V. XXII, 
fto. 16, (June 1966), pp. 80-85
26. Jarlot, op. cit. p. 35
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It is most apparent, therefore, that the impact of 
Communism in Italy was not superficial, nor limited to the 
unhappy and dissatisfied working classes. Its impact was broad 
and deep and, until the Italian intelligentsia began later to 
catch up vrlth the most advanced non-Larxist social economic 
thinking, almost overwhelming. The ideological confrontation 
took place not only with the intellectuals of the "lay” tradition.
Catholics, that is to say the Catholic intelligentsia, 
still exercised a profound influence in Italian society. Wo one 
realized this better than Communists. Sut while the "lay” intel­
ligentsia v/ith its traditional anti-clericalism could not (or 
refused to) enter any dialogue with the "clericals," Communists 
were prepared to do so on an ideological level. The political 
actions of the PCI with regard to the insertion of Article VII 
in the Constitution have already been referred to. This, how­
ever, had little, if any, ideological overtones. It was simply 
a tactical effort to keep the door open for future efforts towards 
achieving some understanding with the Catholics. Such an under­
standing took time to mature but the maturation did take place. 
These were the "difficult but not sterile years" and the diffi­
culty lay in the torturous political developments which took 
place among all parties Left and Right.
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Towards the "Openings"
ifhile it would be interesting in itself to trace in 
detail the political contortions which took place among the 
government parties after the 1953 elections, these do not lie 
within the immediate scope of this discussion. It is, however, 
necessary to indicate major developments as they relate to the 
position of the PCI.
The Christian Democratic loss of its parliamentary 
majority was not without its victims and the first of these 
was De Gasperi himself: after ruling the country more than
seven years he found himself unable to conjur up another 11 com- 
binazione" by which his eighth ministry could win a majority of 
of parliamentary support.
The search thus began for another way out of the 
political impasse with attempts to govern by monocolore (single 
party) government (i.e. Christian Democratic ministries) or by 
reviving the old quadripartite formula. Until the next general 
elections were held in 195d one short-lived ministry was 
succeeded by another in a vain effort to find oome kind of 
majority based on Centre-Eight support. This meant that extreme 
Right-wing parties usually lent their tacit support by not 
voting against the government. In turn, the government had to 
be careful not to antagonize its Right-wing support by appearing 
too zealous about economic and social reform.
The result was that successive governments all suffered
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from an immobilism which frustrated even non-Communists who 
were sincerely interested in seeing some progress made, For a 
long while apologists of the Centre-Right were able to ration­
alize this inertia by conjuring up before the antl-Communist 
public an alarming vision of the only other alternative: 
government of the Loft. .Vhile the very mention of such a thing 
no doubt caused some Italians to have nightmares about a Great 
Dividing-Up Day in which their pockets would be emptied by the 
Bolsheviks, the prospect of a government including the "demo­
cratic Left” appeared to more and more people as the only 
rational alternative. The reasons were many. While the govern­
ments which succeeded each other after every few months were 
distinguished by one coition feature, paralysis, on the level 
of internal party politics the common characteristic cf all 
parties seemed to be change fluidity and clarification of 
trends. This was true for both Left and Right wing parties.
After De Gasperi’s fall tho phrase "apertura a sinistra11 
which was coined by Pietro Hcnni. secretary of the PSI, became 
one of the most frequently used terms in the Italian political 
vocabulary, VJhile -Nenni had used the phrase to mean that his 
party was prepared to arrive at an understanding with the DC 
if the latter were -willing to collaborate, the term assumed a 
wider significance. The opening to the Left meant not only the 
possible inclusion of Socialists in government but meant that 
within the DC itself the Left-wing tendencies were beginning to
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come into their own. This was indirectly due to a clarification 
of the position of the Liberal Party which had frankly become 
the spokesman for business and industrial interests, thus 
stealing some important support from the DC Right.
Simultaneously in the DC personalities (such as 
Amintore Fanfani) who were leaders of the Left or "popular" 
currents in the party were assuming positions of power and 
influence: in 1954 Fanfani was elected secretary of his party.
Slowly the DC began to move leftwards while within the PSI 
trends indicated a reciprocal move to the Right. Such political 
manoeuvrings had the effect of bringing the much thought about 
"opening to the Left" closer to realization.
One of the most decisive "pushes" towards the Left 
occurred in 1955 when Giovanni Gronchi x*as elected President of 
Italy in succession to Luigi Einaudi. Gronchi was a Christian 
Democrat but he was not the official choice of the DC which had 
chosen a conservative with good business connections as its 
official candidate. Gronchi belonged to the Left wing of the 
Christian Democratic party and it was a humiliation to that 
party*s Right-wing when, with Communist and Socialist support, 
he was elected to the presidency of the republic.27
27. The Italian Constitution stipulates that a president must
be elected by a two-thirds majority of both Chambers. After 
the third ballot, if no one is elected, a simple majority 
becomes sufficient. This makes the political weight of the 
Left decisive in presidential elections since alone it con­
trols more than one-third of the vote in the parliament.
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With GronchiTs election the Christian Democratic Right 
lost the dominant position it had held in the party since the 
end of the war. Conversely, the DC Left began to play an 
increasingly important role in deciding party policy although 
as yet it was unable to dictate any policy. On the other side 
of the Right-Left dividing line the PSI continued its slow 
separation from the PCI, Part of the reason for this was the 
clear possibility that Socialists might finally enter the pro­
verbial "control room" and might share in shaping public policy. 
But this was only part of the reason. As attractive as parti­
cipation in government appeared to the Socialists, other reasons 
for the disengagement from the PCI were very decisive and per­
haps most can be traced to the momentous year of 1956. For the 
international communist movement the year 1956 has profound sig­
nificance especially when one considers the relationship of 
one national communist movement to another.
Within the USSR, the years following WW II were 
characterized on the economic level by a tremendous growth under 
the Fourth and Fifth Five Tear Plans (1945-1955)* During these 
years the immense damage done to the Soviet economy during VJVJ II 
v/as not only repaired but the rhythm of industrial production 
was increased to such an extent that a comparatively prosperous 
and comfortable life was beginning to become a reality for the 
masses of Soviet citizens. Agriculture, the perennial Soviet 
victim of under-investment, lagged behind industry in produc-
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tivity, but as a consequence the agricultural problem was 
increasingly to receive the close attention of Soviet planners.
But these achievements had not been without cost: 
decades of privation and sacrifice had gone into building the 
bases for the abundant life which was promised by the leadership. 
By the early Fifties an entire generation of Soviet citizens 
had been born and had grovm up under a communist regime, had been 
educated to a degree which was later to surprise the world and 
had sustained dreadful suffering during the war to defend what 
they had collectively built. The old rulers of the USSR, how­
ever, did not develop with the economy and, after the war, 
resumed the old methods of governing a modern and growing indus­
trial society with a young and more sophisticated population 
than that of the earlier era. Repetition of 1930 slogans 
about capitalist encirclement and internal dangers to the Revo­
lution no longer carried the same weight with the younger 
population straining restlessly under the limitations and 
restrictions placed on personal expression.
Finally, in 1953, Stalin, the figure who came to 
symbolize both the achievements as well as the despotism of the 
Soviet regime, died and the ferment began. After a series of 
struggles among personalities representing currents of opinion 
in the CPSU, Nikita Khrushchev emerged as the new leader, a 
compromise between the "liberals" (Malenkov) and the "hard 
liners" (Molotov). To move forward Khrushchev found it necessary
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to change the old methods of ruling symbolized by the constipated 
party apparat built up under Stalin. To do so meant that 
the halo which had been placed over the head of Stalin during 
the long years of his reign had to be removed and this occurred 
on February 25, 1956 when Khrushchev delivered a "secret" speech 
to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.
That the speech was meant to be secret can be under­
stood by its content for Khrushchev shocked and surpised even 
his audience of party members by denouncing a list of crimes 
which had been committed by Stalin during his life in power, 
crimes which had long been the objects of accusations outside 
the USSR but the subject of eloquent silence within the USSR,
The secret demystification of Stalin to Soviet Communist Party 
members was probably part of a gradual long range plan to ease 
further the controls on Soviet society particularly in cultural 
matters {literature, the arts, etc.) which were already in the 
process of a "thaw." That the speech was intended to remain 
privy to a restricted few testifies to the understanding the 
Soviet leaders had about the probable consequences publication 
would cause especially outside Soviet borders. In June 1956, 
however, the American State Department published what it claimed 
was Khrushchev^ speech. Events then took their own course and
2b. The most sinister aspect of Stalinist rule, police terror­
ism , personified by the chief of the Secret Police, Lavrenti 
Beria, was eliminated shortly after Staling death. Beria 
himself was liquidated and the independence of the Secret 
Police restricted.
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and in East Europe led to the well-known eruptions in Poland 
and Hungary during October and November.
As has already been mentioned, the communist regimes 
governing East Europe originally owed their establishment to 
the presence of the Red Army in each of the various countries.
In some of these countries, such as Poland and Hungary, where 
anti-Russian sentiment was traditional, the Soviet deus ex machina 
behind the new regimes was bitter enough to accept. But the 
imposition of a stifling orthodoxy by leaders who were perhaps 
more Stalinist than Stalin made the extreme social economic 
and political transformations occurring in the Peoples* Demo­
cracies even more indigestible. Such leaders had built their 
power on Stalin*s support and while he was alive basked in his 
approval while carrying out highly unpopular measures (e.g. col­
lectivization of agriculture in Poland.)
With the death of the Soviet roi soleil the hard-liners 
in East Europe were already living on borrowed time. When nev/s 
of Khrushchev's astounding speech destroying Stalin’s aura of 
infallibility filtered down to the ordinary people, all the 
bitterness and resentment, pent-up during the hard years of 
radical and ruthless change, sought expression. While the 
first eruptions occurred in Poland in October, it was in Hungary 
that the most extreme reactions took place the following month. 
Whereas in Poland a compromise was found and moderate "national- 
communist" leaders (i.e. Gomulka) took over from the Stalinists,
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the Hungarian Stalinists held on tightly until popular demonstra­
tions in Budapest forced the latter out and swept "liberals” 
into office.
tfhile the Hungarian movement no doubt was partly 
animated by Right-wing Hungarians hopeful of a reversal in the 
political order, it seems most correct to characterise the Buda­
pest events as a movement of nationalist and intellectual protest 
by Hungarian Communists who were chafing under narrow Stalinist 
tutelage (Gyorgy Lukacs, the most eminent living harxist philo­
sopher, for example, sympathized with the insurrectionists). 
Hungary might have been Poland excepting for two facts: firstly,
the Hungarian regime, by pulling out of the V/arsaw Pact, was 
going, or threatening to go, further than the Soviet leaders 
were willing to tolerate and secondly, the crisis over Suez 
diverted more world-wide attention (especially in the ex-colonial 
"Third v/orld") to itself than did Hungary. These combined cir­
cumstances resulted in the quick suppression of the Budapest 
uprising by Soviet tanks. The "settlement" of its Hungarian 
problem then allowed the Soviet leadership to concentrate on the 
invasion of Egypt and to issue its ultimata to the Anglo-French 
Israeli invaders to cease their attacks.
What, one may properly ask, has all of this to do with 
Italian Communism? The answer is: kuch. The consequences of 
the events of 195& occurred on four levels or in four areas: 
within the PCI itself, between the PCI and other Italian socialist
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parties, between the PCI and other national communist parties, 
and on particular personal levels affecting mainly intellectuals.
While Khrushchev13 "deStalinization" speech will 
probably remain the most famous document of the Twentieth Con­
gress of the CPPU, the Congress had also adopted other resolu­
tions which were of immense significance for parties such as 
the PCI. In particular one resolution seemed to reflect 
Italian views exactly. Proceeding from an analysis of the 
world which revealed: that Communism, although no longer
isolated in one country, had grown powerful enough even in the 
one country to challenge the capitalist world on equal terms 
and could resist "imperialist encroachments’1 on socialist 
countries still too weak to resist alone; that working classes 
in capitalist and colonial countries were gravitating more and 
more towards communist and socialist ideas; and, that in fact, 
in several countries the balance of political force was such 
that national communist parties posed a real challenge to the 
political status quo, the Congress inserted the following reso­
lution into the party programme:
In a number of capitalist countries the working class, 
headed by its vanguard, has, in present conditions, a real 
opportunity to unite the overwhelming majority of the 
people under its leadership and to ensure the transfer 
of the basic means of production into the hands of the 
people. The right-wing bourgeois parties and the govern­
ments formed by them are suffering bankruptcy more fre­
quently. In these conditions the working class uniting 
around itself the toiling peasantry. big sections of the 
intelligentsia, all the patriotic forces and resolutely ^ 
rebuffing the opportunist elements, who are incapable of 
giving up a policy of compromise with the capitalists and
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landlords, is in a position to win a solid majority in 
parliament and turn it into a genuine instrument of the 
people’s will.29
This statement could hardly have approximated the point 
of view of the Italian Communist leaders more closely without 
referring specifically to Italy and the PCI. It vindicated 
unequlvocably the line taken by the PCI since 194-4 and indicated 
approval of the PCI’s adoption of constitutional and parliamen­
tary methods of pursuing power. The leadership of the PCI for 
its part welcomed this declaration and indeed the work of the 
whole Congress with understandable enthusiasm. In his report 
to the Central Committee of the PCI shortly after the end of 
the Twentieth Congress, Togliatti dwelt at length on the inter­
national situation and on the possibilities offered to communist 
movements by what he termed the abandonment of "ideological 
schematicism" and "worn slogans" in favour of net* initiatives 
in thought and actions warranted by the new and favourable 
conditions in which the world communist movement found itself.
It was, of course, necessary to maintain and defend the funda­
mental principles which had always guided the communist move­
ment but not at the risk of transforming these principles into 
sterile formulae applicable for all time and all places: "V/hat
we are doing today would have been neither right nor possible 
thirty years ago."30
29. Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism. (Moscow n.d.) p, 504
30. Togliatti, "II XX Congresso del PCUf" in Problem! del movi- 
mento operaio internazionale (1956-1961), (Horae: 1962) p. 55
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In the same report, Togliatti also dwelt at length 
on a critical examination of the life and work of Stalin in which 
he sought to extract from Stalin*s achievements his positive 
accomplishments while indicating the serious degenerations both 
in the Soviet party and government caused by the uncritical 
adulation and personal exaltation of the Soviet leader. In 
discussing the gravity of the distortions caused in the CPSU 
and in the Soviet government by the cult of Stalin, Togliatti 
never gave them the interpretations which arose in other quar­
ters notably among Socialists and Social-Democrats. The latter 
groups sought to attribute the crimes which Stalin committed 
not simply to the flaws in the character of the Soviet leader 
but described them as products of a Soviet society which they 
argued was so deficient in democratic guarantees that such 
crimes were facilitated. While it was just and necessary to 
condemn some of Stalin's actions it was quite wrong, in Tog- 
liatti's view, to broaden this into a general condemnation 
and rejection of Soviet society and the Soviet state. Prom 
his own criticisms and from the declarations of the CPSU at 
its Twentieth Congress, the Italian communist leader stated 
his hope that the PCI would see the lessons to be learned and 
proceed towards making even greater achievements in the future 
than it had in the past in searching out "an Italian road 
towards Socialism."
Thus the first effect of the Twentieth Congress in 
Italy was to foster a spirit of renewal, of liberalization and
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revitalization in the PCI. The rejection of Stalinist methods 
and excesses was a reassuranco to those Left-wing intellectuals 
who while attracted to the PCI and its traditions hesitated 
before the pai*ty»s past identification with Stalinism. This 
assertion of self identification was further emphasized a few 
months later in June when Togliatti gave an interview to the 
publication Nuovi Argomenti {co-edited by Alberto Moravia).
It was during this interview that Togliatti first enunciated 
his famous thesis of ’’polycentrism" in the international 
communist movement. Togliatti explained that, while not dimi­
nishing the importance of the CP3U and the Soviet Union, it 
was no longer necessary to consider the Soviet Union as single 
guide for other socialist countries nor the CPSU as the only
model for other communist parties. The world had become so
diversified that to consider any one way of action as the only 
possible way was quite simply impossible:
The entire system is becoming polycentric and even within 
the communist movement itself one cannot speak in terms of 
any single guide but rather in terms of progress which is
made by taking paths which are often diverse.
One general problem which is common to the whole movement 
has resulted from the criticisms levelled at Stalin— the 
problem of bureaucratic degeneration, of the suffocation 
of democratic life, of the confusion between constructive 
revolutionary forces and the destruction of revolutionary 
legality, of the separation of the economic and political 
leadership from the life, the initiatives, the criticisms 
and the active creativity of the masses...It will be up 
to us to v/ork out our own ways and methods so that we too 
may be protected against the dangers of stagnation and 
bureaucratization in order to solve together the problems 
of freedom and social justice for the working masses.31
31. Togliatti "L*Intervista a "Nuovi Argomenti" Problem! inter- 
nazionali...p. 116-117 -------- ------
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During the summer of 1956 Togliatti amplified and elaborated 
these positions.
By shattering Stalin1s myth of his own greatness, his 
wisdom, his goodness and infallibility, by shattering, in a 
word, the prestige which he had amassed for himself and the 
party he led, the iconoclastic Soviet leaders of the Twentieth 
Congress inevitably ’weakened their own prestige and that of 
the CPS'u. But, for parties such as the PCX, with long and rich 
ideological and political traditions of its own, the possibilities 
presented by the programme adopted by the Twentieth Congress 
and the anti-Stalinist declarations of Soviet leaders were 
limitless. It would be correct to say that it was precisely 
because of its ideological and political traditions that the 
PCI was better prepared than some other parties {such as the 
French CP) to carry the possibilities of deStalinization and 
polycentrism to its most fruitful conclusions,
Togliatti lost no time in clarifying publicly lest it 
be mis Linderstood by anyone, that while the party unequivocably 
accepted and defended the Soviet system itself, even while 
reserving serious criticism for some of its aspects, Italian 
Communists were not bound to emulate or imitate the example or 
experience of any other state or party. The PCI was now even 
more prepared in other words, to increase its flexibility of 
attitudes, to minimise its sectarianism and to offer its 
cooperation to other parties in their common struggle towards
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achieving a new "Left" majority in government. The price of 
its cooperation was to have a voice in determining the goals 
towards which the new majority would address itself. The year 
1956 began well for the POX, It ended less happily.
The events in Hungary already have been described.
The effects of the Hungarian events in Italy were widely and 
deeply felt and by June the PCI was experiencing some electoral 
losses during municipal elections in such traditional electoral 
strongholds as Milan, Turin and Genoa. »'hile the ferment caused 
by the Twentieth Congress and the Khrushchev speech continued 
within the PCI and outside of it throughout the summer months 
the events of October and November caused the party its most 
serious crisis. Declarations clarifying party orientations 
were able to arrest the effects of the Hungarian uprising neither 
within the ranks of the PCI nor within the wider context of 
the Italian Left.
Within the PCI, two tendencies wore formed: one to
the Left of the "official" party position the other to the 
Right. Of the two, the latter tendency was by far the most 
important. Prom this group a number of articulate younger 
Communist leaders {such as Antonio Giolitti) broke v/ith the 
party and entered the PCI. The Hungarian uprising caused kno 
small amount of confusion and contradiction among Italian
Communists. The PCI’s "official" public position, reflected
\
by the party daily "L’Unita", ’was tc interpret the violence m
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Budapest as the work of neo-Fascist clericalists prodded on by 
foreign capitalist imperialists intent on igniting a wave of 
counter-revolutions in Eastern Europe. Other pro-Communist 
papers, groups of Comraunist intellectuals, even some leaders 
of the CGIE, on the other hand, expressed solidarity with the 
Hungarian insurrectionists, for its part, the PSI condemned 
the Goviet suppression of the uprising vigorously and "without 
reticence."32
It was the solidarity which the leadership of the 
PCI expressed for the boviet position on Hungary x/hich caused 
dissident Communists such as Giolitti to react so decisively 
against the party. By defending the ultimate rightness and 
necessity of the foviec actions in Hungary, as it had in the 
past uncritically defended Btalin and the Soviet Union against 
all enemies, the PCI, in the view of the dissidents, was pre­
venting itself from becoming the advocate of theddemocratic 
ideals which it approved and sought to pursue in Italy. During 
this period the PCX lost many of its most discerning and intel­
ligent supporters, some 300,000 or so formal members. That the 
exodus was not larger than it was perhaps can be attributed to 
the crisis occurring simultaneously over L-uea where the last 
gesture of nineteenth century colonial imperialism was repealing
32. The profound emotions felt by so many European intellec­
tuals over the Hungarian events were given a most eloquent 
expression by Albert Camus who coined the phrase "socialism 
of the gallows" to describe the regime which ruled Hungary 
before the uprising. Camus* eloquence articulated the 
feelings of many of the Italians who broke with the PCI 
over the Hungarian question.
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itself to be as ruthless against Egypt as the Soviets were 
against Hungary. To be against the stance of the PCI did not 
mean approving the behaviour of the other side. Caught in this 
bind was the PSI to which many of the disaffected Communist 
intellectuals turned.
The Hungarian events finally ruptured the Socialist- 
Communist alliance which had already suffered a great strain 
E/er since 1953> from the time of De Gasperifs fall, Menni had 
been intimating to parties of the Centre and flight that the 
PSI was willing to move from the opposition into the ranks of 
the government. After Hungary, Henni returned to the Soviet 
government a Stalin prize which he had been awarded when his 
relations with the Communists had been closer and, in a series 
of articles in "Avanti" and other socialist publications, Nenni 
other socialist writers sought to express with greater clarity 
the ideological divergences which separated the PSI from the 
PCI and In these writings the question of Stalin was treated 
more as the point of departure than as the kernel of the problem. 
The Socialists sought to justify the autonomy of the PSI on 
the basis of deeper differences. In this polemic the Socialists 
even returned to some of the criticisms directed by Karl Kautsky 
against Russian Marxists,
Kautsky, and by inference the Italian Socialists who 
referred to his positions, had insisted that in doctrinal terms 
a socialist revolution was impossible in Russia for it would
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not be based on the Imperative preceding bourgeois and indus­
trial revolutions carried to their most advanced stages. These 
criticisms, Togliatti replied, were but: "Old absurd heresies,
I’ri.th which we have been acquainted for a long time, but which 
in the face of a record of forty years of successes, of vic­
tories, of progress toward Socialism cannot today provoke 
anything more than a smile."33
In reviving this old issue at its Thirty-Second Con­
gress in early 1957 j the PSI was resurrecting its Maximalist 
dilemma. Two choices had always faced the PSI after 1921, 
choices which created unsolvablo approach-approach conflict: 
one choice was to accept the Bolshevik revolution and to assume 
the consequences of defending it like it or not, as the PCI 
had done, or to accept the implications of Kautsky*s criticisms 
and hence move towards Social-Democratic positions. In the 
past the PSI had always hedged on both but final choice was 
to come shortly and is in fact now being made. In 1957 the PSI 
was still unable to take any dramatic step even though the 
record showed that since 1946 the PCI had been absorbing 
Socialist supporters into its ranks to an alarming degree.
On the other hand, Interest in PSI-PSDI reunification 
was aroused when during the summer of 1956 Nenni and Saragat
33t Togliatti "Le decision! del XX Congresso e il Partito 
socialists italiano," Problemi internaaionali, p. 2B4
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held a series of conversations at a resort tovm where both 
were passing their holidays. The hopes aroused in many quarters 
that the reunification was imminent were to prove as yet pre- 
nature. A major reason for this was the existence of a large 
and influential Left-wing in the PSI which wanted neither to 
break with the PCI nor to reunite with the Social-Demoerats 
particularly If reunification occurred on the latter*s terms.
For the next few years therefore the PSI would become engaged 
in a slow and anguishing move to the Right which would lead 
eventually to the much desired aperture a sinistra and most 
recently to a final process of reunification with the Social- 
Democrats. In this process the PSI Leftwing was to break off 
from the party giving Italy a fourth Socialist Party: the
Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (or PSIUP).
The PCI emerged from 1956 badly shaken but still 
remarkably intact; indeed the party was chastened by its crises. 
By 1957i the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, 
prospects seemed brighter: 1957 was the year of Sputnik I, the
year Soviet schools graduated over 50,000 engineers (more than 
the US figure for the same year), and the year when finishing 
touches were being worked out for the new Seven Year Plan by 
which Soviet industrial production was to be increased by SO#
(at a time when the West was experiencing its recession of the 
late Fifties).
Inevitably, just as the PCI shared the faults of
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Soviet policies it benefitted from its achivements. Distaste­
ful as the events of Fall 1956 were to many Italians, and as 
serious as was the damage these events caused to the PCI, 
greater distance in time tended to place 1T1956,f in the context 
of painful time of readjustment for the Soviet Union, the PCUS 
(and the PCI) after Stalin’s disappearance from the political 
scene. And, the more politically conscious intelligentsia 
realized, after the polemical furor died down, that something 
had changed. The ideological statements of the PCI remained 
on record as a possible point of departure for new attempts 
to break the inertia which characterized Italian politics, an 
inertia whose chief cause was the exclusion of the PCI from 
being seriously considered as an active element in the sisterna.
These new appraisals of the positions of the PCI 
by the more politically evolved sections of the Italian public 
was not necessarily an indication that the Left-wing intelligentsia 
in particular had been reconvinced of the rightness of PCI 
policies any more than it was convinced that the PSI for its 
part was taking the right course of action. Many of these 
individuals as a result ’were to feel most comfortably in the 
small but influential PfrlUP.
The first indicator of what effect all the ideologi­
cal confusion and political turbulence of the last years was to 
have on the Italian electorate (especially on the Left) came with 
the elections of 1958.
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New Horizons
The 195tS election results revealed several trends of 
which the most fundamental was an unmistakable though gradual 
shift of political sentiment to the Left. The three Right-wing 
parties (the neo-Fascist MSI and two Monarchist parties) together 
obtained less than 10# of the popular vote. Some of their 
losses were picked up by spokesmen for the Confindustria. the 
Liberal party, but most fell further Left to the DC which on 
several occasions in the preceding parliament had formed majori­
ties with the open support of Monarchists and neo-Fascists,
The very last (Zoli) ministry before the elections lasted for a 
year on the basis of such support and Right-wing Italians con­
sequently felt more confident about the good intentions of the 
DC. Their votes helped in turn to strengthen the position of 
the Right-wing within the Democrazia Cristiana. Ironically such 
support came at a time when the DC Left was coining into Its own 
within the party and was laying the groundwork for the apertura 
a sinistra.
In sum, the DC obtained a total of 42.2# of the vote, 
not as good as in 194# but better than in 1953; the miniscule 
Radical and Republican parties, which had joined together for 
the election, managed barely to survive with a total of six 
seats between them; the Social-Democrats advanced slightly 
(about half as much as the Liher-als in terms of their popular 
vote); the PSI improved its shewing also and won 14.2# of the
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vote compared to its 12.7# in 1953- The PCI, despite 195&> held 
its own. The PCI actually obtained over half a million new 
votes but this only increased its share of the popular vote to 
22.7# from 22.6# in 1953.
While the voting pattern tended towards the Left, the 
1958 elections produced no dramatic surprises. more than anything 
else it consolidated the party positions from which negotiations 
leading towards l»apertura would proceed. This is not to say 
that all was smooth sailing from then on. On the contrary, in 
the next few years some very difficult obstacles were to be 
encountered, though overcome, by proponents of the ’’opening.”
While the Leftward reorientation of Italian politics 
met with the vigorous opposition many expected, it did, on the 
other hand, receive quiet but effective support from a most 
unexpected quarter. A few months after the Italian elections, 
in October 1958, Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, Patriarch of Venice, 
assumed the title of Pope John XXIII. Papa Giovanni had spent 
most of his life as a diplomat of the Holy See mainly in the 
politically turbulent Balkans and, after u!\'l II, as papal nunzio 
in France. His experience and intimacy with the realities of 
International politics was therefore more than superficial. 
£10000111*s family origins were humble and, despite the exalted 
position he personally was to achieve, his brothers continued 
to live, as had their parents, as peasant sharecroppers near 
Bergamo in Northern Italy.
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v/ith this background, the papal personality of 
John XXIII was to reveal itself as being radically different 
from that of his austere and aristocratic predecessor. Pius XII. 
V/here the latter seemed to embody the posture of the Church 
Militant the former seemed the incarnation of the Church Tolerant. 
This was particularly true with regard to their attitudes 
towards the conflicting ideologies dividing international and 
national societies and especially with regard to their attitudes 
about the Individuals who championed them.
Italian Vaticanologists, who, perhaps not unrightly^ 
claim to be the most sensitive to the slightest nuance in 
official Vatican positions, soon realiased that Pacelli and 
Roncalli were two different personalities. Just how different 
was not long in being demonstrated when John XXIII suddenly 
threw open the Church’s shuttered ‘windows flooding it with the 
light and fresh air which he hoped would bring about its long 
needed aKglornamento. V/hile in religiously pluralist societies 
the Johanine spirit of ecumenism was correctly interpreted as 
an invitation to collaboration among Christians, in Italian 
terms ecumenism was interpreted as an invitation to collabora­
tion between the two real Italian faiths, one sacred, the other 
secular: Catholicism and Socialism. In five brief years John
himself succeeded in laying the foundations for both confronta­
tions : in the religious sphere by summoning the Ecumenical
Council and in the political sphere by promulgating his two 
great encyclicals Mater et Kagistra and, a few months prior to 
his death, Pacem in Terris.
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For Italian politics there is no question but that 
the encyclicals took priority in immediate importance over the 
Council itself, v/ith as much concern as his predecessor 
Leo XIII had shown for the same problem, John reaffirmed, 
in Hater et Maglstra his Church1s profound desire to see 
alleviated the unjust social and economic misery in which so 
much of mankind was condemned to live. Wot only did this rein­
force the commitment of the Italian Catholic Left to work for 
social and economic justice but it reanimated Italian Communists 
in their heretofore largely frustrated efforts at achieving a 
dialogue with the Catholics on personal as well as an organiza­
tional bases. Such considerations became increasingly amplified 
in the official programmes of the PCI.
The PCI had never made atheism a condition of member­
ship in the party. Anyone who accepted the political programme 
of the party could become a member regardless of his religious 
convictions. This was the official position of the PCI since 
its earliest Congress after V/W II and in succeeding Congresses 
the policy of the "outstretched hand" became even more prominent. 
At the party’s Tenth Congress in 1962 delegates were asked to 
debate the thesis that "the aspiration toward a socialist soc­
iety... can find a stimulus in a religious conscience anguished 
by the dramatic problems of the present day world." It now 
became increasingly necessary to appreciate that the possession 
of an acute social conscience was not the exclusive possession
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of any one or any group, i-iater et legistra had shown this 
clearly and the need to cooperate x/ith the Catholics was there­
fore all the more pressing:
In Italy, the Catholic Church and the Catholic movement 
guide not only some sectors of the labour movement but 
above all a large party of the peasantry and the middle 
classes who today can and should be participating in the 
building of a new society. This is why the victory of 
socialism in Italy being bound as it is to a bloc of 
forces considerably larger and more articulated than the 
alliance of workers and poor peasants, the effort to 
arrive at an understanding with the Catholics is considered 
to be one aspect of the Italian road to socialism...-'-
One could almost think that the dialogue between the 
PCI and the Catholics was being conducted on one side by Pope 
John personally. Several months after the Tenth Congress of 
the PCI, in the summer of 19&3, the encyclical Pacem in Terris 
was published. In it all of Pius XIIfs uncompromising severity 
towards atheistic Communism and its nefarious advocates seemed 
to dissolve in a new attitude of loving one*s neighbour as one­
self. After surveying the political condition of the world in 
Pacem in Terris John concluded that Catholics must seek to co­
exist in societies not only "with Christians separated from 
this Apostolic See” but also "with men of no Christian faith 
whatever" who nevertheless were "endowed with a natural upright­
ness of conduct":
In such relations let the faithful be careful to be always 
consistent in their actions, so that they may never come to 
any compromise in matters of religion and morals. At the
1. From the "Tesi per il Xo Congresso del PCI" in "Le Neo- 
Fiarxisme Italien," Jarlot, op. cit. p. 39
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same time however, let them be, and show themselves to be 
animated by a spirit of understanding and detachment, and 
disposed to work logically in the pursuit of objectives 
which are of their nature good, or conducive to good.
In the practical application of such general principles
governing human relations, the Pope continued, there lay a danger.
It was to confuse individuals with the things they advocated:
...one must never confuse error and the person who errs,,.
The person who errs is always and above all a human being, 
and he retains in every case his dignity as a human person; 
and he must be«regarded and treated in accordance with that 
lofty dignity,-5
It bocame imperative to distinguish between "false 
philosophical teachings11 and movements of an economic, social 
or political nature even if the movements were animated by the 
aforesaid "false teachings." Movements of this sort were ulti­
mately subject to change because the conditions in which they 
operate change:
Besides, who can deny that those movements, insofar as 
they conform to the dictates of right reason and are inter­
preters of the lawful aspirations of the human person, con­
tain elements that are positive and deserving of approval.^
Sincere pleas for understanding and conciliation by both sides
further catalyaed efforts to achieve what had been desired by so
many for so long and today this is one of the most fascinating
aspects of Italian intellectual and political life.^
2. Pope John XXXII, Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris. April 11, 
1963, (Washington: 1963) p. 37
3. Ibid.
4 . Ibid.
5 . Vide "Le Neo-Marxisme Italien" by the French Jesuit Georges 
Jarlot (Etudes, Jan.-June I960, pp. 32-47).
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The willingness of Italian Marxists to engage in the 
dialogue stemmed not from a Machiavellian desire to convert 
Catholics to Communism nor to trick innocent Catholics into 
supporting the PCI but rather from the confidence that Marxist 
humanism could hold its own with transcendental Catholicism.
They did hope that out of such a dialogue Catholics would at 
least come to realize that their religion should not be subor­
dinated to any particular political or economic point of view 
nor that their Church should protect and defend the vested 
interests of any one class, that Catholics would see with Fope 
John that, without abandoning their faith, Catholics could 
decide "the ways and degrees In which work in common with 
Communists might be possible for the achievement of economic 
social and political ends which are honourable and u s e f u l . "6 
For their part Italian Communists utterly rejected 
any kind of primitive or "totemiatic" view of religion, rejected 
the idea of official State Atheism and publically defended the 
idea of full freedom of religion without any civil discrimina- 
tion being imposed against believers. From what convictions 
did such a confidence in the validity of their own point of 
view arise?
To speak honestly we do not believe that the building of 
a socialist society carries within itself the disappearance 
of the religious fact, tfe recognize that religion has pro­
found and complex roots in the human mind; that like all
6. Pacem in Terris
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phenomena of the superstructure it has its own autonomy 
with regard to the structure, v/e speak of the decline of 
the religious conscience not as something to be brought 
about by a struggle nor as ammechanical consequence' 
resulting from the disappearance of capitalism, less still 
by an act of suppression by the Ptate. V/e believe that 
the validity, the vitality of all ideological positions 
and thus of all religion, still depend above all on their
capacity to offer an explanation, a solution for the prob­
lems which history successively posos to mankind.'
In other words, if Catholicism as a body of religious thought
can successfully maintain its pertinence and validity to man as
he marches through history its value will be self-evident and
positive. If it fails to do this its decline will be inevitable
and will occur as fast as it fails to explain and solve the
problems which history will successively present to the human
race:
Let us be clear about this much. Catholicism cannot 
cease being a religion of transcendence any more'than 
Communism can cease being an atheistic humanism. It is 
in its very dialectic that it (marxism) must find the 
justification for religious tolerance, not as a temporary 
tactic but as an exigency of dialectical materialism.^
The challenge put to the Catholics by the Communists 
was seductive: If you Catholics have enough confidence in your
religion as we have in our doctrines let us begin now to work 
together to build the more humanely ordered society we both desire 
and let us see which of our convictions will withstand the heavy 
demands the future will inevitably bring to bear on then. Let
7. L*Unita. 3-9 Oct, 19&4, quoted in Jarlot op. cit. p. 40
3. Jarlot. op. cit. p. 41
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us seek to co-participate in a nev; hegemonic relationship. In 
this, we, for our part, will admit that your beliefs will bo as 
necessary to us as oitr ovm because our convictions are not static. 
They require praxis to live and to continue evolving. But in 
meeting us on common ground do not keep on throwing dogma in 
our faces. Try to see where your dogma has lost any trace of 
objective meaning, v/e, in turn, remain prepared to discard 
whatever elements of our ovm thought become negated through 
the process of our dialectical reasoning, a process in which 
the positive elements of your unilateral religious sentiments 
will survive synthetically with what remains positive in ours.
V/e already share after all, even if from very different posi­
tions some few analogous views of fan from which we might pro­
ceed.
You, as Catholics, believe in the ultimate dignity 
of the human person and in the value of freedom; one need only 
to refer to the great Church enyclicals and to the teachings of 
Pope John to verify this. But the freedom you defend is not 
that of the capitalist bourgeoisie whose concepts you have 
opposed from the time of Pius XI and Leo XIII; yours is not an 
individualist freedom it is a communal personalism. For 3rou> 
freedom is earned as a redemption from sin achieved through 
personal acts of asceticism. Your freedom is the luminous 
freedom of the children of God. Each personal triumph is not 
simply personal but is social for you believe in the unity of
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of the mystical body, of its edification in common. For you
the history of Kan is the history of a struggle from evil to
the Good and in this every personal act of virtue becomes
amplified in the mystical body:
Veil then let us build Kan together. Together let us help 
him in his conquest of freedom, struggle together against 
Man's collective enslavement through Kan's exploitation of 
Man, by war. Together let us build this future society 
without exploitation because lacking classes: in freeing
Han from his fellow Man and from Nature the true freedom 
of each individual will result.9
The elaboration of the "dialogue" did not occur at 
once as if both sides were bursting with a pent-up desire to 
have it all out. It began slowly, modestly, quietly and at 
first only among restricted groups and small circulation perio­
dicals. During the last few years it hao acquired a greater 
elaboration and fluency of expression. It has gained a trider 
audience and continues to evolve. The important fact is that 
it began at all and that it did begin is due to an incalculable 
extent to the influence of John XXIII. Papa Giovanni also 
helped accelerate the already initiated movement towards the 
opening to the Left and by attempting so much in such a brief 
time John XXIII earned the title of "Red pope." The nickname 
was not meant to flatter particularly since it was applied by
9. Jarlot, pjl^cit^ p. kk
10. Vide "Italy's Catholic Communist Dialogue" Claire Sterling, 
The Reporter, Vol. 32 No. 6 (April 22, 1965) pp. 18-22
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
227
those groups and classes who were enjoying social status and 
economic privilege under existing conditions. Even (or especially) 
among some Catholic circles John’s actions caused anxiety, con­
sternation and no little opposition. Powerful conservative 
Italian prelates in the Curia romana and in the Italian episco­
pate closely connected to the Catholic Action and, consequently, 
to the DC Right were unprepared, unwilling or unable to adapt 
to the new attitudes of conciliation and accommodation with the 
arch enemies of the Church, especially after having participated 
in nearly two decades of Pacellian intransigence.
The existence of such powerful pressure groups made 
the first efforts to form a Centre Left government extremely 
difficult and the strain of accommodating so many opposing ten­
dencies in one Catholic party almost brought about the fragmen­
tation of the DC. The internal balance of the DC had to undergo 
a delicate transformation before the Centre Left experiment 
could begin. The transformation resulted in a modus vivendi 
agreed upon by the three main party currents. Balancing the 
extreme Right with the restless Left, sometimes called the V/hite 
Communists, was a cautious, moderate, centre group led by the 
inscrutable Aldo lioro, Italy’s current Prime Minister. The Moro 
wing was at least willing to try the Centre Left experiment 
even if without the enthusiasm of the Fanfani Left, Amintore 
Fanfani was personally convinced (and tried to convince his 
centrist colleagues) that the course which Italian politics had
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been following since the War had reached a dead end.
With the outlook of a political economist (which 
subject he professed at the University of Rome) Fanfani was 
able to look penetratingly at the unchanged realities of 
Italian life tirhich the miracolo economico was failing to 
influence; namely, the continuing imbalances in economic dis­
tribution among classes, Regions and occupations. Without 
serious planning to coordinate investments through which cer­
tain social and economic needs would receive priority attention 
the continuing disparities in Italian society could attain 
insoluble proportions.
With the shrewd eye of an expert politician, Fanfani 
also realized that since 1943 and the rejection of "tripartism” 
the political base on which the DC and its allies were operating 
was being steadily eroded. If Christian Democratic governments 
continued to base their majorities on the open or tacit support 
of the reactionary Right, which was not prepared to cooperate in 
carrying out the reforms which were imperative, the immobilism 
of the government would deteriorate into general paralysis and 
the advance of the Communists would be ineluctable. For the 
DC but one course of action remained. Since the PSI was showing 
its increasing autonomy from the PCI and was offering its col­
laboration the time for the centro-sinistra was now mature.
When, for a variety of reasons, the first couple of 
ministries formed after the 1953 elections collapsed, the DC
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found itself at a fork in the road. The directions in which the 
party could choose to continue on were either Left or Eight, but 
not Dead Centre. The party did eventually turn Left, but not 
before making some final explorations on the Right, a move 
which proved to be far more imprudent than must have been 
imagined. During a t\*o month impasse in i960 both Fanfani and 
Antonio Segni failed in their attempts to create "transition" 
cabinets with the support of the democratic Right. Since it 
was well known that the DC was merely grooming itself for an 
impending opening to the Left, the Liberal party refused to 
lend itself to any such scheme.
President Gronchi then made the mistake of charging 
a DC "notabile" Ferdinando Tambroni to form a government. Tam- 
broni, an ambiguous figure with no real following in the party 
turned out to be an ambitious opportunist, Wot restricted by 
party loyalty or personal scruples Tambroni was fully prepared 
and did in fact welcome the support of the neo-Fascist MSI to 
give his government its parliamentary majority and to perpetuate 
the life of what was expected to be only a temporary government.
Furthermore Tambroni revealed himself to be as ready 
to crush any Leftist-inspired disturbances with the same ferocity 
as had been used around 1943 and the early Fifties by De Gasperi*s 
Minister of the Interior, Mario Lcelba. In May and June of 
I960 the installation of American missiles in Italy resulted 
in public demonstrations in a number of Italian cities. Some
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demonstrations, also involved wage disputes and in both cases 
Communists figured prominently, if not exclusively.
When Tambroni ordered the demonstrations to be put 
down, the Prime idnister’s orders were carried out with a will 
and in the ensuing police repressions a large number of demon­
strators v/ere injured. This in itself aroused great hostility. 
Tambroni, however, made another move which aggravated public 
hostility even more. In July, the XiSI was given government 
permission to hold a national congress in Genoa, one of the 
cities where the war-time anti-Fascist Resistance had been 
strongest. Verbal protests which arose from all quarters were 
ignored and the permission was upheld.
When the congress v/as about to open, violent mass 
demonstrations reuniting all the old parties of the Resistance 
flared up in Genoa and spread to other major Italian cities.
In Rome, the uproar occurring in the streets overflowed into 
the Chamber of Deputies, The whole country was put into a 
state of such tension that the fear of civil war crossedmmore 
than one mind. In the face of such an overwhelming public 
demonstration of violent anti-Fascism the compromised Tambroni, 
who was accused by some of nourishing sinister political ambi­
tions, was toppled and the country settled back to catch its 
political breath.
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Finalmente
If anything positive came from the Tambroni adventure 
it was surely the clarification of public sentiment about any 
further compromises with Fascism. The trend towards the centro- 
sinistra was reinforced more than ever and on August 2, I960 
Amintore Fanfani appeared before parliament seeking approval 
of a new ministry to succeed that of Tambroni. Because the 
Fanfani cabinet would reject extreme Right-wing votes for its 
majority, by prior understanding, the PSI abstained from voting 
against the government and thus was breached the first small 
opening to the Left. The first actual centro-sinistra ministry 
was not formed until a number of months later. Before it came 
about two events took place and further eased the way: the 
first was the holding of municipal elections in October I960 and 
the second was the Christian Democratic Congress of January 1962.
The elections were important because the parties 
directly concerned with the hypothetical Centre-Left majority 
hoped to hold "dress-rehearsals" for the national experiment 
first on municipal levels. Thus, although the Tambroni affair 
caused all the Left to win some substantial gains in such 
centres as Milan, Genoa, Florence and Palermo, the PSI broke away 
from the traditional opposition bloc it formed with the PCI 
to elect, in conjunction with the DC, the PSDI and smaller 
radical parties, Centre-Left municipal executive committees 
(giunte). In a few instances the new combination meant that
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the PCI could not participate in the new giunta. '.'Jhile thin 
aroused a natural resentment within the PCI certain elements 
in the PSI (the faction which was later to form the PCIUP) 
were also unhappy with their party’s official line and tried 
to resist it.
A majority of the party followed Nenni’s leadership 
nonetheless and the latter began to steer his party towards its 
historic appointment with the DC. The second important event 
preceding the Centre-Left experiment, was the Maples Congress 
of the DC, On this occasion koro himself used his considerable 
forensic skill for some five hours to harangue.his party into 
accepting the new course the party was taking. When the Con­
gress adjourned, the DC was pu’olically committed to trying the 
centro-sinistra formula.
The way was no^ w clear: both major participants had
given public demonstrations of their good Intentions and indi­
cations from the Vatican were favourable. Only the terms 
needed to be worked out. While Socialists still remained tli9 
outside buttress of Fanfani’s new cabinet, the PSI promised to 
give the government the support it needed if it carried out 
certain measures which the PSI wanted. The latter concerned 
domestic matters; in foreign affairs the Socialists were willing 
to suspend their opposition to the government’s commitment to 
uphold the Atlantic alliance.
The programme Fanfani presented for parliamentary
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approval included among proposed measures: establishment of the
Regions; nationalization of the powerful electric industry; for­
mulation of a national economic plan; school reforms and new 
agricultural measures. So pledged, the Fanfani ministry, bas­
ing its parliamentary majority on the Socialist pledge not to 
vote against it, took office on March 10, 1962.
'/hen the term of the Fanfani government was ended 
by the scheduled national elections of April, 1963 its record 
of legislative action was not unpromising. The hydroelectric 
companies had been nationalized, a tax aimed at curtailing land 
speculation was placed on real estate profits and a withholding 
tax of 15/fc was imposed on stock dividends (which usually remained 
undeclared on income tax forms), the school system was partially 
reorganized to make education less of an elitist affair a 
government committee for national economic planning was created 
and the amount paid to old age pensioners was increased.
As necessary as these measures were, they were akin 
to feeding aspirin to a victim of cancer who required major 
surgery. The one important measure which would have made any 
kind of lasting structural modification of the centralized 
Italian state, the creation of Regional governments, was not 
even introduced in parliament for discussion. If the Regions 
were freed from the DC central control which was exercised through 
the Ministry of the Interior acting through the provincial 
prefectures, the only effective support for the DC in many areas
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would have been severely jeopardized.
Regional autonomy would mean that in at least three 
Regions the executive giunta would be likely formed by Communists 
(or by Communists with Socialists, a major cause of many Right- 
wing reservations about the whole Centre-Left business.) In 
other Regions communist power v/ould still be such that even in 
opposition the PCI would influence the programme of the Regional 
giunta. for these reasons the DC procrastinated; moreover, since 
the national elections were approaching the party could not 
afford to antagonize its Right-wing support more than it had 
already done.
Thus, when it became clear that the DC was not pre­
pared to fulfill all its promises, the PSI declared Itself no 
longer bound to support the government. It was also more con­
venient for the PSI not to have to appear before the electorate 
as the chief underpinning of Christian Democratic power. The 
centro-sinistra idea was not abandoned, however. It was hoped 
that the elections would confirm it even more. The PSI, parti­
cularly, expected that its line would be approved because 
finally a working class party was again about to become an 
active element in the government leaving the PCI still isolated 
in opposition, tfith such expectations the election campaigns 
began.
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II Iliracolo
During the decade of the 1950*s Italy appeared to all 
the world as the epitome of the '’Good Life" offered by Western 
European "neo-Capitalism"— capitalism of the masses. Italy was 
the land of La Dolce Vita, Gina Lollobrigida, "Roman Holidays," 
Vespas, Olivetti typewriters and Olivetti industrial paternalism. 
Italy was Sophia Loren, sunny beaches, lakes and mountains, 
artistic cities ("see Italy first") Fiats, Pirelli tires and 
Pirelli Towers, JJecchi sewing machines, pizza, luxury liners, 
magnificent traffic jams, Nervi architecture, high fashion. The 
"Italian line" became a synonym for a new sybaritic style of 
life. The prosperous decade seemed fittingly capped with the 
Olympiad of Rome in I960 and, in the following year, by the 
national centenary celebrations held in Turin. And indeed the 
decade has been dazzling.
Italian per capita income had increased in the ten 
years alone almost as much as it had in the preceding half cen­
tury. The national annual growth rate became one of the highest 
in the world (13^ in i960); industrial production tripled and 
exports had increased fourfold. In this same period the majority 
of Italians ceased being employed in agriculture and the bigger 
cities groaned to accommodate their swelling populations. As 
farmers turned into factory work^-s and Southern migrants sought 
jobs in the North, unemployment fell to a third of its former 
figure. Some industries even experienced manpower shortages
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for lack of skilled workers. Demand for consumer goods zoomed 
and new Italian appliance industries mushroomed from practically 
nothing. The population became physically mobile, first on the 
Vespa scooters and later, when instalment buying permitted, in 
small Fiats. Italians became better clothed and better fed.
They began to have more to spend on diversions; even publishing 
became an industry under the impact of ”11 boom.11
Riding on the crest of so enormous and unprecedented a 
wave of economic expansion, the exponents of those policies of 
economic liberalism v/hich facilitated such a development might 
well have been led to look back on their achievements with com­
placency. But Italy has always been a country of sun and shadow. 
La Dolce Vita, sweet as it was for those who could live it 
(though even this was questioned by Fellini) did not correspond 
to the continuing struggle of those many Italians still caught 
in la miseria. And while the salutary effects of il benessere 
(well being) did reach most Italian families to greater or lesser 
degree, the serious shortcomings of the boom lingered. The 
most naive but fundamental mistake made by the economic libera- 
lists was to think that by creating an abundant consumer-oriented 
market economy for a fully (or almost fully) employed population, 
the working classes would be satisfied and pacified and their 
demands for a better life would be drowned in the clamour for 
more bread and circuses.
It did not require any special skill to understand why
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a "semi-submerged" population, suddenly faced with both an 
opportunity to work and an opportunity to buy would set about 
acquiring all the goods and gadgets which previously it could 
only look at longingly with its nose pressed to the window pane. 
Studies made in some northern Italian cities among migrant 
families revealed that frequently, despite greater earnings, 
family diets continued to be based on the cheap but monotonous 
staple of pasta and, rather than spend new income on improving 
the variety of diet, families preferred to continue eating its 
pasta while watching the new television set or while listening 
to the voice of a blaring pop singer on the new phonograph.
Increased buying power, in a country such as dltaly 
whore such power was rarely granted, inevitably pushed up demand 
even more quickly so that the cost of living rose faster than 
wages. But demand did not abate and the diminished capacity 
to buy only frustrated newly-aroused hopes and newly-awakened 
tastes ("Howya gonna keepurn dovm on the farm...?"). And when 
it became evident that the system which had successfully aroused 
the new demands to share in il benessere remained indifferent 
to the very problems it created, the urge for a better life moved 
from the purely quantitative consideration in the direction of 
a general desire for a reform of the entire system itself.
The growth had undoubtedly taken place, but not with­
out its price. Italy changed from a predominantly agricultural 
country to an almost industrial one, but in the process millions
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of Italians were forced to pull up the deep roots previous 
generations of ancestors had put down in the land to move to 
Northern urban environments where their reception was frequently 
one of hostile misunderstanding. The almost complete abandon­
ment of countless Southern villages did little to alleviate the 
disparity with the North and was small help to the implementation 
of the agricultural reform.
Urban building underwent an incredible growth and 
cities teemed with hundreds of thousands of new apartment dwellers. 
But without enough strict supervision to enforce even the inade­
quate urban plans in existence, the big Italian cities sprawled 
in every direction like oil stains. The countryside around the 
cities disappeared under tidal waves of reinforced concrete 
poured by real estate "developers11 who scrupulously aval lid 
wasting perfectly usable building land on parks and playgrounds.
Forced to live in the "periferia" of the cities for 
economic reasons, urban workers had to wait for slow, crowded 
and inadequate public transportation to carry them to work in 
the Centro. Italians saved to become mobile in their own Fiats 
only to get caught In paralytic traffic jams. Thousands of 
families continued to live in wretched housing conditions while 
thousands of newly-built apartments entirely beyond their finan­
cial reach stood empty for lack of takers. Italians began 
enjoying vacations by the sea, only to watch the pristine beauty 
of Italian coasts become enveloped in miles of squalid commercialism.
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Italians became used to lurid scandals often involving corrupt 
high government officials caught with their hands in the public 
till, while having to suffer bureaucratic insolence for the sake 
of obtaining even simple documents, While the fruits of economic 
abundance were welcomed by all Italians they found that the 
benessere which the centro-sinistra promised to extend was not 
all it could be. The elections of 19^3 revealed this state of 
mind with unmistakable clarity. 3ut the promise of the centro- 
sinistra was to dim not just by the qualitative shortcomings of 
Italian "neo-Capitalism.” By the time the focialists and Chris­
tian Democrats had courted each other long enough to be ready 
to take their vows, the Italian economy, which h_d risen to 
unprecedented heights, was entering the downward phase of the 
business cycle and the centro-sinistra found itself facing 
immense problems of a purely economic nature.
Much of the industrial expansion of the fities had 
been built on the abundance of cheap labour available in Italy.
Ey the end of the decade this reservoir vras beginning to dry up 
and increasing demands for wage raises put double pressure on 
the employers. The push for better wages was animated by the 
big trade unions, led by the CGIL, which, after years of sub­
dued activity, rekindled their militancy.
In the CGIL, Communist l. and Socialist union leaders 
collaborated to work out a strategy of maddening work slowdowns 
and hiccough strikes which permitted workers to earn part of
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their T.vages while making life miserable for the employers.
Union policy was that local grievances could be settled locally 
according to the requirements of each case, but the national 
policy would be to win a general pay raise for ail workers, ob­
tain equal pay for equal work between male and female employees 
and, most importantly, to force employers oo recognise the union 
as the only spokesman for the workers.
After months of these tormenting tactics, which kept 
nearly three million v/orkers of all categories occupied in a 
game of musical strikes, the employers finally capitulated. 
Because one of the largest groups of strikers belonged to the 
civil service, one of the biggest of the employers was the 
government. The agreement which was signed in February 1963 
sanctioned an immediate wage increase of 16,£ for1 government 
employees, industrial workers and agricultural labourers. Other 
increases were to follow. In the case of some women workers, 
the parification of their earnings with those of their male 
counterparts brought pay increases of up uo 40'p.
Concrete victories like these greatly enhanced union 
bargaining pov/er, particularly that 01 the CGIL which had been 
in the forefront of the struggle, fay increases equalled some 
two billion dollars and not surprisingly augmented the buying 
power of the workers who benefitted from the pay boosts. If 
Italy was not an "affluent" society, it had become an acquisitive 
society and, with more money around to spend, consumer demand 
rapidly exceeded national productivity.
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On top of this, crop failures helped boost food prices. 
Imports to meet both the food shortage and the sustained consu­
mer demand increased so greatly that the favourable Italian trade 
balance was reversed from surplus to deficit. The trend was 
alarming but a government hoping to win greater popular support 
by promising the working classes a larger share of the national 
wealth could not say ’Enough and no more* to the working classes 
right after they had won their first substantial wage increases 
since the end of the war. On the other hand, the profits which 
had been based on cheap labour were now disappearing and Italian 
competitiveness in the international market began to feel the 
strain. The other alternative was to increase productivity 
through expansion which would permit more earnings from export 
sales. Expansion, however, required capital and in the infla­
tionary Italian economy what money was being invested went where 
prices could be expected to rise most with the inflation, In 
property. But there was another reason which caused capital 
to become scarce.
The nationalization of the electrical industry had 
been an act of good faith by the DC to show the PSI, which had 
insisted on this action, that its Intentions were serious. The 
nationalization was not only very expensive for the national 
treasury (it cost $25 billion), but politically it cost the DC 
dearly. Seeing that Fanfani was determined to carry out the 
Centre Left adventure the business community stiffened in hostile
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opposition and, fearing that the power companies were only the 
first of a long list of PSI victims, worried investors quickly 
sent their money to safer Switzerland. In 1962 alone about half 
a billion dollars in lire was sent abroad. Later the figure 
doubled. Some of this returned to Italy as Swiss reinvestment 
but most stayed out of the country. Thus, short of investment 
capital, industrial improvements ifere curtailed, expansion was 
slowed and unemployment began to creep up again. It was against 
this dramatic background of contradictory trends that the 1963 
elections were held.
The Elections
The outcome of the national elections of April, 1963 
surprised everyone but particularly the DC and PSI. Both of 
the chief exponents of the Centre-Left formula lost votes: the
DC lost 4*1$ of its vote dropping from 42.3$ in 1958 to 38.3$ in 
1963, the second lowest share of the popular vote it had ever 
won; the PSI managed to hold its lines but still lost .4$ of 
its vote falling from 14.2$ to 13.8$, Monarchists suffered 
most severely falling from 4 .8$ to a decimating 1.7$. in bhe 
winner*s circle stood all the other parties. On the Right, 
the MSI advanced by .3$ to win 5.1$ but the PLI did no less 
than double its share of electoral support by winning 7.0$ of
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the total. On the Left the PSDX advanced by 1.55& to win 6,1% 
of the vote, but the greatest surprise was the support given 
to the PCI,
In 1963 one out of every four Italians voted for the 
Communists; this despite all the vicissitudes the party experi­
enced during the preceding few years— deStalinization and its 
effects, Huigxry and its aftermath, the break with the PSI and 
the unprecedented prosperity caused by the boom. But perhaps 
the greatest consternation over the communist advance was 
caused by the failure of the Centre-Left government, after almost 
a year and a half of power, to break the PCI hegemony of 
working class support. The party not only held its positions 
but gained over a million new votes (195&: 22.7%; 1963: 25-35") *
Although the parties of the Centre-Left won a combined 
total of 59.6% of the popular vote (this includes the 1.4% of 
the Republican party) the 1963 election results could not be 
taken as an unqualified endorsement of the incipient apertura a 
sinistra, at least as it had developed up to that point. On 
the Right the doubling of the vote for a party which spoke for 
business interests was itself eloquent of conservative senti­
ment since many of the votes lost by the DC are thought to have 
gone to the Liberals, On the other hand the utter failure of the 
PSI to lure any communist votes away from the PCI indicated 
that even many Socialists were displeased with their party*s 
relations with the DC.
The PCI had also benefitted elsewhere partly by winning
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the votes of the internal migrants. The Monarchist vote was 
split in two ways: unsophisticated peasants, influenced by
relatives who returned home from jobs in Germany, Switzerland 
or France to vote, probably joined them to support the PCI 
while all but the hard-core of nostalgic Monarchists, realizing 
the futility of their cause switched to the MSI. Social-Democratic 
gains came from both Right and Left; from Right-wing Socialists 
anxious to get on with l*apertura and from middle class progres­
sives who were impatient with DC cautiousness.
Shortly after the elections Togliatti was asked his 
opinions about their outcome particularly about i*hy it seemjd 
that prosperity had not favoured the fortunes of the centro- 
sinistra. The reasons, Togliatti, thought, were not very 
obscure:
Italy is in the process of rapid reconomic and social 
transformation. But this process is taking place in a 
society dominated by big business and conservative poli­
tical forces and therefore creates more problems than it 
solves... change has itself created...the desire for a 
better life and a more just social and economic order 
and hence has driven (the electorate) towards the Left.
VJhat is more, economic development has accentuated and 
clarified a whole series of social contrasts and injus­
tices of which the workers are victims. These cannot be 
rectified within the framework of our present antiquated 
society which has been overtaken by its own economic 
development. Thus powerful forces are now driving towards 
a renewal and a reform of the structure and its institu­
tions. These forces are simultaneously reformist and 
revolutionary. They are reformist because they include 
precise demands of a democratic and social nature. But 
they are also revolutionary because of the resistance of 
the ruling class which is obstinately conservative and 
whose own conduct demonstrates the need for a new class 
to control the country. We made gains in this election
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because we offered the people both satisfaction for their 
economic and social demands and an opportunity to share 
in the control of society.il
Regardless of its partisan origin this analysis of
the background of the election results seems correct. To have
accurately discerned the problems of Italian society was not
to exercise in polemics. In reviewing the same question a
correspondent of the French radical journal I.»Express arrived
at a similar conclusion:
The success of the PCI cannot be interpreted as a cry of 
protest; rather it bears witness to the attraction exer­
cised on the Italian people by a party which offers it a 
new society, qualitatively different from the old while 
the parties of the Centre-Left offer a larger quantity of 
material possessions.12
The International Aspects
Aside from bewildering certain circles in the West, 
who could not understand why or how a party like the PCI could 
continue to make the advances it did, even when growing Italian 
prosperity was alleviating the economic distress of so many 
Italians, the successes of Togliatti*s party had other implica­
tions. These were related to the international communist movement.
11. Quoted by K.S. Karol in "Togliatti Speaks His Mind," New 
ftatesman. (24 Mayi 19&3) p. 790
12. Michel Bosquet "Aspects of Italian Communism" The Socialist 
Register 1964. (New York: 19&4) p* £3
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The grave and complex problems faced by the interna­
tional communist movement after the critical events of 1956 have 
already been partially related, particularly as they affected the 
PCI. The questions raised in international communist circles 
by the crises of 1956 did not abate with the passing of years.
On the contrary the problems became more acute and profoundly 
altered relations among communist states and communist parties.
The most widely known aspect of this is the Sino-Soviet ideolo­
gical dispute which has caused relations between the two countries 
seriously to deteriorate. The complex causes of the dispute are 
all but clear and some aspects remain impenetrably recondite 
even to those whose studies on this subject are more than super­
ficial.
"What is really maddening about the Russians," a Czech 
Communist recently told me with a sigh, "is that we 
barely ever know what they are up to. V/e donft even know 
what really happened between them and the Chinese.
Some explanations which have been offered are interest­
ing in themselves but, to review, in the context of this paper, 
all the elements of the Sino-Soviet falling out is impossible 
both for reasons of space and because it is only incidental to 
the immediate subject natter, fet, the dispute does bear on 
the problems of Italian Communism and, to the extent that the 
former has a bearing on the position which the PCI was to adopt 
in its regard, the causes which initiated the whole conflict
13. Reported by K.S. Karol "Avant la Reunion Des Parties Commu- 
nistes” Le foonde Hebdonadaire, (3 Sept.-9 Sept. 1964) p. 3
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must be touched on briefly.
History, according to ijarxism is a record of changing 
relationships. Changing conditions of economic production 
change the social and political texture of the community whose 
economic underpinning has altered. The changes in the political 
and social disposition of the community in turn modify the cul­
tural "superstructure* (philosophy, literature, religion, the 
fine arts, etc.). Put in another way, it slowly changes the way 
people think about things, the v/ay they see things, even though 
seme old ideas persist for a long while even under the new condi­
tions, a phenomenon which, as we have seen, fascinated Gramsci.
The "superstructure," while possessing a certain autonomy of 
its own, always reflects, more or less, its genesis during par­
ticular historical moments.
This "dynamic" of history is eventually spent but only 
after historical evolution arrives at the ultimate stage of 
"pure" Communism. Until this last stage is reached the social 
and political contradictions of imperfect societies remain 
implacable motives for continuing modifications which are achieved 
peacefully or violently, depending on circumstances.
To utilize such an analytical framework, it is possible 
to suggest that those very societies where I-larxism possesses the 
status of an official ideology have become the very elements of 
the historical dynamic described. Elsewhere in this narrative, 
the conditions out of ’which the first revolutionary socialist
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state in history was created have been briefly described. How 
the Soviet Union existed for almost thirty years as the unique 
example of such a socialist state and what effects the peculiar 
conditions of its development had on its internal structure havo 
also been related. And, finally, the very subject of this 
paper has necessarily required that the relationship between 
the PCX and the CPSU be attentively delineated because the his­
torical development of the PCI was for so long a while intimately 
affected by the vicissitudes of the CPSU and the Soviet state 
itself.
Latterly, the attempt has been made to particularise 
how the PCI evolved from a tiny conspiratorial group into the 
largest non-ruling communist party in the world,^ how the 
peculiarly Italian variant of Marxism, exemplified by the thought 
of Antonio Gramsci, has helped to achieve this success and 
how the suitability of the "Italian road to Socialism" for Italy 
has ultimately won the approbation of the CPSU itself.
At the height of Stalin’s power and prestige, when the 
distinction between Communism and the USSR became so blurred 
that defense of Soviet raisons d ’etat sometimes became confused 
with defense of the Marxist idea Itself, the political and ideo­
logical authority of the Soviet centre became unassailable truth
14- The Indonesian CP is perhaps more correctly the largest non­
ruling party but the recent massacres and dispersion of 
Indonesian Communists connected with the power struggle in 
Indonesia suggests that the power and influence of that 
party has been severely curtailed at least for the present.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
249
for all sections of the Communist International: It was che
chief adhesive for all communistrmovements intthe world, a 
source of pride and encouragement ("the International shall be 
the human race"). The International embodied, so to speak, 
the universalized ideological "superstructure" of Socialism in 
one country.
But, History, unsatiated, continued its tireless evo­
lution tovrards the one goal which alone could satisfy It. During 
its progress a plurality of socialist states were created in its 
wake by an historical agent, the Red Army; states, where pecu­
liar internal conditions had created different problems and 
required different solutions but where, because the ideological 
superstructure of Socialism of One Country remained so influen­
tial, inappropriate solutions were borrowed and indiscriminately 
applied by emulators of the USSR. One important exception helped 
to change this: the Chinese Revolution. Here, the internal
dynamics of Chinese social and political contradictions matured 
autonomously to create a socialist revolution. It was an inde­
pendent development unsubordinated as elsewhere, to the exigencies 
of Soviet power and there was no necessary identification of 
Chinese interests with Soviet interests. The independent rise 
of communist China ended the uniqueness of the USSR as a centre 
of doctrinal authority even though the Chinese were prepared to 
concede Soviet priority in this area because of the immense 
prestige the latter had accumulated during all the years it stood
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alone as the single bastion of Socialism.
But, with a plurality of states well on their way to 
creating socialist societies, the ideological centralism of an 
earlier era, when communist parties were still struggling for 
their existence, now seemed unnecessary. The one factor which 
sustained the preeminence of the CPfLi remained its unchallenged 
historical prestige. ;Jhen, tnerefore, in ±9$& the exigencies 
of internal Soviet growth and development induced the Soviet 
leadership itself to destroy the prestige which had been won by 
Stalin and his party, they destroyed the basis upon which they 
themselves could continue to base their own international authority: 
if Communists had to stop believing in the past infallibility 
of Stalin (and hence the CPSU) y/hen the fate of entire national 
communist movements had depended so much on the unquestioning 
acceptance of his decisions, for what reason should Communists 
continue uncritically to adhere to the Soviet counsels now when 
conditions were so much more favourable for autonomous development.
If Stalin had mademmistakes in the past who was to say that 
current leaders could not do likewise.
Thus, a vacuum of authority was created in the apex of 
international Communism and there existed no personality of 
Stalinas stature to refill it. None, the Chinese suggested, 
except liao Tse-Tung. Togliatti, on the other hand, thought 
that the change was more fundamental. Socialism was no longer 
limited to one country; therefore, the superstructural reflection
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of that one historical-political moment had become outmoded:
"The Soviet model can no longer be considered obligatory." The 
system was now "polycentric" and this required new attitudes, 
especially concerning the possibility of diversity in the 
various national approaches to Communism. The "Italian road 
to Socialism" was but one example of this diversity which in 
the peculiar context of one national was not vfithout its value.
In the past, the unity provided by fidelity to the 
Soviet vanguard of revolution had been an indispensible source 
of strength and this strength in unity remained indispensible 
for communists movements today. For a number of reasons it couid 
not exist in the institutional manner of the past but it had to 
be maintained nonetheless.
Lacking any overriding central authority and with the 
existence of a plurality of communist states, any incipient 
disputes between these states over method, interpretation or 
application of doctrine not to speak of conflicts arising out 
of surviving sentiments of nationalism, could not be settled, 
as in the past, by acceding to the directives of the authorita­
tive centre. Therefore, to avoid conflict, the principle of 
unity in tolerant diversity had to be the idea binding communist 
parties and communist governments.
The USSR could not be denied the prestige and respect 
which were due to it but, in a polycentric context, the unhappy 
negative effects which Stalinism had left in Soviet society had
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to be eradicated to that a regenerated USSR could win spontan­
eously the solidarity which in the past it obtained through 
historical circumstances. Standing in the way of this were the 
Sino-Soviet disagreements.
It is at this point that we must be satisfied to say 
that for a numer of reasons: ideological, political, economic,
diplomatic, organizational and military, the CPSU and the Chinese 
Communist Party and then the USSR and China engaged in a dis­
pute which has been aggravated today to incredible degree and 
has strained Soviet-Chinese relations almost to the point of 
rupture. While the dispute began after the Twentieth Congress 
of the CPSU, it became more serious and public after the Twenty- 
Second Congress of the CPSU in 1961,
For its own reasons the Soviet leadership was ready 
to renounce its role as monitor of the international communist 
movement whereas for other reasons the Chinese insisted on the 
necessity for a central doctrinal authority to enforce ideologi­
cal unity. At first the Chinese hoped that, by giving unqualified 
support to the USSR during the crises of 1956, the Soviets would 
pay greater heed to Chinese views even while the former remained 
the acknowledged leaders of the world communist movement. In 
perpetuating the authority of the Centre there could be little 
toleration for national deviations from Leninist fundamentalism 
such as the line followed by the "revisionist" Tito and the 
flexible Togliatti, But it was precisely the Stalinist insistence
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on unsuitable orthodoxy and uniformity which had led to tne 
eruptions of 1956 in the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe.
For these international and other internal reasons the 
Soviets renounced the idea of reviving the Centre and were will­
ing to tolerate heterodoxy in non-Soviet communist movements.
When the boviet position became clear the Chinese sought to 
assume the mantle of authority on their ovm since tue CPSU vfas 
"revisionist” and the USSK "bourgeois.”
In the torrent of words which flowed around these
questions the extreme language used by the CPC against its
ideological adversaries became, at times, quite vehement and 
vitriolic and in the source of the debate some of the choicest
words uttered by the Chinese were aimed at the figure who seemed
to incarnate the "rightist” viewpoint: Comrade Togliatti, *^5
At first, attempts were made to patch up the dispute through 
meetings of all the international communist parties. In 1961 
eighty-one communist parties met in Moscow and tried to work 
out a compromise statement. This turned out to satisfy no one 
and the debate continued. As it unfolded the PCI was, at times, 
to become very actively involved because acceptance of the 
Chinese theses concerning the proper method of carrying out 
revolutionary activity would have meant the complete rejection
15. In this regard the Chinese views are amply stated in "More
on the Differences Between Comrade Togliatti and Us.” Written 
in 1963j it is a long polemic against the political strategy 
followed by the PCI with all the proper references to 
Chapter and Verse from the Texts to prove that the PCI was 
not Marxist-Leninist.
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of "la via italiana al socialismo" which the PCI had so care­
fully been plotting out since the war. But, on the other hand, 
the Italians were equally disturbed when the Soviet leaders, 
wanting to have it out vfith the Chinese, invited national 
communist parties to a meeting which was to have been a pre­
liminary for an international coimaunist conference. The unwel­
come implications were clear: ohe conference would have amounted
to a showdown and, led, inevitably, to a disastrous schism.
Out of this dissent with both Chinese and Soviet posi­
tions an "Italian tendency" arose. This was not an official 
position promoted by the PCI to rival either the Chinese or 
Soviet theses but, nonetheless, it exercised a deep influence 
within communist circles and was greeted with widespread 
approbation when it became known publically. The "Italian" 
interpretation of the problems facing Communists in the sixth 
decade of the twentieth century and the solutions with which it 
suggested the problems be approached were basically the public 
profession of what were private thoughts. The latter were 
expressed by Palmiro Togliatti with such candour that what 
became his last political act was assigned an unexpected status 
of a public document with ramifications which continue to bear 
fruit.
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II Proinemoria
In the summer of 19^41 during a visit to the Crimea, 
Togliatti took occasion to dwell upon problems which had arisen 
over the last several years and sat down to record them on paper. 
Although Togliatti could not know it at the time, the twenty- 
two pages he was to fill with hie reflections became one of 
the most significant documents of contemporary Communism.
Pince the Italian party secretary was scheduled to 
meet with Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, the thoughts he expressed 
in the notes probably were intended to serve as a memorandum to 
be communicated to the Soviet leader. Thus, Togliatti surveyed 
a very wide panorama of issues which he felt were of deep con­
cern not only to the PCI and the CPSU but to the entire 
communist movements.
Almost immediately Togliatti expressed his serious 
reservations about the wisdom and timeliness of calling an 
international conference of communist parties to deal with the 
dissension with the Chinese, reservations which were equally 
shared, he noted, by other parties. The problem was not of 
opposing Chinese positions but of opposing them while avoiding 
an undesirable rupture in the international movement. By 
holding an international conference such a consequence might 
be hastened rather than avoided. Togliatti therefore suggested 
what he felt would be more fruitful methods of combatting the 
"erroneous political positions” and "splitting activities" of
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the Chinese party. It was necessary, he wrote, never to dis­
continue the polemic against points of principle and policies 
of the Chinese; but in doing so the verbal violence used by 
the Chinese in their sweeping denunciations had to be avoided. 
Instead the debate should be based on concrete issues and 
carried on in an objective and persuasive manner and "always 
with respect for the opponent." This could best be carried out 
by holding at the same time a series of meetings with groups 
of parties belonging to various sectors of the movement (West 
Europe, Latin America, the Third World and of the Peoples 
Democracies) so that the problems raised since 1957 could be 
reviewed collectively and common interests and responsibilities 
could better be defined.
After this had been carried out over a year or longer, 
then the advisability of holding a general conference could be 
raised. In the interval the Chinese Communists could have been 
isolated by confronting them with a more united movement possess­
ing a better defined general policy line for use in common as 
well as a better understanding of the tasks to be faced in each 
sector. With this much having been accomplished the idea of 
holding an international conference could have been given up if 
this seemed necessary to avoid a formal split.
Togliatti regretted that this line had not in fact 
been followed by the Soviets: Chinese attacks had instead been
answered in kind "with ideological and propagandist!c polemics"
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and these results of this he judged as being "none too good."
If, instead of countering Chinese attacks with more attacks, 
more time was spent on developing and applying actual positions 
of policy, the Chinese could have been answered with facts and 
not words. Defeat of Chinese positions could most effectively 
be accomplished by concrete political initiatives. For example, 
the universal welcome reserved for the signing of the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty revealed world-wide approval of the Soviet 
doctrine of "peaceful coexistence."
This type of action would be of great value to communist 
movements in other countries also. If Western communist par­
ties and representatives of communist and progressive movements 
from the "Third World" were to meet to elaborate a concrete 
policy regarding the cooperation and forms of aid which the 
former might extend to the latter this too would be to answer 
words with actions. During internal debates in the PCI, Tog­
liatti noted this strategy had always rendered Chinese positions 
"completely indefensible and powerless" because the greatest 
success occurred when the shift was made from "general questions 
(the character of Imperialism and of the State, of the motive 
forces behind revolution etc.) to concrete policies currently 
being followed (the struggle with the government, criticism of 
the Socialist Party, unity of the labour unions, strikes etc.).
The gist of the entire matter, Togliatti argued, was 
that in continuing the struggle against the Chinese theses,
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even if a conference were in fact to be convened, political 
initiatives which could contribute to defeat of Chinese posi­
tions should never be abandoned and such initiatives could 
most easily arise out of discussions among various sectors of 
the world movement concerning their mutual and particular pro­
blems. From these considerations, Togliatti moved to considera­
tions about the international situation in general which he 
viewed "with some pessimism" since the problems facing inter­
national communist movements existed within the larger context.
The American presidential campaigns were disturbing, 
not just because one candidate (Goldwater) included "war as a 
part of his programme" and "talks like a Fascist," but because 
the latter*s offensive "was pushing the American political 
front further to the Right" and was strengthening the tendency 
to regard greater aggressiveness in the international sphere 
"as an escape from domestic crises" of which "the race conflicts 
between Negroes and Vifhites was but an element" and as "a basis 
for an understanding with reactionary elements in Western Europe." 
This made the world situation quite dangerous. In Western 
Europe the monopolistic concentrations "of which the Common 
Market was the Instrument" was being "accelerated by American 
competition" and this formed the basis for increasingly reactionary 
policies of authoritarian regimes which intended "to prevent 
any advances of the working class." In the international sphere 
this rivalry was resulting in deep conflicts of which the crisis
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in NATO was one expression.
Such contradictions might be exploited but there was 
no cause for any great optimism since ”all these groups tend to 
greater or less degree...to engage in neo-colonialism and impede 
the economic and political advancement of newly liberated Afri­
can states,” The crisis over Vietnam was revealing how ”we 
could suddenly find ourselves facing...dangers in vrtiich all 
communist and working class movements in Europe and the entire 
world will have to commit themselves to the hilt.”
All of this had to be realised when dealing with the
Chinese:
The unity of all socialist forces, regardless of ideologi­
cal differences, joined in a common effort against reac­
tionary imperialism is an urgent necessity. We cannot 
imagine that China and the Chinese Communists could possibly 
be excluded from this unity. VJe must, from now on there­
fore not place obstacles in the way of this objective but 
rather make it easier. Let us not break off our polemics 
by any means, but let us always keep as their point of 
departure the evidence based upon today*3 realities that 
the unity of the entire working class and the communist 
movement is necessary and can be achieved.16
Concerning communist movements in Western countries 
Togliatti declared that they should not be depicted in an overly 
optimistic light. Even if in a few specific countries, such as 
Italy or France, progress was being made, communist forces fre­
quently were ”not up to the tasks which they must face” and
16. Togliatti, Fromemoria Pi Yalta (Roma: 1964) p. 10
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instead of having an effective influence on the life of their 
countries parties were reduced to carrying on propagandists 
types of activity. It was urgent to overcome this by forcing 
Communists out of their relative isolation and to insert them­
selves actively in the political system by becoming effective 
mass movements. This being the case the consequences of a 
split in the international movement were to be feared: a split
In the international movement would inevitably result in splits 
within national movements. All parties, especially the ones 
with weak bases, would then be forced to dedicate a great part 
of their energy and already limited resources to carrying on 
internal polemics with pro-Chinese factions. "This would cause 
much discouragement among the masses and would place great 
obstacles in the way of the development of our movement."
Objectively, the conditions for the advancement of 
the communist movement among the masses and in public life in 
general did exist but it was necessary to know how to exploit 
the conditions; to have enough courage to overcome political 
dogmatism; to be able to face new problems in new ways using 
methods which were suitableto the political and social environ­
ment in which rapid and continuous transformations were taking 
place.
This was particularly valid for the situation in which 
the PCI had to operate and which was valid for most Western 
European parties; a situation resulting from the problems of
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capitalist economic development which the ruling classes were 
unable to deal vrith using traditional methods. The bigger 
countries particularly were faced with problems of centraliza­
tion of economic management and attempts were being made to 
solve them through economic programming made, in the interests 
of big monopolies, from above, through state intervention.
"This issue is the order of the day throughout the West and 
now there is talk about international programming...by leading 
bodies of the Common Market."
Such were some of the new problems which the working
classes had to learn to deal with in new ways. "We have to
fight in these areas also" and there were concrete ways of
doing so. It required that the immediate claims of the working
classes be combined with proposals for reforms in the economic
structure (such as agrarian reforms, nationalizations etc.)
placed within a general plan for economic development designed
as an alternative to capitalist programming. This would not be
socialist planning but it would he a net* form and a new means
of struggle making progress towards Socialism. The possibility
of maki"g successful advances in this direction depended
greatly on how the whole problem is posed then solved:
Political initiative in this direction could make it easier 
for us to achieve greater influence over the broad sectors 
of the population which have not yet taken the path of 
socialism but are looking for new possibilities.17
17. op. cit. p. 13
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The fight for democracy, in this context, comes to assume a 
greater concreteness which is tied to the reality of economic 
life because "capitalist programming has in fact always been 
tied to anti-democratic and authoritarian tendencies," against 
which a democratic procedure in the management of economic 
life must be adopted.
But, besides all of these areas of endeavour open to
the communist movements there are others of great importance
where Communists must operate with greater courage especially
by abandoning old formulae which are not related to today1s
conditions. This is particularly true with regard to relations
with people of religious conviction:
In the Catholic world both within organizations and among 
the masses there was a clear shift to the Left at the time 
of Pope John, Today a countershift to the Right has taken 
place at the centre (of Catholicism). But at the lower 
levels the pressures for a shift to the Left remain strong 
and this we must realize and encourage. For this purpose 
the old atheistic propaganda is useless. The very problem 
of the religious conscience, of its content of its roots 
in the masses and of the way it must be overcome must be 
posed in a different manner than the past if we wish to 
:each the Catholic masses and be understood by them. 
Otherwise our "outstretched hand" will be taken to be an 
expediency and almost as a bit of hypocrisy.
The problem of relations with the Catholics was related 
to another, that of relations with the world of culture. There, 
opportunities for the penetration of communist influence still
16. op. cit. p. 15
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remained largely open if Communists became the real champions
of freedom in intellectual life, of artistic expression and of
scientific progress. This required the understanding on the
part of Communists that those in the intellectual world who
see things differently are not enemies or enemy agents.
Mutual understanding reached by continuous discussion 
adds to our authority and prestige and at the same time 
helps us to expose our real enemies, the pseudothinkers, 
charlatans in art, etc. In this area much help could 
come to us--which is not always the case— from those 
countries where wo already direct public life,19
The point of departuro for all of those considera­
tions remained the resolutions of the Twentieth Congress but 
the latter needed to be developed and deepened:
For example, deeper reflection on the issue concerning the 
possibility for the peaceful transition to socialism leads 
us to clarify what we mean by democracy in a bourgeois 
state, how the limitation of freedoms and democratic 
institutions should be broadened and what the best forms 
for participation by the working masses in economic and 
political life would be within the framework of a state 
whose bourgeois nature has not change and hence whether a 
struggle aimed at gradually transofrming this nature from 
within is possible. In countries where the coDimunist 
movement is already strong such as our own (and in France) 
this is the central issue’of our political struggle.,.My 
own view is that in line with present day developments 
and general prospects (for the advancement and victory of 
socialism in the whole world) the concrete forms and condi­
tions for advance and victory of socialism will today and 
in the immediate future be very different from what they 
have been in the past. At the same time the differences 
between ono country and another will remain great. For 
this reason every party must know how to operate in an 
independent manner. The autonomy of parties, of which we 
are most vigorous advocates, is not only an internal 
necessity of our movement but is essential for our progress
19. op. cit. p. 16
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under present conditions. v;e would therefore be against 
any proposal to create a centralized international insti­
tution. We are determined champions of unity in our 
movement and in the international labour movement but this 
unity must be realised through a multiplicity of concrete 
policy positions that correspond to the conditions and 
the levels of development of each c o u n t r y .20
Isolation among parties was the opposite danger but 
it must not be prevented by an international communist conference 
adopting rigid formulae for all conditions. These would only 
prove to be impediments to further advance. Let there bo instead 
meetings and exchanges of ideas between parties in order to 
study common problems of politics, economics, philosophy, his­
tory, etc. and let debates among responsible spokesmen of 
socialist governments even occur publicly so that public opinion 
can become interested. This could only add tc the prestige of 
the spokesmen and their governments. Lut; in holding such 
debates, the rudeness and vulgarity displayed by the Albanians 
and Chinese must have no place.
finally, Togliatti wrote with regard to the problems 
faced by the socialist countrios that "it is 'wrong to say that 
everything is always going well in the socialist countries1' when 
in fact "difficulties, contradictions and new problems are always 
coming to light." These should be presented in their true light. 
"The very worst thing is to give the impression that everything 
is always going fine when all of a suddon vre find ourselves 
faces with the need to discuss and explain difficult situations."
20* op. cit. pp. 16-17
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The criticisms of Stalin must not be hidden for they have left
scars which are deep enough already and have made even those
elements who would be closest to the communist parties cynical
about new economic and political achievements:
Besides this there remains unresolved the problem of the 
origins of the cult of Stalin and how it was possible that 
it occurred. No one accepts the explanation of everything 
having risen out of the serious personal defects of Stalin, 
The inclination is to examine what political errors could 
have led to the origins of the cult. This debate is 
occurring among historians and qualified groups within the 
party, '/e are not discouraging it because it tends towards 
a profounder understanding of the revolution and its pro­
blems. Vie do advise prudence vrhen arriving at any conclu­
sions to keep in mind the publishings and researches being 
made in the Soviet Union.
But the problems vrhich arouse the greatest amount of atten­
tion...today in particular is that of the suppression of 
democratic and personal liberties which f.talin carried out. 
Not all the socialist countries present the same picture. 
The general impression is one of slowness and l'esistance 
in the matter of returning to the Leninist norms which used 
to guarantee '-rithin the party and outside of it broad free­
dom for expression and debate in the field of culture, art 
and also in politics. This slowness and resistance is 
difficult for us to explain especially in view of the 
present situation when capitalist encirclement no longer 
exists and economic construction has made tremendous 
advances, \'Ie have always proceeded from the idea that 
Socialism is the system in which the workers enjoy the 
greatest freedom possible and actively participate in an 
organised way in the management of all social life, We 
welcome therefore all the positions of principle and every 
fact which shows us that this is the reality of every 
Socialist country and not just the Soviet Union. On the 
other hand those facts which at times indicate the opposite 
damage the entire movement,21
Finally Togliatti lamented what he called the "mani­
festation of a centrifugal tendency" among socialist countries
21• op. cit. pp. 20-21
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regretting that there was "without doubt a renascent nationalise. 
VJe realize however that national reeling remains a lasting fac­
tor in the working class and socialist movement for a long time 
even after the winning of power." At the end Togliatti again 
urged a greater critical spirit which would lead to better 
understanding and greater unity v/ithin the government. Reminding 
himself that these ideas and others of purely Italian concern 
would have to be elaborated with greater detail verbally, 
Togliatti finished his memorandum.
A few hours later, on a visit to the international 
camp of Young Pioneers at Artek, near Yalta, the Italian 
communist leader was stricken with a cerebral hemorrhage. A 
few days later, after guiding the destinies of the Italian 
Communist Party for forty years, Palmiro Togliatti died.
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In a very real sense, that which has been written up 
to now is but a preface to what could be written on the same 
subject taking the Yalta Memorandum as point of departure 
instead of point of arrival. If Togliatti wrote what became 
his "political testament" it was probated by his successors in 
the PCI.
When Togliatti1s funeral bier was carried In pro­
cession through the streets of Rome over a million Italians
followed it to the cemetery gates and "the depth of their grief 
*]
was striking.,tA At the height of the emotional exequies the
new secretary of the PCI, Luigi Longo addressed the mass of
mourners and it was then that the existence of the Togliatti
commentary became known to the public. Later the text itself
appeared in the pages of Rinascita and was ready not only by
the fascinated Italian public but in international communist
circles where Togliatti "was regarded with an admiration*3
approaching reverence.”2
Our enemies, Longo later wrote, ...found themselves in a 
difficult position on seeing the collapse of their anti­
communist propaganda" because "the frankness of the Memor­
andum caused consternation among those who accuse us of 
not being able to call a spade a spade while the interna­
tionalist spirit permeating it embarrassed those who think 
that the autonomy of the Communist parties implies a break 
with the international Communist movement and rejection of 
proletarian int emationalism. 3
1* ..Claire Sterling "The Torturous May of Palmiro Togliatti", The 
Reporter. Vol. 31, Wo. 5 (Sept. 24, 1964) pp. 33-37
2, Ibid.
3. Luigi Longo "The Italian Communist Party and Problems of the 
International Communist Movement, World Marxist Review.
Vol. VII, Mo, 11. (Nov. 1964) pp. 3-11
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Calling a spade a spade did not help very much in pre­
venting any further aggravation of the Sino-Soviet dispute but 
perhaps it is significant that the do facto split has never been 
formally acknowledged by either side. What remains most remark­
able about the document is that, in being made public, Togliatti’s 
private rebukes to the Soviet leadership over its policies, 
while being delivered "with respect for the opposition” became 
what has been called, the "Magna Charta of Neo-Marxism.”
For Togliatti’s heirs in ’he PCI and, indeed, for the 
leaders of other national communist movements, especially for 
those in power, the "testament” articulated, once and for all, 
the unspoken feelings of many Communists who, while remaining 
sincere in their convictions, were no longer prepared to accept 
tutelage from outside their own movements because in the past 
this had already "left scars which are deep enough.”
This "declaration of independence” was itself a 
remarkable enough achievement and that it should have come with 
such an eloquent conviction from spokesmen for the Italian 
Communist Party was a fact of great significance} a fact of sig­
nificance but not of surprise. At least the hope is that the 
reader of this paper will not have found it surprising: the
writer has aimed throughout to show how such a development could 
come from the PCI, to show why it should even be expected to 
have come from the heirs of Gramsci and Togliatti.
It is perhaps not incorrect to believe that the Soviet
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leadership itself, or part of it, accepted the accuracy of 
Togliatti*s criticisms. The last Soviet personality with whom 
Togliatti spoke before his death was Leonid Brezhnev. It was 
Brezhnev who accompanied Longo in bringing Togliatti»s coffin 
back to Italy; it was Brezhnev who first learned of the contents 
of the memorandum, and it was Brezhnev who was later to sub­
stitute Nikita Khrushchev as First Secretary of the CPSU when 
the latter submitted to his political defeat at the hands of 
younger men in the Soviet leadership. V/ould it be wrong to 
infer a connection between these circumstances?
Togliatti»s memory remains highly honoured in the 
Soviet Union today. The new Fiat auto works which will double 
automotive production in the USSR when they are finished are to 
be built in the ancient city of Stavropol whose name has been 
changed to "Togliatti." This would not be done if someone were 
being bitterly remembered as a heretic. On the contrary, these 
facts attest to the new maturity which has been reached in the 
relations among communist parties, relations based on tolerant 
respect for diverse opinions which Togliatti urged so forcefully.
In the Italian context also the "testament" left a 
rich bequest one which has not been, is not being, squandered 
by the present leaders of Italian Communism. Since the summer 
of 1964 Italian politics have been undergoing a metamorphosis 
whose rapidity has not made its implications superficial. Com­
mentators are speaking of the "crisis of the PCI" as it has not 
been spoken of since 1956; of the party’s "isolation," of its
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"unsolvable contradictions*" What seems to nourish such judg­
ments is the spectacle of vigorous and unprejudiced debate 
occurring among Italian Communists in public, debates which 
take as their point of departure Togliatti»s specific exhorta­
tions that such events take place ("with respect for either 
side,") "on the basis of objective arguments."
Some of the current objective arguments arise from 
the very character of the political transformations occurring 
in Italy. The principal result of the changes some have dis­
cerned to be an incipient "bi-partism" in Italian politics.
The PSI, minus the Social-Proletarians, has continued the 
evolution begun after 1956. What this seems to mean more than 
anything is the final disappearance of Italian "Kaximalist 
Socialism" into a Social-Democratic oblivion. The PSI and the 
PSDI are on the eve of their reunification, a reunification 
which seems to be taking place under terms most congenial to 
the positions of the PSDI which has over the years tended to 
become an undistinguishable appendage of the Italian political 
Centre still dominated by the DC. At the same time the PSDI 
lost what little rapport it ever had with the v/orking classes. 
Perhaps the PSI will succeed in carrying over its working class 
political base and out of the union will come a party which can 
finally challenge the political power of the DC. The outside 
help of the PCI is admitted to be a reserve power to the PSI-PSDI 
alliance in this confrontation even though the PCI still remains 
"outside the game."
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On the other side of the foreseeable bi-partisan 
realignment will stand the DC and the Liberals who have more or 
less absorbed the support once given to the small Right-wing^ 
parties. Italy too will then have a political system which 
will approximate a balance between two "acceptable" democratic 
alternatives.
Out of this situation is seen to stem the "crisis of 
isolation" facing the PCI. The erosion of its political base 
is seen as an inevitable consequence of the Socialist reunifi­
cation. Y/hether this really does occur can only be seen in 
196S : the results of 1963 would not tend to confirm this in
advance nor xvould the increasing support obtained by the PCI 
in every election since 1946. This is one of the great riddles 
of current Italian politics.
But TogliattiTs heirs particularly the younger ones 
are not sitting on their hands to see what turns up. Abandoning 
the "old formulae which do not correspond to today1s conditions" 
party personalities such as Giorgio Amendola and Pietro Ingrao 
are vigox-ously leading the debates which have excited imagina­
tions within the PCI and outside of its ranks. Both men are 
aware that despite the current power of the PCI and despite the 
slow advances which it has made, Italian politics at the root 
remain characterized by a rather depressing stagnancy.
The problem both men are posing isJiow to make the 
one quarter of the electorate controlled by the PCI mean some­
thing more than just the largest political opposition group.
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The economic crisis which began in 1962 got worse before it 
got better and taught Italians the meaning of a new word which 
they were to hear often: con,"iuntura, meaning a complex of
circumstances leading to economic recession. Yet, despite the 
congiuntura, the centro-sinistra became a going concern and 
Communists were being left out of it.
Togliatti had raised the question of whether the 
advance of socialism were possible inside the framework of a 
bourgeois state. After his death this problem was carried 
further into a deeper examination of the nature of the state 
particularly with regard to Lenin’s interpretation of it as 
contrasted to Engels1 and Gramscifs interpretation.^ Out of 
these scrutinies the Gramscian characterization of the state 
as ’’apparatus of hegemony" took on greater relevance in the 
actual Italian situation than Leninas depiction of it as 
purely a repressive instrument offering no possibility of inter­
nal modification.
Gramsci (and Engels) interpretations suggested rather 
the real possibility of internal mutation through utilization of 
universal suffrage and parliamentary power. Thus, concluded 
both Amendola and Ingrao echoing Togliatti, the question was 
how to find allies for the PCI to collaborate in forming a mass 
bloc which would revolutionize the capitalist bourgeois state
4. Vide Luciano Gruppi "La tesi di Lenin e di Engels sullo stato” 
Rinascita, (Rome) No. >0, (July 25 1964) p.
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not by frontal attacks (as urged by Lenin) but by achieving 
intermediate changes which would foreshadow socialist trans­
formations.
Ingrao and Amendola agree on the problem but not on 
strategy. Ingrao thinks in broader philosophical terms 01 a 
massive realignment of Italian politics which would result in 
the creation of a substantially new Left based upon an ideologi­
cal understanding between the Catholic Left and the Communists.
In this effort both the DC Left and the PCI would 
have to subject themselves to critical self-examination. For 
the DC Left it would mean to follow its socialistic inclinations 
to their logical conclusions; that is, to oreak away from the 
party whose leadership has frustrated and sabotaged efforts to 
achieve social reform by exploiting the bogey of a totalitarian, 
atheistic, communist threat to Catholic survival. Now, the 
PCI, through its own self-examination has reduced the latter to 
a ludicrous piece of prejudiced propaganda. The dialogue with 
the Catholics has become an irreversible fact of Italian cul­
tural life and a book II dialogo alia prova (Dialogue put to 
the Test), in which ten Catholic and Communist intellectuals 
each contributed a chapter in a collective discussion about 
possible understanding between both groups, was testimony to 
the commitment to follow through the tendency to its ultimate 
degree wherever it led. If this could convince the Catholic 
Left to break off from the DC and form a new "hegemonic bloc"
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with the PCI the rest of the Italian Left would have cc adhere. 
The future of Italian politics would be revolutionary.
For Amendola, Ingrao*s abstract goals and the method 
of attaining them, by placing the political nature of the PCI 
in an amorphous ideological paranthesis while undertaking its 
own ideological self criticism would be both a danger to the 
integrity of the party and would not guarantee the successful 
attainment of the proposed entente with the Catholic Left. 
(\mendola*s strategy is another; more pragmatic but no less 
radical. The solution Amendola proposes is based on the con­
crete political realities of the country. Considering that 
those parties who more or less constitute the Italian Left 
(excluding the DCfs Left wing) command 4b£/; of the popular vote 
(based on the results of the November 1964 administrative elec­
tions) Amendola speaks in terms of forming "a new party" of the 
Left. But the implications of his proposals are truly startling:
Today the exigencies for a single party of the Italian 
working class are b o m  out of a critical awareness; neither 
one of the two solutions presented to the working class 
in the capitalist countries of Western Europe during the 
last fifty years, the social-democratic solution and the 
communist solution, has shown itself up to now as being 
valid for the goal of achieving a socialist transformation 
of society., or a change in the system. If we do not pro­
ceed from this admission which is critical and self-critical 
at the same time we will not be able to understand the 
pressing need for a radical change which will permit the 
overcoming of the causes which for fifty years have pre­
vented the working class movement of advanced capitalist 
countries from giving its determining contribution to the 
advance of socialism in the world.5
5. Giorgio Amendola, ,fIpotesi sulla riuniflcazione" Rinascita 
(23 November, 1964) p. £>
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The reasons for this are historical and arose from 
particular conditions. The problem today is to see if nev/ con­
ditions have been created which would permit 3a different grouping 
of the forces of the working class, and, in Italy, a new reor­
ganization of the political array on the Left.” When Amendola*s 
declarations were published a minor earthquake occurred in 
Italian political life. A month earlier, the London Economist 
had written, with regard to the Italian Communist party, that 
"the Italians are banking on becoming a successful mass radical 
party at the risk of losing their communist character."6 
Amendola showed just how great a risk he was willing to take.
Since the Eleventh Congress of the PCI, held in January 
of this year, Atnendola*s theses have prevailed over Ingrao*s, 
although Longo himself devoted a great part of his address to 
the Congress to invite the Catholics to extend the dialogue 
which had already been initiated to ever wider areas. In this, 
the PCI itself was prepared "to risk losing" its colonist 
character. But to risk and to lose are not the same thing: what
Amendola is proposing is a pragmatic agreement among parties of 
the Italian Left as they are already constituted.
What he is urging is an abandonment of the old partisan 
prejudices ivhich in the past nullified the political efforts of 
both the communists and social democratic movements which instead
C. The Economist - Foreign Report No. B76 (Sept. 10, 1964) pp. 1-4
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achieved their greatest success in splitting the uniiiy of the 
European working class. There was 110 reason why these parties 
could not now join together, on pragmatic "bases, to collaborate, 
according to their own particular tendencies or inclinations, 
to build a mutually desired society which would embody shared 
principles of economic and social justice. If it were desired, 
Longo was to declare, the PCI would even be willing to change 
its name.
What should be made of all this? Is it all mere 
expedience to win power at any price, to seduce the opposition 
by dazzling feats of ideological contortion? This is not the 
opinion of the writer. He prefers to interpret current day 
Italian Communist politics as the muturest articulation ox a 
political line that can be -eracod back to L*Ordine Muovo, a 
line which has been leading to an unchanging goal, that of 
realizing in Italy a society based on economic, social, poli­
tical and cultural justice among men.
The Italian Communist Party has pursued its self- 
imposed goal with a tenacity unmatched by any other Italian party 
including the PSI and has paid with great sacrifices the price 
of perpetuating its struggle, at times against overwhelming odds. 
In its political and ideological history, the PCI had, from its 
inception, possessed an intellectual vigour which was never 
completely extinguished not even when the exigencies of a hos­
tile environment demanded that it be subordinated to a greater
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need for political solidarity with the movement which incarnated 
the hopes of Communists everywhere. It did not succumb to the 
shackles of a twenty-year prison sentence,
From the time the PCI emerged from its clandestine 
existence after the end of the Second World War, the party 
gave the greatest articulation to the aspirations of the 
Italian masses and the latter remained attached to "their” 
movement despite the onslaughts directed against it from every 
direction, Much of the confusion of modern Italian politics 
can be better understood if in the background one looks for the 
consistent efforts on the part of the anxious powers who govern 
to stave off the communist advance by any means available, 
violence notwithstanding, The best that was ever achieved was 
the political stalemate which exponents of the PCI have untir­
ingly been seeking to break.
It is this writer’s opinion that the PCI cannot be 
prevented much longer from claiming its share of public power 
which mass support has made legitimate. Even an "opening to 
the Left,” if it excludes the communist Left, will not reduce 
the pressure of public demands for greater justice in Italian 
society unless the claims elaborated by the PCI are satisfied. 
And if these claims are satisfied the "opening to the Left" 
will have included the communist Left even without the PCI,
It is the writer’s thesis that the Italian Communist 
Party has revealed itself to be eminently qualified to share
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in the governing of Italy, qualified politically, intellectually, 
ideologically and historically. The PCI does not seek to 
impose totalitarian rule on Italian society but seeks to exer­
cise its rightful role in shaping the destiny of the Italian 
people. It is hoped that the justification for this thesis 
has been demonstrated in this paper. With this hope, the reader 
is invited to share it.
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Some of the key articles in the constitution were:
Article 3 ...It is the task of the Republic to remove the
obstacles of an economic and social order which, limiting in 
fact the liberty and equality of citizens, prevent the full 
development of the human personality and the effective parti­
cipation by all workers in the political, economic and social 
organization of the country.
Article 39 The organization of trade unions is free...
Article 40 The right to strike is exercised within the
sphere of the laws which regulate it.
Article 41 Private economic initiative is free. This may
not develop in conflict with social utility or in such a manner 
as to cause damage to security to liberty, to human dignity.
The law determines the appropriate programs and 
controls in order that public and private economic activity 
may be directed and coordinated toward social ends.
Article 42 Property is public or private. Economic goods 
belong to the state, to organized groups, or to individuals.
Private property is recognized and guaranteed 
by law, which determines the methods of its acquisition and 
enjoyment and the limitations designed to assure its social 
functioning and render it accessible to all.
279
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In cases prescribed by law, and on the basis of 
compensation private property may be expropriated for reasons 
of general interest.
Article 43 For the purpose of general utility the law may
originally reserve or may transfer, by means of expropriation
and with indemnity, to the state, to public bodies, or to 
communities of workers or of utilizers, specified enterprises 
or categories of enterprises which relate to essential public 
services or to sources of energy or to situations of monopoly 
and which have a character of pre-eminent general interest.
Article 44 For the purpose of securing a rational exploita­
tion of the soil and of establishing just social relationships, 
the law imposes obligations and restrictions on private property 
in land; it fixes limits to its extension according to the 
region and agrarian zone it promotes and requires reclamation, 
the transformation of latifundia, and the reconstitution of 
productive units; it aids the small and medium scale proprietor...
Article A 5 The Republic recognizes the social function of
cooperation conducted on the basis of mutuality and without 
purposes of speculation for private gain. The lav; promotes and 
favours its extension by suitable means and assures its character 
and permanence subject to appropriate controls...
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Article U& With a view to the economic and social advance­
ment of labour and in harmony with the requirements of produc­
tion the Republic recognizes the rights of workers to 
collaborate in ways and within limits established by the law 
in the management of business enterprises.
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The constitution also contains an article> number
seven, which is probably the roost controversial of the entire 
document. The position which the PCI adopted regarding its 
insertion brought down upon it a barrage of criticism and 
accusations of expedient hypocrisy by shocked anti-clericals 
and other "lay parties.”
Article 7 reads:
"The State and Catholic Church are, each in its own 
order independent and sovereign.
Their relationships are regulated by the Lateran 
Pacts. Modification of the Pacts which have been accepted by 
the two parties do not require the procedure of constitutional 
amendment.”
Although the Constitution adds in Article Eight that all reli­
gious confessions are "equally free before the law” the very 
nature of the Lateran Pacts act as a substantial negation of 
Article Eight. The Catholic Church under the terms of the 
Lateran agreements is quite unquestionably given a position of 
privilege for Article One of the Pact declares Roman Catholicism 
to be "the sole religion of the state." The Church is given 
special rights to teach religion in state high schools as well 
as to run its own private schools. Furthermore, Italian laiv 
concerning marriage and divorce was to conform to canon lav/.
The latter was particularly offensive to non-Catholic religious
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
minorities who were placed in an inferior status since their 
desire to dissolve a marriage was regulated by the religious 
court of a Church to which they did not belong. Finally, the 
Pope and Princes of the Church were given special privileges 
in Italy which amount to rights of censorship since numerous 
works of arts and letters can be sequestered on charges of 
contempt for the state religion or "defamation" of the person 
of the Pontiff.
The PCI rationalized its vote for retention of the Lateran 
Pacts as a gesture of good will towards the Catholics with whom 
Communists sought to collaborate and to whom they wished to show 
their lack of anti-clerical prejudice. Be that as it may, 
Article Seven of the Italian republican constitution has time 
and again been cited as justification for censorship in the 
arts and letters and caused more than one Communist to be 
brought to court on charges of "defamation" of the papacy or 
"contempt for the state religion."
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